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NOTE ON SPELLING
AND NAMES
In editing this volume, I have followed, for the most part, modern Turkish spelling,
as it renders correctly the pronunciation of Turkish and Kurdish names, thus
making the proper names and place names more understandable not only to the
Turkish speaker but also to the English speaker and reader. In modern Turkish, the
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in sit in English. There is also an undotted i in Turkish, which sounds like the u in
stadium. The letters f and s are similar to the ch in church and the sh in should. The
c is pronounced like they in John. Turkish also has a letter g, which has the effect
of lengthening the preceding vowel and sometimes obviates the need to pronounce
the following consonants, as in aga (large landowner). The one exception to this
scheme is in chapter 3, which deals with Iraqi Kurdistan where Kurdish names and
places have an Arabic transliteration.
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INTRODUCTION
Thi:lis is the first book of which I am aware, in any language, to deal exclu-
sively with the impact of the Kurdish nationalist movement on Turkey and the
Middle East during the 1990s. As the contributors to this volume make clear, this
is a period when the Kurdish nationalist movement has mounted its biggest chal-
lenge to the Turkish state in the twentieth century. In the aftermath of the Gulf
war, the challenge escalated to new dimensions. Other than Michael Gunter's The
Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (1990), no full-length scholarly monographs
or books have been devoted exclusively to the Kurdish nationalist movement in
Turkey during the 1990s. David McDowall, in his recent A History of the Kurds
(1996), devotes two chapters to the Kurds in Turkey, but they are embedded in the
larger history. The volume presented here is the first treatment to attempt to cover
comprehensively the domestic, foreign, economic, political and judicial challenges
facing Turkey from the growth and spread of the Kurdish nationalist movement.
The Gulf war in 1991 gave substantial impetus to the Kurdish nationalist move-
ment throughout the Middle East, as the contributors make clear. But this volume
focuses on Turkey. Because of its pro-West orientation since it joined NATO in
1952 and its geopolitic and geostrategic alliance with the West since then, less at-
tention has been paid in the West, especially in the United States, to the history
and politics of Turkey. It seems that government and academic circles think it best
not to draw attention to some of Turkey's unpleasant politics and policies. Chief
among these are Turkey's policies to control, constrain and eliminate the Kurdish
nationalist movement wherever it rears its head. Turkey has pursued this policy
since the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925.
If the Kurdish nationalist movement was the sore thumb of the Turkish re-
public after its creation in 1923, it became the Achilles heel of the Turkish state
in the 1980s and 1990s. Led by the Kurdistan Workers' Party, known under its
Kurdish acronym, PKK, the Kurdish nationalist movement challenges the very
structure of the state and its legitimizing Kemalist ideology. The nature of this
multifaceted challenge is the topic of this volume.
Gulistan Giirbey starts off the discussion by analyzing the challenge posed
to the Turkish state by the growth of the Kurdish nationalist movement in the
1980s and 1990s and the array of political, judicial, constitutional and ideological
constructs and the military and police power with which the Turkish state sought
to control, constrain and eliminate Kurdish nationalism. She notes that by the
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1990s the Kurdish challenge had become so great that even established political
parties, most of which included Kurdish members, began to officially proffer "so-
lutions" to the "Kurdish problem," as Kurdish nationalism is euphemistically called
in Turkey. Although, as other contributors note, Turkey's president Turgut Ozal
(who died on 17 April 1993) may well have had unstated motives for encouraging
political parties to "recognize" the Kurdish movement in Turkey. Ozal, and certain
government circles, may have wanted to take advantage of the Gulf war and may
have thought that the U.S.-led allied forces would encourage Turkey to invade
northern Iraq and thus legitimize Turkey's occupation of part of northern Iraq.
Official recognition of the Kurdish minority in Turkey would provide Ankara with
the moral cover it needed to incorporate portions of northern Iraq under Turkish
political jurisdiction. Giirbey draws our attention to the conjuncture between
Turkey's response to the Kurdish challenge within Turkey itself and its wider
geopolitic and geostrategic concerns in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Cauca-
sus and Central Asia in the post-Soviet period. She contends that a potential
breakthrough between the state and the PKK could occur if genuine representa-
tives of the Kurdish nationalists and political parties were allowed to exit. But as
Hamit Bozarslan points out, such a dialogue has not yet been allowed to be es-
tablished. The Democracy Party or DEP, a political party representing Kurdish
interests in the 1990s, became the main target of the army, the political establish-
ment and the media because none of them could tolerate an independent Kurdish
representation. Given the Turkish state's lack of response to Kurdish demands for
genuine political representation, Giirbey hopes that an earnest dialogue can be es-
tablished with the mediation of a array of international organizations.
Aram Nigogosian takes Giirbey's arguments further by focusing on the PKK
itself, the most militant Kurdish response to the Turkish state and the most effec-
tive in internationalizing the nationalist cause of the Kurds. He notes the great
number of armed, security, police and intelligence forces deployed against the PKK
and the scorched earth and ethnic cleansing policies that Turkey has pursued in its
attempts to eradicate the PKK presence in eastern and southeastern Turkey. Ni-
gogosian is pessimistic about a peaceful resolution, but he sees the possibility for
increased dialogue, as there are circles in Turkey, especially wealthy businessmen,
who think that a political resolution of the conflict is the only way to negotiate dif-
ferences.
The miscalculations of the late president Ozal are ably demonstrated by
Michael Gunter. Rather than Turkey receiving international legitimacy for its
occupation of portions of northern Iraq as part of the allied war effort, Ankara
has been compelled to make several large incursions into northern Iraq since the
end of the Gulf war in order to root out PKK bases. The greater irony, at least for
Ankara, was that in August 1995 the PKK decided that it was in its best interest
to attack the forces of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), one of the two
leading Kurdish nationalist organizations in Iraqi Kurdistan, which had developed
increasingly closer relations with Turkey since the end of the Gulf war. The PKK
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attack on the KDP threw a monkey wrench into the policies Turkey had pursued
to contain the Kurdish nationalist movement in the aftermath of the war. The
PKK attempt to become an accepted player in the Kurdish politics of Iraqi Kur-
distan was squarely contrary to the Turkish government's attempts to contain the
challenge of the PKK within Turkey. The PKK decision to attack the KDP is one
of the most unexpected developments of the Gulf war.
Indeed, as Henri Barkey demonstrates convincingly, the consequences of
the Gulf war and the subsequent escalation of the activities of the Kurdish na-
tionalist movement both in Iraq and in Europe, have put Turkish domestic and
foreign policies literally "under the gun." Barkey depicts lucidly the debilita-
ting political, economic—but primarily diplomatic and foreign—policy effects on
the demands of Turkey to constrain Kurdish nationalism. In spite of continued
U.S. and European support for Turkey against the PKK, the relationship is
troubled by the different positions of Ankara and Washington toward northern
Iraq. Ankara thinks, "the entity in northern Iraq is acquiring attributes that
can potentially influence Kurds living in Turkey." U.S. policy contributes, espe-
cially through the activities of Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), to the Kurd-
ish nationalist movement in northern Iraq, aiding its attempts to acquire those
very attributes. That is the rub. Ironically, Syria and Iran, both with large Kurd-
ish populations of their own, cooperate with Turkey to prevent the develop-
ment of an independent state in northern Iraq. The differing positions of the
U.S. and Turkey toward northern Iraq represent a classic clash between the in-
terests of a middle-level power and its major patron. Barkey concludes that, as
another unexpected consequence of the Gulf war, Ankara has transformed the
Kurdish issue into its greatest vulnerability and has been "imprisoned in a cage of
its own making."
Robert Olson, in his contribution, emphasizes some of the points made by
Barkey and dwells particularly on the Kurdish question and its role in Turkey's for-
eign policy with Syria, Iraq, Iran and Russia. Since other contributors discuss
specific aspects of Turkey's relations with Iraq and Syria, it is interesting to note
that the Kurdish question is also one of the factors, perhaps the major one, that
compels cooperative relations between Ankara and Tehran. As Olson makes clear,
the main reason for this steady cooperation is fear of the geopolitic and geostrate-
gic consequences if the entity in northern Iraq acquires more attributes of an
independent state. The relations between Turkey and its southern neighbors
demonstrate that Turkey is fortunate that all three of its southern neighbors—
Syria, Iraq and Iran—have large Kurdish populations. If they did not, they would
undoubtedly use the "Kurdish card" more effectively against Turkey, which is ex-
actly what Russia has done to prevent greater Turkish support for the Chechens
in their war against Russia. Moscow, Olson shows, has made it clear that any sub-
stantial Turkish support for the Chechens would led to more substantive Russian
support for the Kurdish nationalist movement, especially the Kurdistan parliament
in exile (KPE).
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Philip Robins offers a nuanced explanation of the degree to which the Kurd-
ish issue affects European-Turkish relations. He suggests that despite the loud
denunciations of some European countries and political organizations, especially
the European Parliament, of Turkish human rights violations against the Kurds,
the Kurdish issue as a factor in Euro-Turkish relations is "more apparent than real."
He divides the Europeans into small players and big players. The small players,
who generally have fewer economic relations with Turkey, emphasize human rights
violations while the big players—United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy—tend
not to let human rights or the Kurdish issue in its wider application interfere with
increasing economic ties between them and Turkey. This policy was confirmed by
the European Union's overwhelming vote—343 for, 149 against and 36 absten-
tions—on 13 December 1995 to accept Turkey as a full member into the European
Customs Union.
In a brilliant contribution, Hamit Bozarslan provides an assessment of the
contradictions of the mechanisms, instruments and ideologies the Turkish state
has utilized to eliminate, constrain and channel the challenge of Kurdish nation-
alism movement to the Kemalist state or, as Bozarslan has it, the Gokalpian state.
He traces the ideological origins of these contradictions while indicating the flexi-
bility within the contradictions. Among other actors, including political Islam and
Alevism, Bozarslan states that Kurdish nationalism has contributed to the frag-
mentation of the Gokalpian construct and notes that Kurds have been important
political players in Turkey's political space since the 1920s and have asserted them-
selves, with the exceptions of the coup d'etat periods. He stresses, however, that
the impact of increased Kurdish nationalism from the 1970s onward changed the
patterns of negotiations between the state, the political parties (whether they were
conservative or social-democratic) and the Kurds. The lack of success of these ne-
gotiations led to a further weakening of the political parties with the exception of
the islamist Welfare Party (WP).
Bozarslan draws attention to the relative success of the WP to attract Kurd-
ish votes as compared to other parties. This became clearer as the WP emerged as
Turkey's largest political force in the Parliamentary elections held on 24 December
1995, in which it won 21.3 percent of the vote. Its leading rival, the Motherland
Party (MP), received 19.6 percent and the incumbent party, the True Path Party
(TPP), got 19.1 percent. Bozarslan suggests several reasons for the WP's success:
(1) it has no historical legacy in the Kurdish areas; (2) of all the political parties it
is most in disfavor with the army; (3) it profited from the banishment of the Kurd-
ish oriented Peoples Labor Party (PLP or HEP) and the Democracy Party (DP
or DEP) in the 1990s; (4) its islamist discourse stresses Muslim solidarity between
Kurds and Turks; (5) it supports the supra-ethnic Muslim Brotherhoods (tarikats),
which played an important role in the Kurdish nationalist movements in the 1920s
and 1930s; (5) locally the WP is Kurdified; (6) the WP is the only political party
using an anti-Kemalist discourse; and (7) the WP is perceived by some Kurds as
being more autonomous from the state than other political parties. As a result of
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the suppression of other genuine Kurdish representation, the WP continues to
gather support from the Kurdish people. Bozarslan also notes that the appeal of
HEP and DEP was limited by the competition of the PKK in the 1990s. In con-
clusion, he argues that only a victory by the WP and a continuation of its sustained
challenge to Kemalist discourse "seems to be able to change the situation." The
Turkish state can assure its durability, but one of the conditions for doing so is to
enlarge the Kurdish electoral base. Bozarslan makes it clear that it is the Kurdish
constituency of the WP as much as its islamist center and anti-Kemalist discourse
that makes it open to attack by the media, the army and right wing parties such as
the TTP, ANAP and NAP.
In a co-authored piece, Robert Olson and Yiicel Bozdaglioglu take the
political fragmentation so ably described by Hamit Bozarslan and demonstrate
that the challenge of Kurdish nationalism has been one of the major factors in the
creation of a new political party in Turkey, the New Democracy Movement
(NDM). They argue that the main appeal of the NDM is its open, official and
public acknowledgement of the "Kurdish problem." The NDM was the first
Turkish-dominated political party to place the Kurdish problem on the top of its
agenda. But as Olson and Bozdaglioglu stress, the NDM in no way advocates
political autonomy or exclusive political rights for the Kurds. Their Kurdish pro-
gram boils down to offering cultural and linguistic rights to the Kurds. It is not
even clear to what extent they support language rights, for example, the right of
the Kurds to create a university in which the Kurdish language would be the
medium of instruction.
The NDM planned to carry out its Kurdish agenda while pursuing a neo-
liberal capitalistic economic program: a program that necessarily would have
adversely impacted the Kurds. The NDP hopes that the Kurds perceive the de-
centralization aspects of its program to be in their ethnic interest. The two authors
are pessimistic as to the potential appeal of the NDM to a Kurdish constituency.
This pessimism seems to be vindicated by the poor showing of the NDM in the
24 December 1995 parliamentary elections, in which the NDM received only
135,000 votes—less than 1 percent of the total vote. In the heavily populated
Kurdish provinces, the NDM received more than 2 percent of the vote in only the
provinces of $irnak (4.41) and Van (2.67). It received more than 1 percent of the
vote in Bitlis (1.83); Bingol (1.06); Agn (1.05); Diyarbakir (1.59); Mus (1.12) and
Siirt (1.30).
In the concluding chapter Mark Muller provides a useful detailed descrip-
tion of how the Turkish state utilized the instruments of the law—-constitutional,
criminal, civil—based exclusively on a defined concept of Turkish nationalism,
to eliminate Kurdish political activism and participation during the 1990s. In
the end, the suppression of Kurdish nationalism had to meet the twin lethality of
the armed forces and the coercive power of the legal system of the state. Muller
draws parallels between the militarization of the conflict with the Kurds and the
militarization of the Turkish legal structure, especially the introduction of com-
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prehensive and broadly defined anti-terror laws, such as the notorious Article 8
introduced in 1991. He states that the Turkish anti-Kurdish legal structure con-
tradicts the European Convention governing the establishment of fair trials and
notes that much of the harassment of the Kurdish nationalists was outside of the
official legal structure: dismissal from employment, stalking and even assassina-
tion, and in the case of political parties, banishment. Muller concludes that not
only have the repressive legal measures led to the unlikelihood of meaningful po-
litical negotiations between the state, its representatives and the Kurds, but also
have contributed to a static state political structure more and more immune to
change. He ends by calling for an abolition of the legal measures that led to the
elimination of Kurdish representation in the civil society of Turkey. He notes
carefully that Turkey's entry into the European Customs Union will not, by itself,
create the political will to stop the violations of Kurdish human and political
rights. He insists political reform must accompany legal reform.
Together, the essays presented here draw a complex portrait of the the Kurd-
ish nationalist movement in Turkey and the Middle East during the 1990s.
Parti
T H E DEVELOPMENT OF THE
KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
IN TURKEY SINCE THE 1980S

THE KURDISH NATIONALIST
MOVEMENT IN TURKEY SINCE
THE 1980s
Giilistan Giirbey
I? or more than ten years, the "secret" war between the Turkish military and
the militant Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) has affected the civilian population
in the Kurdish regions in southeastern Turkey, subjecting them to severe violations
of human rights. Long-term prison sentences for Kurdish parliamentarians have
put the Kurdish issue into the limelight. When the conflict began to expand not
only to other parts of Turkey but to Europe as well, in particular to Germany,
reaching the Kurds and Turks living there, it finally became apparent that this
conflict is characterized by a dimension that crosses borders and endangers peace.
This chapter deals with the internal and external factors and the causes and effects
of the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The main focus is on the specific characteristics
of the conflict, the various interests of the conflicting parties, the causes of the
conflict, and possible solutions. The following issues are analyzed in detail: Turk-
ish interests, aims and the measures and effects of Turkish policy toward the
Kurds—in particular, the question of whether the domestic situation with its
prevailing interests allows for a peaceful and mutual resolution of the Kurdish
issue; Kurdish interests and forms of advocacy, as well as possibilities and limits
of a legal representation of the Kurds; complications of the various options for
conflict resolution, as proposed by the conflicting parties themselves, and means
to end the conflict through external influence by international organizations to
which Turkey belongs.
POLITICAL AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE TURKISH POLICY
The treatment of the Kurdish issue in Turkey warrants a discussion of the posi-
tion of ethnic minorities in the Turkish legal and constitutional system, as one
important characteristic lies in the inextricable link between the minority issue
in Turkey and the ideological structure of the Turkish legal and constitutional
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system. Thus, one can maintain that the causes of the Kurdish issue must be
sought in the political and legal system of Turkey itself. The rigid political and
legal system, particularly in its current form, has important inadequacies when ex-
amined in the context of Turkey's obligations, especially within the framework of
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Coun-
cil of Europe.1 The restrictive constitutional rules and regulations attempt to
prescribe the means for political and social life in as much detail as possible, thus
hindering pluralization and democratization of society and politics. A strict Turk-
ish centralism and a strict concept of a nation-state in combination with extreme
nationalism are the essential characteristics of Turkish state ideology, referred to
as "Kemalism" after the state's founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. However, the
population structure of Turkey displays a high degree of ethnic, linguistic, and
religious diversity. At least forty-seven distinct population groups can be differen-
tiated.2 Among them, the Kurds are the largest linguistic and ethnic group.
The Kemalist Concept of Nation Versus Ethnic Minorities
The primary internal cause of conflict is the strict application of the Kemalist
concept of nation3 in Turkey, which defines the Turkish nation as a sum of citi-
zens without consideration of ethnic identity and negates in its legal interpretation
the existence and protection of ethnic minorities. Underlying this concept of
nation is the attempt to create, after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, a nationally
and culturally homogenous, unified state on the territory of the Turkish Republic
with the help of a new integrating ideology of Turkish nationalism. Thus, any
type of articulation of cultural difference was and is perceived as a threat to cul-
tural and national unity and is strictly prohibited. On the basis of the Kemalist
definition of the Turkish nation and the resulting principle of equality, any ex-
pression of Kurdish identity is forbidden and persecuted. As members of the
Turkish nation, the Kurds have equal rights in all aspects; however, the right to
care for and develop their ethnicity, culture and language is not included in the
understanding of equality. This policy of assimilation and homogeneity has influ-
enced and continues to influence the forms of Kurdish resistance and is a cause of
the open use of violence. On the whole, the emergence of the militant Kurdistan
Workers' Party, known under its Kurdish acronym, PKK, must be viewed in this
framework.
Moreover, one must consider a second component, which is very important
in the pluralization of society and the process of democratization in Turkey: The
Kemalist concept of nation cannot be viewed as separate from the principle of the
"indivisible unity of a state's people and its territory" and the concept of "national
culture" (Article 3, Turkish constitution 1982).
The principle of the indivisible unity of a state's people and its territory
plays a central role in connection with the issue of protection of minorities. One
wonders whether this principle is already violated when minorities are granted cul-
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tural autonomy or rights to self-administration. Basic rights and liberties can be
restricted to protect this principle, as is consistently reflected within the legal
system in numerous regulations: Article 125 of the criminal code prescribes capital
punishment for those who attempt, with or without violence, to separate portions
of the state's territory from the state union or attempt to pull away from the con-
trol of the central government. Propaganda against the indivisible unity of the
state's people and its territory is subject to penalty under Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law (ATL).4
The ATL is an example of the legal-political dilemma of Turkey—for ex-
ample, on one hand, it desires to relax its criminal code and move closer to the
requirements of a European standard on human rights; on the other hand, it wants
to secure the claim to power of a centralist state and its ideology. This dilemma has
led to an infringement of fundamental civil rights.
Article 8 of the ATL allows for the identification of separatist tendencies in
their nascent stage. Written and oral propaganda as well as meetings and demon-
strations that aim to destroy the indivisible unity of the state's people and its
territory, by whatever ideas, goals or means, are prohibited. The numerous regu-
lations of the ATL contradict the requirements of a democratic society and of
human rights and prevent discussion of the Kurdish issue, as any discussion per se
is in danger of being persecuted as propaganda against the indivisible unity of the
state's people and its territory. Legally operating organizations, the media and per-
sons committed to the Kurdish issue but also the civilian population in the crisis
regions in southeastern Turkey are subjected to violations of human rights and po-
litical persecution. In fact, trials against dissident opinions refer almost exclusively
to pro-Kurdish commitment. At the present time, more than one hundred persons
are imprisoned, predominantly intellectuals, journalists, writers and scientists.
The changes to Article 8 of ATL (27 October 1995)—as a result of strong
European pressure and negotiations leading to the initiation of a Customs Union
between Turkey and the European Union—only apply to a reduction of prison
sentences. The maximum penalty was lowered from five to three years, some prison
sentences were converted to fines and some sentences were replaced with pro-
bation. "Separatist propaganda" still remains punishable under the law.
The concept of minority, as understood by state and international law, is re-
ferred to by Turkish law only in connection with the clause on minorities of the
Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 (Article 37-42).5 It refers only to the non-Muslim
minorities (Greeks, Armenians and Jews). The internationally accepted rights of
minorities, applicable to religious but also ethnic and linguistic minorities in par-
ticular, have not been accepted by Turkey on the grounds of its strict concept of a
nation-state.
The concept of minority exists on a legal level in connection with the pro-
hibition of "creating minority groups" (as, for example, in Article 81 of the Law
on Political Parties). Political parties and associations may not claim the existence
on Turkey's territory of minorities that are distinguished by differences in their
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national or religious culture, confession, ethnicity or language. They may not
pursue the goal of "creating minority groups" on Turkish territory, to avoid dis-
rupting the "integrity of the nation" through the caring for, developing and
propagating of languages and cultures other than Turkish.
The change of constitutional regulations in July 1995 led neither to a relax-
ation of the central elements of state ideology anchored in the constitution nor to
an adjustment of the concept of minority in line with the European standard. The
changes merely allow for a greater political participation of groups, as, for example,
clubs, professional associations and cooperatives, trade unions, university lecturers
and students.
The Role of Civilian and Military Authorities as Decision-Makers
The military assumes a special position in the political system in Turkey, which
can be attributed to several factors. In the Ottoman Empire, a strong army was the
central instrument of state politics. The founder of the republic, Atariirk himself,
was a member of the military. The link between the military and politics today is
characterized in particular by the central role of the military as a "political force of
order." In its role as "keeper and protector" of Kemalist principles, the military has
become an extremely important agent in Turkish politics.6
The sphere of influence of the military in politics is strengthened by means
of constitutional-legal mechanisms. In the so-called "National Security Council,"
the military is given a constitutionally secured position. After the first military in-
tervention of 27 May 1960, this body was incorporated into the constitution of
1961 (Article 11). Thus, the until-then "hidden participation" of the military in
thd implementation of political power became legally fortified.7
The constitution determines two important tasks of the National Security
Council (Article 118, Turkish constitution 1982): on one hand, the protection and
defense of "national security" against internal and external dangers and, on the
other hand, the "definition, determination, and application of a national security
policy," based on the principle of the indivisible unity of a state's people and its
territory according to the Kemalist state doctrine.8 It is essential to note that the
tasks of the National Security Council are very extensive and its limits are not
clearly defined. Within the scope of its tasks are not only national security and de-
fence but regulation of aspects of the entire life of the society. Thus, the concept
of national security has been extended with the help of the formula that protects
"the welfare and security of the community."
The legal expert on constitutional law and former Turkish foreign minister
Miimtaz Soysal draws the following conclusion regarding the function of the Na-
tional Security Council:
Because the National Security Council is a body which is in a better position
to express opinions concerning issues of national security due to its proximity
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to detailed information, it is only natural that the Council of Ministers "gives
preference" to these opinions. The real danger here lies in the fact that
the concept of "national security" is being used in a very broad and all-
encompassing manner—and includes almost all issues which fall under the
responsibility of the government—and because of this broad interpretation,
a new mixed decision-making body is created which is nearly parallel to the
Council of Ministers, but does not carry political responsibility.9
Apart from this, the decisions of the National Security Council, which are to be
"given preference" by the Council of Ministers, have been given a certain political
and moral binding power. The National Security Council, as a "planning and con-
trolling body," plays an active and determining role in the definition and application
of policy aims and measures and is in no way responsible to Parliament.10 There-
fore, the political system of Turkey has two centers of decision-making: the civilian
authority (in the form of the Council of Ministers and Parliament) and the mili-
tary authority (in the form of the National Security Council). The decision-
making process demonstrates an interrelationship of forces that results in an
imbalance of power at the expense of the civilian authority. The existence of the
military authority in the political system impedes and hinders the pluralization,
democratization and development of a civilized society and politics. As the Kurd-
ish issue in the self-definition of Turkish politics and the military is a national
problem—a potential source of danger for the "indivisible unity of the state's
people and its territory"—and Kurdish claims for increased self-realization are
viewed a priori as a "separatist" threat, it is evident that the National Security
Council is the primary decision-maker in the Kurdish issue.
Constants, Fluctuations and Effects of Turkish Policy
The basis for the military option for the treatment of the Kurdish issue had already
been laid in Turkey's founding years. The Kemalist policy of the national state
and attempts to consolidate all ethnic minorities in Turkey into one homogenous
nation led to several Kurdish insurrections. Between 1925 and 1940 there were over
twenty Kurdish uprisings11 in the Kurdish regions in southeastern Turkey, which
were violently suppressed by the Turkish military. At least from that time on, the
use of military power combined with a concurrent suppression and assimilation
policy has been the core of the Turkish policy toward the Kurds. For decades,
the Kurds have been officially declared to be mountain Turks, and the use of the
expressions Kurds, Kurdish, and Kurdistan, as well as the Kurdish language, were
prohibited. For decades, the Kurdish regions have been subjected to emergency
decree, a regionally specific legal system, state military control and, at the same
time, economic neglect.12
The first change in Turkish policy toward the Kurds occurred during the era
of Turgut Ozal (1983-93). This era was generally characterized by a policy of
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structural change with economic and political modernization and a gradual forc-
ing out of the traditionally dominant and established elite from the bureaucracy
and military in favor of the functional elite, predominantly from business circles.
It is only at a later phase during the era of Turgut Ozal that the Kurdish policy
practiced thus far began to change. Although the military-state repression and
control continued, this era saw the introduction of a liberalization in the cultural
sphere, economic development of the predominantly Kurdish-settled regions, and
the attempt to engage the PKK politically. Ozal tried to implement the liberaliza-
tion of the policy toward the Kurds despite severe criticism by the Turkish elite in
politics, the military and government bureaucracy, as well as by a large portion of
the Turkish press and media. Because of changes in world politics and internal and
external pressures on Turkey regarding the Kurdish issue, Turgut Ozal took the
initiative during the Gulf crisis in 1991 and successfully initiated a new policy
toward the Kurds. While his liberal-conservative party, ANAP (Motherland
Party), wavered between the former Kemalist position and a more liberal Kurdish
policy, his was a policy aimed primarily at dialogue. Ozal viewed the Gulf crisis13
as an opportunity to strengthen the political position of Turkey with its NATO
allies in the Middle East, and for this reason he joined the anti-Iraq policy of the
United States, despite the protest of high-ranking army officers and parliamen-
tary opposition forces.
In a meeting of the National Security Council on 25 January 1991,14 Ozal
pointed out the necessity of reform on the Kurdish issue, stressing that after the
Gulf war, Turkey must be prepared for new developments in the region, and thus,
on the Kurdish issue as well. Ozal initiated dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds to gain
insight on the position of parties affected by the Gulf war and on the situation in
Iraq and the Middle East. Again and again, he stressed the position of Turkey,
which desires to prevent the formation of an independent Kurdish state, but did
not intervene against the autonomy of Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time, he de-
manded that the Iraqi Kurds not support the PKK.15
The legalization of the Kurdish language through the repeal of the law pro-
hibiting other languages (1983) on 12 April 1991 was a further important step
toward a new orientation in the Kurdish issue. So far, this had been the most far-
reaching gesture toward the Kurds living in Turkey. While Kurdish was spoken
freely for the first time, a many-voiced debate began on the new orientation in the
Kurdish issue.16 Ozal used this opportunity to democratically engage the Kurds in
their own country and encouraged discussion on new reforms regarding the Kurd-
ish issue by introducing new proposals, thus incurring criticism from different
sectors of society: political, military and the media. For example, he suggested that
the Kurdish language be introduced into the educational system and into TV and
radio broadcasts. On the whole, Ozal gave priority to the political resolution of
the Kurdish issue. He viewed the parliamentarians of the pro-Kurdish Peoples'
Democracy Party (HEP), and later the Democracy Party (DEP), as partners in
dialogue and described such dialogue as an opportunity to end the war with the
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PKK. To this aim, he asked the HEP and later the DEP representatives to influ-
ence the PKK to take steps toward ending the strife. For this purpose, several
representatives held talks with the PKK leader, Abdullah Ocalan; these nego-
tiations in particular later played a role in the stripping of their parliamentary
immunity and sentencing. Ozal was convinced that peace could be achieved only
through negotiations with the PKK and that a cease-fire was essential for the
introduction of specific steps in the peace process. In contrast to the coalition gov-
ernment and the military, he welcomed the unilateral cease-fire declaration of the
PKK in March 1993. He saw it as an opportunity to engage the PKK politically
and to pave the way for a political solution through specific measures, such as,
for example, the granting of amnesty.17 But his sudden death on 17 April 1993
brought the first liberal attempts to change the Kurdish policy to an abrupt halt.
On 21 November 1991, the coalition government of the Social-Democratic
People's Party (SHP) and the conservative True Path Party (DTP) came to power
by making promising declarations of their intent. This government has refused to
recognize the Kurds as an ethnic minority even though they have recognized the
"Kurdish reality." With regard to the issue of protection of minorities, they refer
to the provisions of the constitution and to the fact that all Turkish citizens have
equal rights and responsibilities under the law. Only those groups referred to as mi-
norities by the Lausanne Peace Treaty are recognized as such; however, the Kurds
are not mentioned in the treaty. Regional or cultural autonomy is not viewed as a
solution. Moreover, institutionalization of the rights of minorities would lead to a
division of the Turkish Republic. The coalition government makes intensive use
of the military option, whereby it strongly leans on the military for support. There
is essentially no change in the coalition government's legal view of the Kurdish
issue as a minority issue, even though the government program explicitly mentions
its aim to adjust the Kurdish minority status to the European standards, as well as
to find a peaceful solution.18
The military and police measures that were already in place and practiced
during the era of Turgut Ozal are now being used to their fullest extent by the
coalition government. For example, the enforcement of an emergency decree in
ten Kurdish provinces in southeastern Turkey was intensified.19 Further measures
in the year 1990 led to massive infringements of freedom of the press and on the
guarantee of due legal process. Since that time, less reliable information has ap-
peared in the press concerning developments in the crisis regions. In August 1990,
basic rights in the crisis regions in the southeast were suspended, which was justi-
fied because of threats to national security. The emergency decree was further
intensified by the so-called Censorship and Banishment Decree, which grants fur-
ther authority to the special governor of the Kurdish provinces. In the region
bordering Iraq, where more severe fighting between the military and the PKK had
taken place, several districts were closed to journalists and civil servants. Only a few
left-wing newspapers—namely, the pro-Kurdish Ozgiir Gtindem (Free Agenda),
published under the name Ozgiir Politika (Free Politics)—still dare to criticize and
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condemn the illegal actions of the security forces, suffering numerous confiscations
of property and threats of disproportionately high penalties for their actions.
The implementation of the security measures in southeastern Turkey is car-
ried out by the paramilitary gendarmerie, predominantly in the rural areas; under
the jurisdiction of the minister of the interior; by the police, predominantly in the
urban areas; by the military, who has at its disposal special commando units ex-
perienced in winter combat with the capability for cross-border operations and air
reconnaissance by plane and helicopters, called "Rambos" by the population; and
by village guards. Since July 1987, the new post of multiregional governor, known
as "Super Governor," was institutionalized and granted comprehensive powers
similar to a commander of martial law who is authorized to suspend basic civil
rights and liberties. The governor's seat is in Diyarbakir.20
The so-called "village guards," which by early 1996 were estimated to
number sixty-seven thousand, are recruited from Kurdish tribal groups opposed
to the PKK and are armed and lucratively paid by the state. A new cycle of vio-
lence has been introduced by these village guards, as they not only lead the fight
against the PKK but also incite tribal strife and feuds between families. The PKK
has declared these village guards to be "enemies of the people" and has brought its
acts of violence on themselves and their families.21
Not only large-scale military operations but also expansive forced resettle-
ments and food embargoes are fundamental elements of the security measures in
the Kurdish crisis regions in southeastern Turkey. The depopulation of the rural
areas in which the PKK operates is carried out by forced evacuations, deportations
and bombardments of villages and settlements, accompanied by the destruction of
nature. Underlying this forced expulsion of the Kurds from their regions were
plans to create a fifteen- to forty-kilometer-wide security corridor along the Turk-
ish border with Syria, Iraq and Iran. These plans have been implemented in
particular in the Botan region (Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt), the center of the PKK's
activities. The policy of deportation and the establishment of restricted military
zones in strategically important areas, where the PKK fighting develops, occurs
concurrently with the attempt to drain the PKK of logistic support by the estab-
lishment of so-called "strategic villages" and to keep the Kurdish population under
state and military control. The displaced flee to the nearby cities and towns and
live there in slums and temporary dwellings.
The cross-border actions of the Turkish military are based on security
treaties with Iraq, which allow for such operations up to forty kilometers into each
other's territories. Turkey presents its military interventions in Iraqi Kurdistan as
part of its security measures against "terrorism." It has carried out several such
military operations, partly in cooperation with Iraqi-Kurdish parties, as, for ex-
ample, in October 1992 and for several months in the spring of 1995. By these
actions, Turkey attempts to undermine support for the PKK fighters among the
Iraqi Kurds and to prevent the flight of the PKK into Iraqi-Kurdish territory. At
the same time, it tries to counteract the formation of a Kurdish nationalist state
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in Iraq and the entire region with the help of trilateral agreements and treaties be-
tween Ankara, Damascus and Tehran, initiated by Ankara and met with interest
by the neighboring states. A further aim of the Turkish regional and Middle East-
ern policy is to exploit the contradictions between the various Kurdish movements
in meeting its objectives.
The "secret war" in southeastern Turkey between the Turkish security forces
(the army, the gendarmerie, the militia, the political police, the secret service, the
anti-terror units and the village guards) and the militant PKK has meanwhile led
to a growing politicization of the population, a polarization of the conflicting par-
ties and a militarization of politics, accompanied by massive violations of human
rights, both at the hands of the state security forces and the PKK.22 The escala-
tion of violence has had serious consequences: The closing down of shops has
become a part of everyday life in the Kurdish provinces while the burials of the
victims of state violence regularly develop into larger demonstrations, which are,
in turn, met with deadly shots into the crowd by security forces. In addition, there
have been numerous murders of both critical and Kurdish journalists;23 prominent
lawyers and representatives of political parties, especially of the prohibited pro-
Kurdish HEP and DEP parties; and Kurdish businessmen.24 The security forces
make no special effort to solve these murders. Rumors in the press speak of
activities of an anti-guerrilla unit (Kontrgeril/a), similar to the death squads oper-
ating in Latin America, which executes or allows the disappearance of legally
employed pro-Kurdish persons as well as critics of the state military policy, with
the secret approval of state bodies. Many circumstances point to the existence of
certain mechanisms that are no longer under the control of the government. Fur-
thermore, the steadily growing support of the PKK by the Kurdish population is
not only an expression of their despair at the everyday suffering inflicted by Turk-
ish security forces but also an expression of Kurdish emancipation as a result of a
growing national consciousness of the Kurds.
On the whole, the discrimination and the attacks against the Kurds have in-
creased in western Turkey. The situation of the Kurdish refugees in western
Turkish cities has become more difficult. They are the first to be arrested during
police raids and searches, as often they are suspected on grounds of Kurdish origin
alone. Since many Turks feel helpless in reacting to PKK attacks, they play out
their frustration by carrying out general attacks against the Kurds. Provocations
and attacks occur in particular during mourning ceremonies for PKK victims.
Each mourning ceremony becomes transformed into a demonstrative show of
power aimed at the Kurds. In several towns of the Aegean and Mediterranean
regions, attacks on Kurds and their facilities, lasting several days, have taken place
(for example, in Izmir, Mersin, Manisa, Aydin, Nazilli, Turgutlu, Fethiye, Urla,
Alanya, Denizli, Antalya, Konya, and Adana). They range from physical violence,
destruction of Kurdish shops and attacks on predominantly Kurdish districts of
cities to various methods of discrimination, such as refusing apartments to Kurds
and boycotting of shops run by Kurds.25 As a rule, this repressive policy against
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the Kurds, which is accompanied by arbitrary police searches in predominantly
Kurdish districts and systematic provocations by right extremist nationalist forces,
activists of the ultra-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), is tolerated by the city
administration. Many Kurds have left the cities after such incidents.
The growing process of alienation between the Kurds and the state, as well
as between Kurds and Turks, the basis of which had already been laid with the
foundation of the republic, leads to a strengthening of nationalist sentiments
among the majority of the Turkish population, resulting in hostility and vengeful
sentiments, which in turn have effects on the development of Kurdish nationalism
and Kurdish resistance.26 Anti-Kurdish propaganda and press coverage in the Turk-
ish media contribute to an escalation of the situation. In today's situation, a ma-
jority of the Turkish public is skeptical toward a consistent and neutral human
rights policy and increasingly calls for uncompromising statements against the
PKK.27
The efforts of state power to build up Islamic and right-wing radical na-
tionalist groups, in particular the MHP, as a counterweight to the PKK have led to
a further cycle of violence. A considerable portion of the special units and security
forces are preferentially recruited from the ranks of MHP activists. Press reports
speak of efforts of state power and the Kontrgerilla, with the help of NAP activists,
to build up so-called defense organizations directly on location, which are used in
the fight against the PKK and their sympathizers and to win over the population
for the MHP. Apart from the Kontrgerilla, the Turkish variant of Hizballah, al-
legedly not only supported by but founded by the Kontrgerilla organization, is
held responsible for numerous unsolved murder cases and disappearances.28
Another consequence of the escalation of violence is the flight of the Kurds
into the cities of the Kurdish regions in southeastern and western Turkey and
northern Iraq. Concurrent with forced deportations, so far more than twenty-three
hundred villages have been cleared, destroyed or bombarded; crops, trees and
meadows, as well as about 10 million hectares (about 2.5 billion acres) of forest,
have been burned in southeast Turkey. More than 2 million Kurds have been
driven out of their home villages. On the outskirts of the cities, illegal Kurdish
settlements have been established and have the potential for becoming targets of
repression. However, politicization continues there as well, which enables the PKK
to organize in the cities. The policy of deportation has, on the whole, broadened
the conflict by carrying it, and with it the PKK, into the urban areas.29
According to reports of the Turkish Association for Human Rights,30
twelve thousand Kurds have meanwhile fled to northern Iraq (Kurdistan Regional
Government-Iraq) and live in camps there. Most have fled because of their fear of
the arbitrary behavior of local administration and Turkish security forces, which
have set villages on fire or bombarded them because of the citizens' refusal to fight
as village guards against the PKK. However, the Turkish Foreign Ministry claims
that the PKK has forced the inhabitants into northern Iraq to support their claims
that the Kurds flee alleged Turkish repression.31
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Another consequence of this "secret war" is the enormous economic burden.
The costs of military actions in southeast Turkey are rising daily. The fight against
the PKK places an additional strain of approximately 13 million deutsche mark
annually on the Turkish budget. The conflict intensifies the imbalance between
the western and eastern parts of the country and prevents economic upswing. The
economic crisis increasingly endangers social peace. Meanwhile, even the largest
Turkish association of employers and entrepreneurs, TUSIAD, has warned of an
impending "social explosion" in its recent report.32 Various groups that profit from
the resulting wartime economy are fundamentally interested in the continuation
of the conflict. The object of the secret war that the population has financed for
more than ten years comes increasingly under question. In January 1994, the gov-
ernment extended military service by three months.
Positions of Turkish Parties
With regard to an assessment of the Kurdish issue, the parties share the view that
the Kurdish problem in Turkey does not exist in the sense of an ethnic minority
issue (with the exception of the HEP and DEP). It is reduced instead to a "prob-
lem of terrorism" or a "socio-economic problem" or both. This stereotypical
assertion, as well as the ideology of the national state and the centralist unitary
state, is strictly adhered to. The Social-Democratic People's Party (SHP)—today
the Republican People's Party (CHP) following the fusion of CHP and SHP in
early 1995—issued a report in July 1990 that calls for a halt to the military mea-
sures practiced thus far, a limited decentralization of state administration, and a
strengthening of democracy, accompanied by programs of economic and socio-
cultural development but does not include a far-reaching political resolution of
Kurdish autonomy. Only a few CHP parliamentarians demand that Kurds be
granted cultural rights and that the provisions of the OSCE, which Turkey has
signed as a member state, be applied. As partner in the government coalition, the
CHP is responsible for a policy based on a military option that represents re-
pression, oppression, and violence.
Although the "Kurdish reality" is recognized by the CHP, the True Path
Party (DYP), and the Motherland Party (ANAP), it is not linked to the grant-
ing of rights to Kurds; the right-wing radical Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
negates this reality and denies the existence of the Kurdish people and language.
The NAP is convinced that there is no Kurdish issue but a "PKK issue" and that
a special organization should be established to fight it.33 It also consistently speaks
against a dialogue-oriented policy toward the Kurds, which the ANAP and the
Democratic Left Party (DSP) look upon with reservation.
A solution may lie in the unrestricted application of the legal principle
of equality and the liberal guarantees to civil rights in the constitution. A far-
reaching political resolution of cultural and political autonomy is not even dis-
cussed by any of the major political parties. The parties share the common view
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that an actual cultural and political autonomy would lead to a fragmentation of the
Turkish state. This perceived threat of a division of the Turkish national state by
the Kurdish issue is shared and politically exploited by all political parties (except
HEP and DEP). The expression terrorism is turned into a verdict that the parties
(except HEP and DEP) attribute to any Kurdish attempt at self-realization and
thus provides a theoretical justification for its suppression.34
On the whole, the parties are characterized by an amorphous conceptuali-
zation of the Kurdish issue. Neither is the majority of the parties ready to initi-
ate a political dialogue with the Kurds. This is demonstrated by the fact that the
exclusion of DEP from Parliament has been consistently supported by the op-
position parties.
An exception is the New Democracy Movement (NDM) of young busi-
nessman Cem Boyner, founded in January 1995, which has been supported by
many Turkish intellectuals, scientists, journalists, businessmen and former gener-
als. It views itself as an essential political alternative to all parties and pursues
economic and political liberalism. It aims for the formation of a civil society in the
sense of a civic society and questions the strict application of the Kemalist state
doctrine and the Turkish policy practiced thus far toward the Kurds. The move-
ment views the following as specific steps in a resolution of the Kurdish issue: the
pluralization and democratization of society, the granting of cultural rights and
freedom for representing Kurdish interests without endangering the unitary struc-
ture of the state; and the implementation of a dialogue-oriented policy toward the
Kurds. The National Security Council, as a constitutional-legal body, is to be dis-
solved so as to pave the way for a truly civilized political development.35 Whether
the New Democracy Movement will attain broad support from the society at large
remains to be seen, although, on the basis of its pluralistic and liberal under-
Standing of politics, it should be able to work toward a political and democratic
resolution of the Kurdish issue.
On a societal level, meanwhile, the Kurdish issue is partly discussed in con-
nection with basic societal and political reforms and a renunciation of Kemalist
state ideology. Ideas range from a democratization of the country, a decentrali-
zation of the state, a change of the Turkish constitution, a removal of the military
authority from politics and the granting of cultural and political autonomy to the
Kurds to the establishment of federalist structures. This discussion is conducted
primarily within circles of intellectuals, a few journalists, businessmen, writers,
artists and scientists, and within some interest groups and new liberal movements.
The concept of "civil society" (from sociologist Murat Beige), the "Islamic re-
formist" concept (from authors Ali Bulac and Abdurrahman Dilipak), and the
"neo-Ottoman" and "second republican" concepts (from economist and colum-
nist Mehmet Altan) represent the various political currents in this multifaceted
debate.36
The few civil organizations37 that exist in the form of interest groups, foun-
dations and associations attempt to seek alternatives to state politics. They are
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subject, however, to the numerous restrictive legal regulations and the authoritarian
concept of basic civil rights and the state. Thus, the scope of their activities and
impact is very limited. In particular, associations and organizations that concern
themselves with Kurdish politics and culture are affected by political repression in
law and in practice. The escalation of violence by the state and the PKK, as well
as the growing influence of the military authority in the political system, endan-
ger the existence of the few civil organizations attempting to survive as forms of
expression in a society that is only beginning to develop a civil character.
KURDS STRIVING FOR AUTONOMY
Atatiirk's promise to the Kurds to create a common state for the Turks and Kurds
was not kept after the formation of the Turkish Republic. Instead, all Kurdish or-
ganizations, publications and schools were prohibited. Thus, the attempt to "build
a nation" laid the basis for a policy of forced assimilation and a destruction of
Kurdish culture.38 The status of autonomy that the Kurds enjoyed during the
Ottoman Empire was dissolved in favor of an overall centralization of the state
and a homogenization of society. The Treaty of Sevres of 10 August 1920, which
foresaw the creation of a Kurdish and an Armenian state but was replaced by the
Lausanne Peace Treaty (1923) after the successful Turkish War of Independence,
had an enormous impact on Kurdish nationalism,39 which reached its peak with
the formation of the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in the Kurdish re-
gions of Iran (22 January through 15 December 1946). Even today, both of these
historic moments are effective symbols, as they were the first manifestations of
Kurdish nationalism (in the formation of a state).
The Resurgence of Kurdish Nationalism
Although the repression, deportations and suppressions drained the Kurdish
population of their energy for a renewed insurrection, numerous uprisings in the
early era of the Turkish Republic introduced a new phase of Kurdish nationalism
and Kurdish resistance, which continued by other means in the following decades.
While the sixties were characterized by an emergence of numerous Kurdish or-
ganizations and magazines concerning themselves with Kurdish language, culture,
history and literature, a radicalization of Kurdish demands was observed in sub-
sequent years.40
Since the mid-1980s, Kurdish nationalism in Turkey has seen another resur-
gence. External factors have included the end of the East-West conflict and the
establishment of new states on the territory of the former Soviet Union, demon-
strating that peoples' yearnings, long-cherished, can be fulfilled. The Arab-Israeli
peace process in the Middle East also gave hope to the Kurds for a similar resolu-
tion and has confirmed for them the effectiveness of political struggle in achieving
their aims. In addition, the massacre of several thousand civilians by use of toxic
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gases in March 1988 in Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan, carried out by Baghdad, com-
bined with the refugee drama of Iraqi Kurds at the end of the second Gulf war
not only brought the Kurds and their various organizations closer together but also
led to an internationalization of the Kurdish issue, which thus far had been viewed
primarily as an internal affairs issue of the countries in question. Moreover, the
proclamation of the Kurdistan Regional Government-Iraq in October 1992 had
a catalyzing effect on the Kurds. In the event of its survival, it will tremendously
increase the hope for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue in the remaining
regions in the near future.
The inappropriate Turkish policy, which attempts to carry out forced as-
similation of the Kurds through military violence and which excludes a dialogue
with the Kurds, represents the internal factor responsible for the strengthening of
Kurdish nationalism. The "secret war" in the Kurdish region in southeast Turkey
has contributed to a development of national consciousness among the Kurdish
population. Kurds, Kurdish intellectuals, and refugees in exile and diaspora have
always played and still continue to play an important role in the process of the cre-
ation of a nation. Media is particularly important in this process in the age of
satellite transmission, as can be observed with the Kurdish channel MED-TV,
licensed in Great Britain, which has been transmitting a daily satellite program
in Europe and Kurdistan since 24 December 1994. Through audiovisualization
of the Kurdish culture and issue and its cross-border transmission, the channel has
the potential to sensitize large portions of the population to the Kurdish issue
in the diaspora and in all parts of Kurdistan and to speed up the process of the
creation of a nation.
Kurdish Underground Resistance
The Kurdish organizations in Turkey—the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and
the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK)—stem from three political movements: the
nationalist movement, which in its development has essentially been influenced by
the KDP-Iraq (Democratic Party of Kurdistan-Iraq); a movement that developed
from the Workers' Party of Turkey (TIP), of which the Socialist Party of Kurdis-
tan (PSK), founded in 1974, belongs; and a movement that developed from the
Turkish Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey (DEV-GENC), to which
the founding members of the PKK belong.41
Currently the PKK is the leading organization setting the tone of the
underground resistance, while, at the same time, it is the most controversial. PKK
and PSK share the view that the Kurdish region is a colony of the Turkish state
and that federalism within the Turkish Republic represents a realistic reso-
lution. The parties, however, disagree on the issue of the use of violence—not only
against a foreign central power but also in the internal fight against political
opponents—as a political device.
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The PKK, founded on 27 November 1978 and reactivated in 1982 after the
1980 military coup in Turkey, no longer strives toward the aim of an independent
Kurdish state. No longer does it claim to be the sole representative of all parts of
Kurdistan. Its primary aim today is the resolution of the Kurdish issue through
the establishment of federalism within the Turkish borders. The PKK differs from
the other Kurdish organizations on the issue of violence. The armed fight that the
PKK has led since August 1984 is based on "revolutionary violence" as a means
of achieving mobilization and liberation. Violence is not only used against the
Turkish government but also in the struggle against its political opponents (dissi-
dents from its own ranks, other Kurdish and Turkish organizations, tribal leaders,
village guards and civilians).42
At their third congress (25-30 October 1986), the PKK resolved to intensify
political activity in the cities, to extend military operations in the urban areas, to
intensify the relationship with other political organizations, both national and in-
ternational, and to establish the Peoples' Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK);
the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK) was founded in 1985. The
cycle of violence continues, carried out by various means: attacks on state facilities
and tourist centers in Turkey; the kidnapping of tourists and the hostage-taking
of civilians in Turkey and abroad; the murder of village guards and teachers;43 at-
tacks on Turkish facilities in western Europe; and the use of violence against other
Kurdish and Turkish organizations and PKK dissidents.
The broad political structure of the organization became apparent in
spring 1990, or in 1992 at the latest, when mass demonstrations took place in the
cities of Cizre and Nusaybin, considered by the PKK as serhildan(s) or upris-
ings, a Kurdish intifada.'"'' The guerrilla strategy of the PKK and the anti-guerrilla
strategy of the Turkish government still determine the scope of violence: The
PKK, which declared a one-sided cease-fire in March 1993, opened a new round
of violence and counterviolence when PKK units broke the cease-fire in May
1993. The sudden death of Turgut Ozal during the period of cease-fire had an
effect on the PKK; a political vacuum emerged after his death and the PKK con-
sidered that its loss of an approachable partner meant the end of the chance for
dialogue. Subsequently, the PKK carried out elections for a Kurdish national par-
liament amongst the Kurds living in Europe. In October 1993 it demanded, under
threat of violence, that the Turkish parties and media close their offices in south-
east Turkey because of their one-sided representation of the interests of the
Turkish state at the expense of the Kurdish people; PKK's actions disregarded free-
doms of the press and speech in southeast Turkey in order to prevent local
elections in March 1994.
The PKK intended to issue two signals by the one-sided declaration of
cease-fire (17 March through 24 May 1993): on the one hand, its readiness for
negotiations, and on the other, the turning back from its ultimate aim of creating
a Kurdish state. The PKK no longer insists on this demand but instead strives
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toward the aim of finding a federalist resolution within Turkey, which could take
various forms. Basically, the PKK views a mutual cease-fire as a necessary prereq-
uisite for talks and the paving of the way for a political resolution.45 In this regard,
the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, on the occasion of the International
Northwest Kurdistan Conference in Brussels in March 1994, as well as at the
Summit Meeting of the OSCE Member States in Budapest in December 1994,
requested in writing that the leaders of Germany, Great Britain, France, and the
United States mediate between Turkey and the PKK. As the latest effort in this
regard, Ocalan repeated this appeal in a written memorandum to the U.S. presi-
dent on 13 October 1995. All these requests, however, propose that the mutual
cease-fire be conducted under international control and involve negotiations. The
PKK has declared its readiness to sign the Geneva War Convention. The Turkish
government, however, considers this a ploy by the PKK and vehemently refuses
dialogue with the "terrorists."46
In contrast to the Kurdish uprisings in Turkey thus far, the PKK is charac-
terized by a broad organizational structure and a force capable of extraordinary
mobilization. It possesses a broad network not only in the Kurdish parts of Turkey
and other countries in the region but also in western Europe. Meanwhile, it re-
cruits guerrillas in both the Kurdish regions of crisis and among the Kurds living
in western Europe. Among the recruits is a strikingly large proportion of very
young people, including girls and young women. On the whole, one can main-
tain that the PKK enjoys enormous support among the Kurdish population, not
only in the crisis regions and their cities but also in western Europe.47 Former
Turkish General Chief of Staff Dogan Giire§ admitted publicly in July 1993 that
roughly one-tenth of the Kurdish population in the Kurdish regions, or approxi-
mately four hundred thousand persons, must be regarded as active sympathizers of
the PKK. Official German reports speak of approximately sixty-nine hundred
PKK members in Germany.48 At mass rallies, the PKK succeeds in mobilizing a
much higher number of sympathizers than is reported by official sources; for ex-
ample, the Second Kurdistan Festival, initiated by the PKK on 4 September 1993
in the Frankfurter Waldstadion (Frankfurt Forest Stadium), was attended by forty-
five thousand persons according to police sources, versus PKK reports of up to
one hundred thousand attendees from the whole of Germany and neighboring
countries.
A significant characteristic of the PKK is that, on the one hand, it leads the
guerrilla war in the Kurdish regions of southeast Anatolia as a militant organiza-
tion while, on the other hand, it has the political flexibility to adapt to international
and regional conditions. It performs widespread, intensive activity abroad in public
relations and has attempted to form a political wing in order to be able to act as a
partner in dialogue. It has turned back from its ultimate aim of establishing an in-
dependent Kurdish state in favor of a new goal of a federalist resolution within the
boundaries of the Turkish state. At the same time, it has declared its readiness to
dialogue. To this end, the PKK has declared one-sided cease-fires. The attempt to
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create a Kurdish parliament in exile, including the DEP representatives in exile, is
a further essential step on the way to the creation of a political wing. On 23 Janu-
ary 1995, the PKK handed a declaration to the International Red Cross and the
Foreign Ministry of Switzerland, in which it stated that the International Red
Cross is granted entry into the war regions to be able to monitor that the Geneva
treaty and its supplemental protocols are being adhered to by the PKK. With this
diplomatic step, the PKK intends to be internationally recognized as a warring
party and demands that Turkey abide by the Geneva Convention. Thus, it at-
tempts to pave the way for dialogue and to state that it does not insist on a violent
military resolution. The PKK has passed resolutions toward a political dialogue
during its Fifth Party Congress (8-27 January 1995). The party authorized Ab-
dullah Ocalan to make offers for a political dialogue and the opening of political
negotiations.49
The founding of the Kurdish parliament in exile on 12 April 1995 in The
Hague must be evaluated as a turning point in the progression of the conflict and
its development. On one hand, the parliament in exile functions as a partner in
dialogue and, on the other hand, it proves that the prohibition of the DEP has
brought the PKK and the DEP parliamentarians in exile closer together. The ob-
viously common activities of the two parties have resulted in the fact that a process
of dialogue and peace that disregards the PKK would be difficult to realize. The
parliament in exile represents this cooperation.50
The source for the broad support of the PKK, called "guerrilla"51 by the
population in the crisis region, can be found not in its Marxist-Leninist ideology
but primarily in its growing Kurdish nationalism.
The Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK), founded in 1974,52 which is led
by the former leading member of the TIP, Kemal Burkay, is another important
Kurdish organization working underground. The PSK supports the right of the
Kurdish people to self-determination but does not define this right as a one-sided
claim to establish an independent Kurdish state. Priority is given to federalism,
maintaining the territorial integrity of Turkey. In this regard, this does not differ
from the aims of the PKK. Burkay proposes a "Turkish-Kurdish Federation" and
cites Belgium as an example. In contrast to the PKK, the use of violence as a po-
litical means is rejected on principle. The Kurdish issue in Turkey stems from the
repression of the Kurdish people, whom the Turkish government has denied all
legal possibility for representing their interests. The problem can be solved only by
negotiations, with the prerequisite that Turkey accept the Kurds as an equal part-
ner in dialogue. A process of dialogue should include all Kurdish organizations,
including the PKK. It is not so much the PKK but rather the Turkish government
itself that has stood in the way of a peaceful solution. The PSK has welcomed the
one-sided declarations of cease-fire and the readiness of the PKK to participate
in a dialogue while giving up their ultimate aims. Together with the PKK, on the
day of its proclamation of one-sided cease-fire (19 March 1993) the TKSP signed
a protocol that determines the cooperation between the Kurdish organizations.
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This step introduced the founding of a "National Front of Kurdistan," comprised
of twelve Kurdish organizations in Turkey. The program states two possibilities
for a resolution: the formation of an independent republic or a federation with
equal rights within Turkey. Moreover, it demands an immediate halt of the state
of emergency and of military measures, a cease-fire, a general amnesty, and the
granting of cultural rights.53
Possibilities and Limits of Parliamentary Representation of Interests
The seven SHP representatives who took part in the conference on the Kurdish
issue in Paris in October 1989 and who were ousted from their party because of
their statements on the Kurdish issue in Turkey, founded the pro-Kurdish People's
Labor Party (HEP) on 7 June 1990. Through an agreement that included HEP
candidates on the party roster of Social-Democratic People's Party (SHP), the
HEP was voted into Parliament during parliamentary elections in October 1991.
The first turbulences came during the swearing in of the Parliament, when two
HEP parliamentarians added a few remarks in Kurdish at the end of their oath.
The reaction to this was extremely strong; images, which could be seen for the first
time in the history of the Parliament, were transmitted for several days in the
Turkish media. Both HEP parliamentarians were accused of "separatist propa-
ganda." The HEP criticized the policy practiced thus far against the Kurds, stating
that the Kurdish issue cannot be reduced to a "terrorism problem," and insisted
that a political solution is urgently needed. It condemned the military option and
stressed that the PKK is not a "terrorist movement." It maintained that the gov-
ernment should begin a process of dialogue that includes the PKK. To this aim,
they would take upon themselves the role of mediator, so that the cycle of violence
can be broken. The HEP provided a written list of conditions to then-head of
SHP, Erdal Inonii, in which it demanded a halt to the state of emergency and
military measures; the granting of cultural rights (school education in the Kurdish
language, Kurdish TV and radio programs), as well as opportunities to form or-
ganizations. The HEP's lifespan was brief, as it was banned by the Constitutional
Court because of "separatist activities."54
In May 1993, the former HEP parliamentarians founded the Democracy
Party (DEP). DEP has also concentrated its criticism on government policies that
employ only a military resolution of the Kurdish issue, denying the real problem
that has existed in Turkey for decades. Political steps must follow the recognition
of the "Kurdish reality" by the coalition government. In contrast to other Turkish
parties, the DEP views the PKK as a political organization, with which negotia-
tions must take place for a peaceful and democratic solution. It is of the opinion
that a political solution must include the PKK; otherwise it is unrealistic and will
not yield results. The DEP also stresses that the state itself uses violence against
its own population. A first step toward a political resolution would be the end of
the special regulations for the Kurdish regions in southeast Turkey, a mutual re-
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jection of the use of violence and a cease-fire. The Kurds represent an ethnic mi-
nority with a claim to minority rights, which the Turkish government committed
to in the OSCE provisions. The granting of minority status would not lead to a
division of Turkey; the Kurds would still desire to live together with the Turks in
Turkey.55
Both the government and a significant portion of the press and media call
the DEP an "extended arm of the PKK." The DEP faces a systematic campaign
of intimidation by forces of state order and fundamentalist underground organi-
zations.56 Prior to the local elections on 27 March 1994, the situation culminated
in a massive campaign against several DEP mayoral candidates in the southeast
provinces.57 A bomb attack on the party offices in Ankara on 18 February 1994
killed one person and injured twenty-two. In March 1994, the Turkish Parliament
repealed the parliamentary immunity of six DEP parliamentarians who were
accused of "separatist activities," an offense that carries the penalty of capital pun-
ishment in Turkey. On 25 February 1994, the DEP withdrew from the local
elections, explaining that, out of fear because of increasing intimidation and the
murder of several DEP politicians, it decided by majority vote not to participate
in the elections.
The repeal of the DEP parliamentarians' immunity, which critics have also
called "the civilian coup of 2 March 1994" goes along with the government cam-
paign under Tansu Ciller to "remove the PKK from Parliament." Through the
DEP's withdrawal from local elections, the government reached its aim of do-
mestic policy, namely, to prevent the Kurdish electorate from casting their votes
for the DEP.
On 16 June 1994, the DEP was banned by the Constitutional Court; the
DEP parliamentarians' mandates were repealed. Shortly before the ban, six DEP
representatives fled abroad, while the remaining two, Sedat Yurtdas and Selim
Sadak, were arrested and imprisoned a short time later. The Constitutional Court
justified the party ban with the claim that the DEP developed "separatist activi-
ties and propaganda against the indivisible unity of the state's people and its
territory." Initially, proceedings were instituted against the imprisoned members
of Parliament on the grounds of Article 125 of the Turkish criminal code, which
carries the death penalty. However, in early December 1994, because of fear of
consequences that would affect the international reputation of Turkey, the eight
members of Parliament (one independent and seven DEP representatives), were
sentenced to imprisonment: Two representatives were to serve three and a half
years, one received seven and a half years, and the remaining five were sentenced
to fifteen years, on the grounds of Articles 168 and 169 of the criminal code, re-
ferring to support of and membership in the forbidden PKK. The two members
of Parliament sentenced to three and a half years were released shortly afterward.58
The DEP parliamentarians in exile have meanwhile founded the parliament in
exile together with the PKK, which must be recognized as a partner in dialogue,
not only by the Turkish government but on the international level as well. The
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DEP representatives justify their participation in the parliament in exile by the fact
that the Turkish government has rejected all peaceful means for the representation
of Kurdish interests on both parliamentary and legal levels. The parliament in
exile is both a result of and a reaction to this policy.
The exclusion of the DEP from Parliament and the sentencing of its par-
liamentarians clearly demonstrates the possibilities and limits of a representation
of Kurdish interests within a political parliamentary framework. It becomes clear
that politicians and Parliament are not ready to begin dialogue with the legitimate
Kurdish representatives of the DEP; in fact, their insistence on excluding Kurdish
representation of interests gains strength. The prime minister has celebrated as a
personal success the ban of the DEP, the party that could have initiated a dialogue.
At the same time, the exclusion of the Kurdish representatives from politics and
Parliament has had a symbolic effect on their supporters: They feel shut out of po-
litical and social life. At the least, the "undecided masses" who are under the
pressure of both the PKK and the Turkish security forces could now give prefer-
ence to a decision in favor of the PKK. Thus, the PKK would be able to assert that
Turkey does not accept the political representation of Kurdish interests, so that
only armed conflict remains viable.
At this point, one must consider that the DEP ban and the sentencing of its
parliamentarians occurred because of the free expression of opinion and not be-
cause of acts of violence by the DEP representatives. Moreover, they have been
accused of maintaining contact with the PKK. This justification is essentially in
contradiction to the freedom of speech and opinion, which, in the case of the
people's legitimate representatives, is additionally protected by political immunity.
Thus, parliamentary immunity loses its essential function.
The basic political line of counteracting representation of Kurdish interests
in politics and Parliament is also displayed toward the pro-Kurdish Democracy
Party of the People (HADEP), a successor to the DEP, founded in May 1994.
Claims by the Turkish press that even the First Party Congress (26 June 1994) had
degenerated into a PKK congress left a mark on the HADEP, the impact of which
should not be underestimated.59 At the congress, the leader of the party, Murat
Bozlak, stressed the necessity to change the Constitution and the Anti-Terror
Law, to revoke the state of emergency and military measures, and to grant a
general amnesty. Meanwhile, Kurdish circles increasingly strive for the establish-
ment of new parties. The aim is to find a legal platform for Kurdish politics and
to strive for a peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue. The spectrum of newly
founded parties ranges from conservative-liberal (Serafettin Elci) to supporters
of the political line of the Socialist Party of Kurdistan (PSK) (Ibrahim Aksoy).
The attempt to establish new parties coincides with, on the one hand, the in-
tensive fight between the Turkish military and the PKK and, on the other hand,
the coming together of the DEP and the PKK and the formation of the parlia-
ment in exile.
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POSSIBILITIES FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCE
The Kurdish organizations demand the right to self-determination for the Kurd-
ish people in their respective countries in accordance with the UN Charter (Ar-
ticles 1 and 2). They define this right as a free decision for membership to a state
and for the forms of such membership. In general, they demand primarily the
granting of an autonomy status within the boundaries of the Turkish Republic,
the forms of which could be various. Though the right to self-determinati'on must
be considered as ius cogens, its content and scope are completely controversial. It is
still primarily viewed in connection with the process of decolonization that has
occurred since World War II. The states where the Kurds live oppose this grant-
ing of the right to self-determination to the Kurds. On an international level,
self-determination in the form of an independent Kurdish national state has not
been accepted. This would disrupt the regional balance of political power in the
Near and Middle East and endanger peace in the region.
The Kurdish organizations in Turkey understand the right to self-determi-
nation as autonomy (cultural and political). The PKK also insists on a right to
self-determination, which it desires to be realized as federalism within the bounda-
ries of Turkey. As the foundation of a national state in the region is considered to
be unrealistic because of the various political interests and established balance of
power, the Kurdish organizations concentrate their demands on the realization of
autonomy (cultural and political) in the respective states without endangering the
territorial integrity of these states.
Thus the understanding of Kurdish autonomy in Turkey comprises several
forms: cultural autonomy, local self-administration, and federalism. As examples
of the latter, the Kurds cite in particular Switzerland, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Belgium, Spain, and the internationally unrecognized Kurdistan Regional
Government-Iraq, with Cyprus being mentioned as well, where, in principle, the
foundation of a bizonal and binational federation is foreseen although not yet
realized. They strive for the formation of an autonomous region in the Kurd-
ish districts in southeast Turkey, which has the largest population of Kurds. They
maintain that regional parliament and government must possess decision-making
authority over important aspects of state sovereignty. This particular solution stems
from the conviction that the Kurdish issue is neither a problem of human rights
nor an ethnic minority issue but rather a national issue. The key to a solution to
the national Kurdish issue is a constitutional recognition of the existence of the
Kurdish people within Turkey, with their own language and culture. Therefore,
those concepts for a resolution based on federalist structures, which at the same
time make co-existence possible within the same state, namely the Turkish state,
are to be given preference.60 Opponents of federalist options for a resolution jus-
tify their criticism by maintaining that Turkey has never had federalism in its
tradition as a state. Neither the economic process of integration nor the process of
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formation of a nation have been completed, so that a federation at this stage of de-
velopment would lead to a segregation of society. After all, one cannot maintain
that a unitary state model is by necessity always authoritarian. Moreover, the war
in the former Yugoslavia has shown that federalism does not always work. They
assert that a federalist resolution is also complicated by the fact that the Kurdish
population lives in wide distribution throughout Turkey.
Cultural autonomy and local self-administration are other forms of an au-
tonomy status for the Kurds in Turkey, a view represented by the pro-Kurdish
DEP. The DEP is also supported by some Turkish intellectuals, journalists, scien-
tists, businessmen, and politicians of the SHP, ANAP, and the New Democracy
Movement. This view is based primarily on human rights and the rights of
minorities as laid down in international treaties that have been signed by Turkey.
So far, the Turkish government has refused cultural autonomy and local self-
administration for the Kurds; however, it supports the autonomy status of the
Iraqi Kurds, since it desires not only to weaken Saddam Hussein but also to play
a vanguard role in the region through influence on the Iraqi Kurds.
First steps toward a lasting resolution would be a combined policy toward
the Kurds that includes (1) a demilitarization of the region (a repeal of the state
of emergency, the withdrawal of the special military units, a stop to the deporta-
tion activities, and the provision of means for the resettlement of former resi-
dents); (2) a comprehensive and unhindered cultural autonomy (opportunity for
free expression through the introduction of the Kurdish language in media and
education, the right to establish Kurdish cultural associations, and the formation
of departments of Kurdish studies at universities); (3) a comprehensive guarantee
of democratic human and civil rights; and (4) a policy for regional development.
These measures would affect neither the state integrity nor the national unity of
Turkey. They would only legalize the Kurdish culture existing in parallel and
would support its development without threatening the dominance of the Turk-
ish culture in the public sphere. At the same time, these measures would not
provide increased political autonomy for the Kurds—that is, no special political
position in their areas of settlement.
It is only when the termination of the armed conflict, democratization,
recognition of cultural plurality, and the granting of human and cultural rights is
achieved by a process of dialogue between the Turkish government and the Kurds
(including the PKK) that, in the second stage, alternatives to a unitary centralist
state model could be discussed and a societal consensus on regional reorganization
could be reached.
POSSIBILITIES FOR INFLUENCE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
The external possibilities for influence stemming from the framework of the pro-
visions of various treaties and documents—which Turkey is subject to as a member
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state—gain additional importance because the internal situation in Turkey at this
moment does not allow for a political resolution of the Kurdish issue. There-
fore, the concerted action of international organizations becomes a significant
option for influencing Turkey toward a more flexible stance in its policy toward
the Kurds.
The system of protection of minorities within the United Nations, the
OSCE, and the Council of Europe plays a role in the resolution of the Kurdish
issue, since Turkey, as a member of these organizations, has committed itself to
the realization and protection of a common system of values and actions. Turkey
is considering the ratification of the UN Treaty on civil and political rights (19 De-
cember 1966, in effect since 1976), two provisions of which refer to rights that
could be granted to a collective: Article 1 of the Treaty, which speaks of the right
of peoples to self-determination; and Article 27, which contains a clause on the
right of members of minority groups to religious, cultural, and linguistic free-
doms.61 Disagreement continues regarding the interpretation of Article 27, spe-
cifically, whether rights are granted to minority groups as a collective, or rather, to
separate members of the minority groups individually. Turkey's reservations on the
minority issue represent the classic Turkish view that legally there are no minori-
ties outside the provisions of the Lausanne Treaty and that Article 27 of the UN
Treaty is interpreted in this sense.
While the OSCE, as an instrument for the building of trust across blocs,
had concerned itself primarily with issues of human rights and disarmament
in Europe during the time of the cold war, today its role and composition has
changed. Currently, it mainly serves the purpose of crisis resolution, maintenance
of peace and conflict prevention, although the development of permanent OSCE
institutions and structures is not yet completed. The principles of human rights in
the Helsinki Human Rights Accord (1975) have been gradually expanded, as the
human dimension—the strengthening and expansion of the system for the pro-
tection of minorities—was discussed at meetings of the Conference for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (1989 in Paris, 1990 in Copenhagen, and 1991 in
Moscow). The Copenhagen Resolution on the human dimension calls for the pro-
tection of minority rights and provides guarantees for members of minority groups
against discrimination. The Paris Charter for a New Europe includes the right of
national minorities to freely express and further develop their identity without dis-
crimination.
In its program, the Turkish government refers explicitly to these rulings, on
the basis of which it desires to handle the issues. Its statements and actions thus
far, however, point to the fact that it has to a large extent succeeded in freeing itself
from the binding power of these rulings. An important problem in this regard is
that the OSCE resolutions are themselves ambivalent: on the one hand, they con-
tain the political declaration to protect and support minorities in their existence
and their interests while, on the other hand, they stress the limits for an external
influence on matters of a sovereign state as understood by the principle of sover-
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eignty and the right of every state to protect itself effectively against attacks on its
integrity and sovereignty. Both factors are not easily compatible and in an extreme
case can become contradictory to each other. Moreover, the effect of the various
OSCE resolutions regarding minorities is significantly reduced by the fact that
there is no internationally codified collective right for minorities, in contrast to the
democratic and civil human rights relating to the individual. When Turkey is con-
fronted with reproaches in this regard, it always justifies itself by pointing to the
rights of states included in the very same document and accuses its critics of sup-
porting anti-Turkey terrorist actions.
The Council of Europe, of which Turkey is a member, has a differentiated
protection and monitoring mechanism in the area of human rights. The Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights has been supplemented by the Convention
on the Prevention of Torture, the additional sixth protocol on the abolition of the
death penalty, and the agreement on an individual's right to privacy of informa-
tion. The parliamentary meeting of the Council of Europe has taken the initiative
to pay particular attention to the rights of minorities within the council's frame-
work of the protection of human rights.
Within the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the UN and the European
Union are the beginnings of a constructive influence in the direction of a clear
yet cautious reorientation of the Turkish policy toward the Kurds. This could
comprise two aspects: the application of consistent and permanent pressure with
regard to the agreed-upon standards while, at the same time, condemning PKK's
acts of violence. All measures should be used to support the pressure by practical
and political means. Here one can point to the fact that Turkey, as party to the
treaty, consistently offends the mutually agreed-upon political principles by its
treatment of the Kurdish issue and human rights. One measure would be an in-
tensive dispatch of fact-finding missions. Based on a combined policy that would
consistently include monitoring mechanisms for the treaties' provisions, Turkey
should be assisted in conforming its understanding of minorities to the European
standards, both politically and legally; creating the conditions for an open dis-
cussion for a resolution of the Kurdish issue; granting the Kurds the possibility
of legal and political representation of interests; and, in particular, not only rec-
ognizing the legitimate DEP representatives as partners in dialogue but also
opening a political dialogue with the PKK. Here, one must explicitly state that
a declaration of nonaggression and cease-fire is the prerequisite for a mutual mili-
tary de-escalation. In this regard, the Kurdish parliament in exile could be con-
sidered as a partner in the negotiation process. Concurrently, the appropriate
international bodies should be prepared to mediate between the parties in conflict.
An intensification of this relationship on a transnational level, in particular with
civilian organizations, individuals and those groups in Turkey that have a critical
view of Turkish policies, is necessary so that the mediating function could secure
societal backing.
Gulistan Gilrbey \ 33
NOTES
1. For a more detailed analysis see Christian Rumpf, "Minderheiten in der Tiirkei
und die Frage nach ihrem rechtlichen Schutz," in Zeitschriftfiir Turkeistudien, Jg. 6., Heft
2 (1993), 173-209; Christian Rumpf, "Die Kurdenfrage in der Tiirkei, Bemerkungen zu
neueren Entwicklungen mit einem Exkurs zur Kurdenfrage im internationalen Recht," in
Zeitschriftfiir Turkeistudien, Jg. 5, Heft 2 (1992), 205-20.
2. See Peter A. Andrews, ed., Ethnic Groups in Turkey (Wiesbaden: 1989).
3. The preamble, Articles 2 and 66, of the Turkish constitution of 1982, see
Christian Rumpf, "Die Verfassung der Republik Turkei," in Beitrdge zur Konfiiktforschung
(Koln: 1983), 105-74.
4. See Biilent Tanor, "Gedanken zum turkischen Gesetz Nr. 3713 zur Bekampfung
des Terrors ("Antiterrorgesetz-ATG")," in Zeitschriftfiir Turkeistudien, Jg. 4, Heft 2 (1991),
153-74; Insan Haklari Demegi-Menschenrechtsverein, ed., Terb'rle MiicadeleYasasi velnsan
Haklan (Istanbul: 1991), 7.
5. S.L. Meray, Lozan Bans Konferansi, Tutanak ve Belgeler (Ankara: 1973), ser. 1,
vol. 1,154.
6. For more information on the relationship between the military, politics and
democracy in Turkey, see Metin Heper, "The State, the Military, and Democracy in Turkey,"
in The Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, vol. 9, no. 3 (1987), 52-64; Hikmet
Ozdemir, DevletKrizi, T.C. Cumhurbaskanhgi Secimleri (Istanbul: 1989), 55-77; Hikmet
Oxdemir. RejimveAsker (Istanbul: 1989), 70-90; Umit Bozdag, Ordu-SiyasetIliskisi,Atatiirk
ve Ind'nii donemleri (Ankara: 1991), 175.
7. See Hikmet Ozdemir, Rejim veAsker, 107.
8. The constitional law regarding the internal service of the armed forces, which
gives the army the task to "protect the Republic and to provide for its security," has thus far
been used as a legitimization for all military interventions (1960,1971,1980).
9. As quoted in Miimtaz Soysal, Anayasanin Anlami (Istanbul: 1986), 346.
10. See Hikmet Ozdemir, Rejim veAsker, 317-20; Omit Bozdag, Ordu-Siyaset
Iliskisi, 178.
11. For more information on the Kurdish uprisings during the years between 1925
and 1938, see Genelkurmay belgelerinde Kurt isyanlan (Istanbul: 1992), vols. 2 and 3.
12. Even during the period of the formation of the state, Atatiirk still spoke of the
"nation of Turkey." Within the framework of a unitary state, he even foresaw an autonomy
for the Kurdish region. In particular, see Ugur Mumcu, Kilrtlere Ozerklik, in Milliyet, 2
March 1992; Ikibine Dogru, no. 20 (26 Sept. 1987). 20-22; Mehmet Bayrak, Kurtler ve
Ulusal-Demokratik Mikadeleleri, Gizli Belgeler-Arastirmalar-Notlar (Ankara: 1993); Mehmet
Bayrak, Acik-Gizli/Resmi-Gayriresmi Belgeleri (Ankara: 1994).
13. For a detailed analysis of Turkish interests during the Gulf war (1991), see
Gulistan Giirbey, "Die Turkei und der Nahe Osten-Die politische Interessenkonstellation
der Turkei im Golfkrieg," in Sudosteuropa-Mitteilungen, Jg. 31, Heft 3 (1991), 209-24;
Heinz Kramer, Die Turkei und der Golfkrieg (Ebenhausen: 1991).
14. See Mehmet Ali Birand, APO ve PAX (Istanbul: 1992), 8th ed., 263. APO is
the acronym for Abdullah Ocalan (the leader of the PKK) and means in the Kurdish lan-
guage "the uncle on the father's side."
15. See Ferhad Ibrahim, "Die Kurdenpolitik der Turkei nach dem iranisch-
irakischen Kreig," in Berliner Institut fur Vergleichende Sozialforschung, ed., Kurden im Exit
Ein Handbuch kurdischer Kultur, Politik und Wissenschaft (Berlin: 1991), vol. 1; Michael M.
34 / THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Gunter: "A defacto Kurdish state in nortern Iraq," Orient, vol. 34, no. 3 (1993), 387; Presse-
und Informationsamt, ed., Newspot (Ankara: 4 Oct. 1990); Henri J. Barkey: "Turkey's
Kurdish Dilemma," Survival (winter 1993-94), 51-70.
16. A discussion took place in the Turkish media regarding examples such as Spain
and the ETA, as well as England and the IRA, and options for the Turkish Republic. See
Milliyet, 13, 15 and 30 October 1993.
17. See Yavuz Gokmen, Ozalyasasaydi (Ankara: 1994), 106-9, 287-92; Hurriyet,
19 Dec. 1994; Milliyet, 19 Dec. 1994; Ozgiir Ulke, 24 Dec. 1994.
18. See the interview with former minister of the interior Ismet Sezgin, Nokta,
23 Feb. 1995,10-11; interview with former foreign minister Miimtaz Soysal, Focus, 31 Oct.
1994, 350-52; Fikret Bila, "Demirel: 'Bolunme korkumuz var,' Milliyet 17 July 1994; in-
terview with Siileyman Demirel, Sabah, \1 Dec. 1993.
19. The provinces that have been under emergency decree since 1987 are Bingol,
Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli, Sirnak, Van, Bitlis, Batman.
20. Turkish Probe, 1 April 1994, 14-15; for more detail on the powers of the super
governor, see Michael Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder: 1990), 83.
21. In November 1993, twelve Kurdish tribal leaders with enormous influence on
approximately 1 million people in the region were invited to Ankara. Talks were conducted
with them on the highest state level to substantiate their cooperation in fighting the PKK;
the government demanded that during the upcoming local elections of March 1994 they
either support the candidates of the large parties or nominate their own candidates. The
tribal leaders once again confirmed their loyalty to the state and agreed to support in fight-
ing the PKK. The 67,000 figure is the estimate of Amnesty International.
22. See, in particular, Amnesty International, Turkey, A Policy of Denial (London:
1995).
23. Meanwhile, more than thirty journalists, the majority from the pro-Kurdish
daily Ozgiir Gundem (today Ozgur Politika) were murdered. So far these murders have not
been solved. In the beginning of December 1994, there was a bomb attack on the publish-
ing offices of Ozgiir Ulke in Istanbul and Ankara, during which one person died and more
than twenty were injured; see Helsinki Watch Report on Human Rights in Turkey (Feb. 1994).
24. Turkish prime minister Tansu (filler stated on 4 November 1993 in the Holiday
Inn Hotel in Istanbul: "Turkey has come face-to-face with an expanding terrorism which
has turned into a militia movement. We know the names of the businessmen and artists
from whom money is being extorted by the PKK. We will make them pay." (As quoted in
Turkish Probe, 24 June 1994, 5.) Two months later, several Kurdish businessmen (seven at
last count) were murdered or declared to have "disappeared." The corpses of the murdered,
showing traces of severe torture, were found later in various sites. See Aktiiel, no. 16,
22 June 1994.
25. See Turkish Probe, 1 April (1994), 13-14; Ozgur Gundem, 19 Aug. 1992;
22 Nov. 1992; 3 Oct. 1992; 5 Oct. 1992; 1 Nov. 1992; 2 Nov. 1992; 12 Jan. 1993; Cumhuri-
yet, 4 May 1992; Mehmet Ali Birand, APO ve PKK, 280-82; Aktiiel, Feb. 1992.
26. See Yalcin Dogan: "Kurt ronesanci," Milliyet, 27 Feb. 1992; interview with Prof.
Dogu Ergil, Milliyet, 17 Feb. 1995. Both Ergil and Yalcin stress that a majority of the Kurd-
ish population is against a fragmentation of the country, while it supports autonomy. This
is also confirmed by the now-publicized results of a study on "The Southeast Problem,"
which Dogu Ergil carried out for the Turkish Union of Professional Associations and Stock
Exchanges (TOBB). This so-called TOBB Report triggered a controversial discussion, es-
pecially in the media, the press and political and scientific circles. It is interesting that 75
percent of those surveyed (altogether 1,267 people in the cities of Diyarbakir, Batman,
Gulistan Giirbey \ 35
Mardin, Adana, Mersin, and Antalya) spoke in favor of the granting of cultural and political
rights and the rights to self-administration. This percentage is distributed in the following
way: 42.5 percent support a federation, 13 percent an autonomy, and 19.4 percent other
forms (the extension of cultural and political rights). A second important result is that 34.8
percent of those surveyed have relatives in the PKK. See Milliyet, 17 Aug. 1995.
27. At demonstrations occurring during burials of PKK victims, nationalistic and
Islamist slogans predominate, directed against human rights and democratization but also
against HEP and DEP. See Milliyet, 24 March 1992; Hurriyet, 24 March 1992; Nokta,
16 Feb. 1992.
28. See Nokta, 16 Feb. 1992; 23 Feb. 1992; 7 July 1993; Aktuel, no. 11, 17 Nov.
1993; Ozgiir Ulke, 24 Nov. 1994; 25 Nov. 1994; Ikibirie Dogru, 7 Feb. 1993.
29. See Hurriyet, 5 Feb. 1995; Milliyet, 16 Dec. 1994.
30. For a more detailed study of the Turkish Association for Human Rights, see
Heidi Wedel,"Vom Motor der Demokratisierung zum Opfer der eskalierenden Gewalt?
Der Menschenrechtsverein in der Tiirkei," in Jorg Spath, ed., ". . . alles dndert sich dieganze
Zeit." Soziale Bewegung(en) inNahen Osten (Freiburg: 1994), 128-34.
31. See Turkish Probe, 1 April (1994), 14-15; 13 May (1994), 18; Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, 1 July 1994; IHD $ube ve Temsilciliklerinin Olaganiistii HalBolge Raporu,
17-83.
32. Seejunge Welt, 9 Feb. 1995.
33. For information on the views of MHP chairman Alparslan Tiirkes, see Aktuel,
no.15, 21 July 1993, 50-53; Milliyet, 12 Jan. 1995.
34. See Hidir Goktas/Rusen Cakir, Vatan Millet Pragmatizm, Turk Saginda Ideoloji
ve Politiha (Istanbul: 1991), 25-32; Tiirkiye SosyalEkonomik Siyasal Arastirmalar Vakfi: Sosyal
demokrasi acisindan Kurt sorunu (Istanbul: 1992); Mehmet Bedri Gultekin: Ikibinlerin
esiginde Kurt sorunu (Istanbul: 1993); Nokta, 3 and 10 June 1990.
35. See Milliyet, 19 and 20 Jan. 1995; speech of Cem Boyner in Washington, D.C.,
6 Nov. 1994.
36. See, in particular, Metin Sever/Cem Dizdar; Cumhuriyet Tarttsmalan (Ankara:
1993); Murat Beige, "The Kurdish Question in Turkey Today. A Personal Assessment," in
Zeitschriftfur Turkeistudien, 5. Jg., Heft 2 (1992), 259-66.
37. For a study of the new social movements, see Heidi Wedel, "Ansatze einer
Zivilgesellschaft in der Tiirkischen Republik—Trager der Demokratisierung oder neue
Eliteorganisation?" in Ferhad Ibrahim/Heidi Wedel, eds., Probleme der Zivilgesellschaft im
Vorderen Orient (Opladen: 1995), 113-14; Gulistan Giirbey, "Politische und rechtliche Hin-
dernisse auf dem Wege der Herausbildung einer Zivilgesellschaft in der Tiirkei," ibid.,
95-111.
38. See Karl W. Deutsch and WJ. Foltz, eds., Nation-building (New York: 1963).
39. For an analysis of the concepts of nationalism, nation, and ethnicity, see in par-
ticular Georg Elwert, Nationalismus und Ethnizitat (Berlin: 1989).
40. See Martin van Bruinessen, "The Ethnic Identity of the Kurds," in Peter A.
Andrews, Ethnic Groups in Turkey, 613-21; Martin van Bruinessen, "Ursprung und Ent-
wicklung des Kurdischen Nationalismus in der Tiirkei," Berliner Institut fur Vergieichende
sozial furschung, eds.; Kurden im Exil, vol. 3 (1993), 18-22; Martin van Bruinessen, Agha,
Scheich und Staat, Politik und Gesellschaft Kurdistans (Berlin: 1989), 51-3; Giinter Behrendt,
Nationalismus in Kurdistan Vorgeschichte, Entstehungsbedingungen und erste Manifestationen
bis 1925 (Hamburg: 1993).
41. See Lothar A. Heinrich, Die kurdische Nationalbewegung in der Tiirkei (Ham-
burg: 1989), 9-41; Ferhad Ibrahim, "Ethnischer Konflikt, soziale Marginalisierung und
36 / THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Gewalt: Zum Befreiungskonzept der "Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan," in Thomas Scheffler,
ed., Ethnizitdt und Ge-walt (Hamburg: 1991), 81-87.
42. See PKK Der Weg der Revolution Kurdistans (Manifesto) (Koln: 1978/86; PICK,
Programm (Koln: 1978/84); Ismet G. Imset, A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey
(Ankara: 1992).
43. Abdullah Ocalan stated that the PKK does not murder civilians or members of
civilian organizations but those that fight it under "civilian" guise. Furthermore, he claimed
that it does not murder teachers; the murdered teachers were not true teachers but mem-
bers of NAP/MHP units. See Ozgur Ulke, 6 Nov. 1994.
44. See Mehmet Ali Birand, APO ve PKK, 276; Omer Erzeren,"Von der Guerilla
zur Intifada? Die tiirkische Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans PKK," in Bahmand Niruman, ed.,
Die kurdische Arbeiterpartei Kurdistans, PKK (Hamburg: 1992), 163-64; interview with
former member of the Turkish secret service Prof. Mahir Kaynak, Nokta, 5 April 1992.
45. For information on the views of PKK leader Adullah Ocalan, see in particular
Rafet Balli, KurtDosyasi (Istanbul: 1992), 202-308; Nezih Tavlas, Semih Idiz, Aziz Utkan,
Sema Emiroglu, APO'ylayuzyiize (Ankara: 1992), 11-14, 21-5, 64, 71-73, 79-80; Dogu
Perincek, Abdullah Ocalan He Goriisme (Istanbul: 1990), 63-5; Hiirriyet, 6 Dec. 1994; Nokta,
23 Feb. (1992): 12-13; Nokta, 4 Oct. (1993), 12-13 (interview with Kani Yilmaz, the
ERNK European representative); Milliyet, 26-7 March 1992; (article by Yalcin Dogan on
his interview with Ocalan); Ozgiir Ulke, 4 June 1994; (interview with Ocalan); Ozgiir Ulke,
30 Sept. 1994.
46. See Nezih Tavlas et al., 61-62; Ozgiir Ulke, 27 Nov. 1994; 4 Dec. 1994; Hur-
riyet, 29 Nov. 1994; Ozgur Politika, 22 Oct. 1995.
47. Turkish columnist Yalcin Dogan declared after an interview with Ocalan and a
visit to the southeast that the majority of the Kurdish population supports the PKK. He
stated that the PKK has obviously made progress and has become a political organization
there. The Kurdish movement has become so strong that it will continue to exist even with-
out the PKK. An economic integration of the crisis regions through the giant South
Anatolia Project (GAP) would not solve the problem; cultural rights have to be granted in
parallel to it. See Nokta, 5 April (1992), 10-11.
48. See Landesamt fur Ausldnderextremismus in Berlin, vol. 1, no. 4 (1994), 16.
49. See Kurdistan Report (Bonn), no. 74, May-June 1995, 23.
50. See Ozgur Ulke, 18, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27 Jan. 1995; Millieyt, 11 Jan. 1995; Hur-
riyet, 13 Jan. 1995; Frankfurter Allgemeine, 13 April 1995; Frankfurter Rundschau, 13 April
1995. The Kurdistan parliament in exile (KPE) has sixty-five members. The political wing
of the PKK, the National Liberation Front of Kurdistan (ERNK), with twelve seats, is the
strongest force. Second in strength is the banned DEP, with six parliamentarians. The par-
liament in exile expressly views itself as an approachable partner in the negotiation process.
In its thirty-five-point program, it has determined its goals for the future, including, among
others to get the Kurdish issue on the agenda of international bodies, to obtain observer
status in these organizations, to intensify diplomatic and political relations, to convene a
national congress and a national parliament on the soil of a free Kurdistan, and to fight for
the recognition of an international status of Kurdistan. See Kurdistan Parliament in Exile,
12-16 April 1995 (The Hague, The Netherlands), 23-25.
51. See Milliyet, 24 Feb. 1992; Sahin Alpay: "PKK meselesi," Milliyet, 26 Jan. 1995;
interview with Dogu Ergi\, Aktiiel, 28 Oct. 1993; 3 Nov. (1993), 65, 70.
52. For a detailed analysis see Kemal Burkay, "Turk Hukuk Sistemi ve Kiirtler,"
in Paris Kurt Enstitusii: Uluslararast Paris Kurt Konferansi 14-15. Ekim 1989 (Istanbul:
Giiltstan Gtirbey \ 37
1992), 142-47; Rafet Balli, Kiirt Dosyasi, 376f; Hiirriyet, 2 Oct. 1994; Milliyet, 20 Feb.
1995; Nokta, 5 April (1992), 21.
53. See Aktiiel, 26 Aug. 1993,25-28.
54. See Sengiil Kihc, Biz ve Onlar, 11-113; Milliyet, 27 Feb. 1992; 14 April 1992;
14 Dec. 1993; Nokta, 2 Feb. 1992, 11; Hiirriyet, 15 July 1993.
55. For information on the positions of the DEP, see interviews of the author with
the deputy party chairman of the DEP, Remzi Kartal (Van) and the DEP-parliamentarian
Sedat Yurtda? (Diyarbakir) on 5 May 1994 in Ankara; letter by Leyla Zana in Siiddeutsche
Zeitung, 9 Dec. 1994; Interview with DEP chairman Hatip Dicle in Milliyet, 14 Feb. 1993;
Ozgiir Ulke, 26 July 1994; Milliyet, 11 Dec. 1994; Nokta, 24 March 1991, 14; 1 March
1992, 18; Sabah, 14 Dec. 1993.
56. In September 1993, DEP parliamentarian Mehmet Sincar was murdered in the
open streets of Batman while investigating "mysterious murders" there.
57. More than seventy DEP activists have been murdered. The murders have not
yet been solved. In early February 1994, general secretary of the DEP Murat Bozlak was
attacked and wounded in Ankara. Meanwhile, the wave of violence has spread to include
lawyers who defend the DEP and its parliamentarians.
58. Sedat Yurtdas and Ahmet Turk were released in October 1995.
59. See Hiirriyet, 27 June 1994; Milliyet, 27 June 1994.
60. See Kiirt Halhnin Haklan Bildirgesi, in Stockholm Kiirt Konferanst, 171-75; Ismet
Cheriff Vanly, Kurden im Exil, vol. 1, part 3, 14-15.
61. See Heiner Bielefeldt, Volkmar Deile, Bernd Thomsen, eds., Amnesty Inter-
national: Menschenrechte vor der Jahrtausendwende (Frankfurt: 1993), 85-87; Christian
Rumpf, Die Kurdenfrage in der Tiirkei, 218-19; Stefan Oeter, "Minderheitenschutz in
intemationalen Abkommen," in Forschungsinstitut der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, ed.,
Minderheitenund Antidiskriminierungspolitih Alternativen zur Integration? (Bonn: 1994),
27-42.
TURKEY'S KURDISH PROBLEM:
RECENT TRENDS
Aram Nigogosian
X urkey's Kurdish problem seemed isolated and under control for decades,
but the ramifications of this bitter struggle in the post—cold war era have made
it Turkey's most salient internal as well as external crisis. In this chapter I con-
centrate mainly on the internal dimension and analyze the evolving process of
polarization resulting from this fierce struggle between forces of suppression and
those of resistance and the clash of two antagonistic nationalisms. Critical policy
choices made by both sides will be examined. Relevant areas of concern include
economic, cultural and coercive factors, but the primary focus will be on the po-
litical arena. Significant goals enunciated by leaders on both sides will be evaluated
to see what they have actually accomplished.
While for the moment both sides can claim to have scored a degree of suc-
cess, neither side can claim to have secured its maximum objectives. The Turkish
state has not been able to suppress effectively the Kurdish insurgency, in spite of
allocations of a great deal of the nation's resources. The Kurdish nationalist move-
ment has not merely sustained its resistance but has grown in strength. It has,
however, been unable to establish a separate state or even to secure exclusive con-
trol over areas where it is active.
Specific factors shape the evolutionary path of this conflict in Turkey. Given
recent trends, the resulting synthesis can only insure increasing suppression, re-
sistance, polarization, alienation and violence. I examine significant obstacles to
resolving Turkey's Kurdish problem but, given this deadly dynamic, also consider
factors that can help reverse this process. I conclude by analyzing when and under
what conditions such opportunities could be generated and under what conditions
they may be exploited.
DYNAMICS OF THE CONFLICT
Since the Gulf war, the conflict between forces of the state attempting to suppress
a widespread insurrection by a national liberation movement of Turkey's Kurds
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and the movement's attempt to resist and to force the state to recognize cultural
and more troublesome ethnic-based political demands has turned more vicious.
Not only has the intensity and scale of the violence on both sides increased, but,
given the transnational nature of the problem, the struggle has been projected on
to the international arena.
The Turkish state has been attempting to eradicate Kurdish uprisings
since the establishment of the republic. It has often used a combination of poli-
cies, including military repression, forced assimilation and cooptation. Confining
the conflict primarily to the southeast has been a mixed blessing. It has en-
abled the state to use its coercive capabilities more fully, but it has also enabled
the countervailing forces of Kurdish nationalists to find sanctuary in these re-
mote and rugged areas. Given the inaccessible nature of some of the terrain,
even today's Turkish armed forces have difficulties locating and eradicating the
insurgents.
This isolation began to break down with the establishment of multiparty
politics in the post-World War II era. Competition for votes was the engine of
penetration by the state. Communication networks began to link the southeast to
the rest of Turkey as well as to the rest of the world. Possibilities of an alternative
political order for the Kurdish inhabitants of southeast Turkey, led by the siren call
for cultural rights, became the vehicle for group-based political demands. Sup-
pression of such manifestations became increasingly difficult. The possibility of
exiting the region and finding success in economic arenas—even in political life or
the military—became possible, as long as manifestations of politicized Kurdish-
ness were extinguished. While the effects of the communication revolution and
international demonstration of it penetrated the region through TV and radio,
providing the attraction of alternative lifestyles, the dislocation of the local econ-
omy as the direct result of the Gulf war slammed the door shut on hopes of eco-
nomic improvements. This occurred at the very time that the Kurds of Turkey
were witnessing the establishment of a quasi-state of Kurds in Iraq. Surely, Tur-
key's Kurds could also take a chance. It was in this pregnant moment that the
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) called for the Kurds of the region to gather
under its banner and found a receptive audience. The mass demonstrations of re-
sistance, the uprisings (serhildans) and the large-scale attacks on military posts at
first surprised the state. But deployments of security forces numbering some four
hundred thousand along with the introduction of air power seemed to curb the
PKK's military capabilities. As is normal in counterinsurgency operations, the
Turkish armed forces' inability to sort out those directly responsible for attacks
against its forces, the over-utilization of brute force and the neglect of positive
sanctions played right into the PKK's hands. For lack of alternatives, the PKK be-
came the defender of Turkey's Kurds who were under massive assaults by Turkey's
security forces. Its supporters and followers numbered in the millions and its mili-
tia grew from ragtag bands into battle-hardened units totaling thirty thousand.
And if PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's plans are fulfilled, the Popular Army for the
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Liberation of Kurdistan (ARGK) will reach fifty to sixty thousand, as called for
in the PKK's 5th Congress in 1995.1
How have these forces fared thus far? Their activities seem to have been
checked in many areas in which they dominated a few years ago. Prudent and
often innovative, the organization has limited its exposure by confining its mili-
tary operations near places that offer sanctuary. Seizing the initiative, they can
mount ambushes and retreat. But the large-scale destruction of Kurdish settle-
ments accompanied by the evacuation of the population who provided the
guerrilla units with intelligence, food and shelter have made their survival more
difficult. Therefore operations are launched in the outer perimeters of traditional
Kurdistan and even beyond, to places like Sivas and Hatay, to thin Turkish de-
ployments and lessen the pressure on their strongholds.2
As the number of military operations is reduced, the work of political or-
ganizations in the metropolitan regions of Turkey, with millions of displaced or
migrant Kurds, progresses. More advances are being made in the international
arena; the Kurdistan parliament in exile (KPE) is having meetings and Kurdish or-
ganizations are attempting to secure recognition from international agencies and
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). These developments are not uncom-
mon for national liberation movements. After having secured a degree of military
capability, such movements generally attempt to shift the focus to the negotiating
table. Although the PKK's offers to negotiate have, as of yet, been rebuffed by
Ankara, the fact that the head of German intelligence met with Ocalan3 and that
Ma1 sud Barzani, the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraqi
Kurdistan, invited Ocalan to a meeting recently4 has established that this organi-
zation, which has survived for seventeen years, cannot be ignored.
OUSTER FROM PARLIAMENT
In addition to the military dimension, the most important political action to cap-
ture the degree of alienation between a large portion of Turkey's Kurds and its
government is the expulsion of Kurdish representatives from the National As-
sembly, the banning of the Kurdish-supported Democracy Party (DEP), and the
arrest and imprisonment of eight parliamentarians in the spring and fall of 1994.
The expulsion of the parliamentarians seems to have been triggered in part by
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller's desire to play to the nationalist vote in forthcoming
elections.5 Democracy Party chair Hatip Dicle's characterization of five people,
including military cadets, who were killed in an explosion at a train station, as
appropriate targets in a war could not have come at a better time for the prime
minister. In response, she stated, "The time has come to take care of the case of
the PKK sheltering under the Parliament's roof. If behind the shield of immunity
those who have the blood of babies in their hands are protected in Parliament this
has nothing to do with democracy."6 Pushed by then-chief of staff Dogan Giires,,
the process of lifting the immunities of the most vociferous defenders of Kurdish
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claims—Selim Sadak, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan, Sirri Sakik, Leyla Zana,
Ahmet Turk, and Mahmut Alinak—took place on 2 and 3 March 1994. On 3
August they were indicted on charges of treason/sedition under Article 125, pun-
ishable by death, on flimsy evidence and dubious testimony. They were tried on
reduced non-capital charges (Article 168, 169) for belonging to or assisting an il-
legal armed group (the PKK) and sentenced to three and a half to fifteen years on
7 December. On 16 October 1995, Turkey's appeals court upheld the fifteen-year
sentences of the most outspoken of the group and released two for retrial. Chief
prosecutor Nusret Demiral was outraged and stated the defendants should have
been executed. In June 1994 the Constitutional Court also suspended the man-
date of thirteen members of the Democracy Party. Six of these fled to Brussels to
meet up with former party chair Yas,ar Kaya. Together they went on to establish
the Kurdistan parliament in exile (KPE).
The KPE was established to give voice to inhabitants of Kurdistan. Domi-
nated by parliamentarians of Kurdish origin expelled from the Turkish National
Assembly, an attempt has been made to incorporate a cross section composed of
politicians, writers, members of youth and religious organizations and minority
groups, such as the Assyrians, the Yezidis, and the Alevis. The PKK and its
adjunct organizations comprise the largest single block of the KPE's sixty-five
members. The first meeting of the KPE took place in The Hague in April 1995,
in spite of a great deal of pressure from the Turkish and U.S. governments that
this body not be permitted to meet. Turkey withdrew its ambassador from The
Netherlands in protest and stopped military purchases—temporarily, as it turned
out—from the Dutch. In July the KPE's second and more discrete meeting took
place in Vienna. But it was the KPE's third meeting in Moscow in November
1995 that raised serious concerns in Ankara as well as in Washington. Since the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey has envisaged an important role for itself
in Central Asia given its linguistic affinities and historical connections with that
region. Europe and the United States encouraged this vision, hoping to exploit
the enhanced presence of Turkey in Central Asia for their own geopolitic and
geostrategic interests. Europe and the United States are interested particularly in
the large oil and natural gas resources of Central Asia. Turkish aspirations, how-
ever, clashed with extensive Russian presence in the region. The fact that Russian
government authorities allowed the KPE to meet in Moscow, even though the
Yeltsin administration did not officially support the meeting, coupled with Rus-
sian claims that Turkish intelligence was actively supporting the Chechens in their
war against Russia, seems to indicate that both sides have prepared the ground for
carrying on proxy wars in each other's backyards, as Robert Olson argues in a sub-
sequent chapter.
The KPE's success in receiving recognition from several European govern-
ments and setting up information centers in several European cities, as well as
establishing close connections with a plethora of international organizations and
other Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), have contributed to keeping
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Turkey's Kurdish problem in the international limelight. Following the example of
the PLO before it became a respected organization, the KPE attempts to place the
plight of the Kurds, particularly the Kurds of Turkey, on the international agenda.
Its various committees have been tasked to work on a array of judicial, educational,
cultural, ethnic, religious and human rights issues that affect the Kurdish people.
The KEP, at least in its public announcements, advocates a negotiated resolution
to the Kurdish problem in Turkey, It offers a spectrum of solutions ranging from
regional autonomy and binational federation to various schemes of political devo-
lution. The most critical issues in these proffered solutions are the separation and
delegation of powers and the equitable distribution of resources.7
The disenfranchisement and ouster of elected Kurdish parliamentarians
is tantamount to the closure of the political process to a significant portion of
Turkey's Kurds who elected them in overwhelming numbers. This sense of being
ousted from legitimate political discourse has increased support for the forces of
the Kurdish liberation movement in Turkey. It is no wonder that PKK is seen by
a large number of Turkey's Kurds as the only effective organization left defending
the interests as well as the honor of Turkey's Kurds. Attempts by others, includ-
ing Kurdish as well as non-Kurdish politicians, to bring grievances of Turkey's
Kurds to the National Assembly have secured little in the way of remedies.
SCORCHED EARTH
In conjunction with efforts to curtail the actions of the most outspoken of Kurd-
ish representatives in Parliament, the Turkish military took measures that further
alienated Turkey's Kurds. In order to deny aid and shelter to the guerrilla forces of
the PKK, large scale destruction and evacuation of villages and settlements began
near the Syrian and Iraqi borders. In 1994 these measures were applied in Tunceli
and its outlying neighboring provinces of Bingol and even as far as Sivas. More
than half the villages and hamlets in Tunceli have been destroyed and the popu-
lation has either fled or been forced out. The Netherlands Kurdish Society and the
Human Rights Organization of Turkey have documented these atrocities.8 The
savagery even outraged members of the Turkish government. The minister of
state for human rights, Azimet Koyluoglii, commented that "in Tunceli, it is the
state that is evacuating and burning villages. Acts of terrorism in other regions are
done by the PKK. In Tunceli it is state terrorism." This was noted on 10 October
1994.9 Today more than twenty-five hundred villages and settlements have been
made uninhabitable and more than 2 million people have been forced out. Kamer
Gene, Tunceli MP representative and formerly deputy chairman of the Parlia-
ment, claimed 70 to 80 percent of villagers in Tunceli had been driven out of their
homes and pastures.10 Algan Hacaloglu, Koyliioglii's replacement, after return-
ing from a visit to Tunceli in August 1995, stated, "Tunceli looks like Bosnia or
Palestine—people in their difficulties, in their hunger, are no different."11 He also
complained that the state was not providing assistance to those who needed it.12
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The PKK has been able to channel into political as well as military arenas the raw
anger generated by the state security forces' indiscriminate measures.
PKK's AGENDA FOR THE NEAR FUTURE
Having examined the Turkish state's attempt to control the PKK-led insurgency,
which has been transformed into a national liberation struggle, in the action-
reaction scenario, can we predict in which direction the PKK will take the fight?
Decisions taken by its 5th Congress in January 1995 may provide some answers.13
There seems to be a strong call for centralized control. As it happens, all organi-
zations that rapidly expand face communication and control problems. As usual
for the PKK, there is sharp criticism of those tasked with implementing policies
and pointing out serious shortcomings. The formulators of policy, on the other
hand, continue to be beyond reproach. In the military arena, a decision to increase
the size of ARGK to fifty to sixty thousand,14 with its command structure being
closely monitored by the central committee as well as by political officers down the
chain of command, indicates possible inadequacies brought on by rapid expansion
of forces. If these plans are implemented, the Turkish security forces will also have
to increase their capabilities in order to be able to keep PKK forces in check. But
it is in the political arena of the national liberation movement (ERNK) that one
can discern changes. The call for respecting the Geneva Conventions on treatment
of POWs and of civilian noncombatants is stipulated but often is breached.15
The base of the organization has been expanded by appealing to all inhabitants of
Kurdistan, from all ethnic groups and religious sects.16 The ability of the PKK to
organize groups that have traditionally experienced enmities and insecurities
in their relations—which the state has exploited and continues to do so—is a sig-
nificant accomplishment that has enabled the PKK to broaden its scope of opera-
tions, compelling security forces to be thinly stretched.
The establishment of a National Assembly, as well as a Temporary Revo-
lutionary Government, is planned.17 In addition, Iraqi Kurdistan is targeted for
an unfriendly merger, if that is what it will take to unify Kurdistan.18 This is the
true meaning of the 2 August offensive. The decision to utilize a diplomatic of-
fensive to secure recognition, acceptance and eventually legitimacy from NGOs,
the United Nations, the European Union and the European Parliament as well
as from the European Human Rights Commission for the ERNK, the Popular
Liberation Front for Kurdistan, is specified. The PKK in particular would like
ERNK recognized as a legitimate political entity. Even political cosmetics have
not been neglected: Ever ready to adapt to changing circumstances, the ham-
mer and sickle have been dropped from the flag, acknowledging the passing of the
cold war.19
In addition to the military and political aspects of their organization, culture
and education also get attention. Opening schools and the teaching of Kurdish
language and culture will be implemented. MED TV, which is alleged not to be di-
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rectly linked to the PKK, is broadcasting via satellite from Europe to all Kurds in
the Middle East should go a long way to providing some of these functions.
PROSPECTS
At best, Turkey faces a precarious balance of forces, obtained at great human
and material cost. More than 200,000 have died since 1985 and Turkey spent an
estimated $8 billion fighting the war in 1995. The array of forces rallying around
Prime Minister (filler for the forthcoming elections will most likely press with
even more vigor to eradicate the Kurdish nationalist movement led by the PKK.
The PKK will in turn attempt to broaden its struggle, perhaps through the medi-
ation of Alevi Kurds and/or by making alliances with the large and increasingly
unhappy, both Kurdish and Turkish, Alevi population.20 The formation of an
alliance between disaffected Kurds and Alevis, mediated by Kurdish Alevis (of
the estimated 20 million Alevis, an estimated 3 to 4 million are Kurdish), is a
nightmare scenario for any government in Turkey. Numbering close to 20 million,
Alevis believe in a more tolerant version of Islam than the mainstream Sunni or-
thodoxy that predominates in Turkey. Alevism is close to Twelver Shi'ism (such
as exists in Iran) in much of its belief system, practices, rituals and traditions. The
Alevis are known for emphasizing egalitarian treatment of women and condone
drinking of alcohol, as well as dancing and music. These very practices have set
them at odds with their Sunni neighbors from time to time. The Alevis hetero-
doxy makes them suspect by some Sunnis. During the early days of the republic,
the Alevis were strong supporters of the declared secular state, especially before
the multiparty period that commenced in 1950, because the state suppressed and
tamed the dominant Sunni religious hierarchy.
In the 1990s, as more provinces, cities, towns and smaller governmental
units coming under the administrative sway of the Welfare Party (WP), the Alevis
have come under increasing pressures. On occasions their prayer houses (cemevis)
have been threatened. Alevis of Kurdish origin, as mentioned above, perhaps
amounting to 20 to 25 percent of all Alevis in Turkey, face double jeopardy: They
are both non-orthodox and Kurdish. Increasing pressures on the Alevi communi-
ties exploded in riots in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other cities in March 1995.
Particularly fierce were clashes in Istanbul, where twenty Alevis were shot to death
by the police and many others were wounded. Property damage was considerable,
accompanied by looting and arson. Order was restored only after intervention by
the Turkish army. It was no coincidence that some of the rioters were Alevi Kurds
displaced after their villages and homes in southeast Turkey had been destroyed by
the Turkish armed forces.
In order to counter the possibility of increased dissent among the Alevis,
and especially the Kurds among them, the Turkish government has attempted to
coopt or, at least, to divide the Alevi community by favoring the more moderate
elements within the community. Ankara also purportedly offers financial incen-
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tives to those groups demonstrating allegiance to the government. The Alevi prob-
lem, like the Kurdish problem, is not confined to any one region. Recent clashes
between Turkish armed forces in the provinces of Hatay, which is adjacent to the
Syrian border, and a large Alevi population of Arab ethnic origin, as well as in
Sivas, may be harbingers of developments to come.
HOPEFUL SIGNS
In this overwhelmingly bleak landscape there are a few small rays of hope. There
are those in Turkey, Kurd and Turk, who, at their own peril, put forth the pos-
sibility of a political resolution of Turkey's Kurdish question. Dogu Ergil's The
Southeast Report (Giiney Dogu Sorunu), and a study, Report on Eastern Anatolia,
just issued by Sakip Sabanci, one of the leading industrialists in Turkey, are ef-
forts in this direction. The state security court dropped its investigation of Ergil's
work as being inflammatory and separatist in December 1995, while Mr. Sabanci
prudently edited out part of his report dealing with the political basis of Tur-
key's eastern problem. Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, which has recently been
modified but not abolished, will keep a lid on open discussion and advocacy of po-
litical solutions such as devolution, more local autonomy, federation and other
proposals.
While the Ergil work aroused a lot of controversy and criticism because
of the scientific methodology it utilized in carrying out the survey as well as
some taboos that it articulated concerning the unity of the state, a selective review
of its findings is constructive. From a stratified sample from Diyabakir, Batman,
(Kiziltepe and Niiseybin districts of) Mardin, as well as from Adana, Mersin and
Antalya where, large numbers of Kurds have settled, 1,267 respondents were in-
terviewed. Results would perhaps be more robust if Tunceli and Istanbul had been
included. Ergil s work did, however, come up with some interesting statistics,
whatever their provenance. The following are among its findings: 91 percent iden-
tified themselves as Kurds; 65 percent said they used Kurdish at home; 63 percent
wanted Kurdish as the second state language; 35 percent admitted having some-
one close in the PKK; 77 percent did not think the Turkish army could suppress
the PKK; 47 percent of those who responded—65 percent did not—supported
PKK actions; 48 percent were appalled by the PKK's violence and intolerance; and
a total of 88 percent called for new political structures for Turkey. Of those sur-
veyed, 13 percent were for independence, 43 percent for federation, 19 percent for
local self-government, and 13 percent for autonomy. It is remarkable that 35 per-
cent of the respondents admitted to having someone close in the ranks of the
PKK, especially given the fact that the Kurdish regions are under extremely tight
security. Relations of known PKK members are routinely harassed, detained and
tortured. Some disappear without a trace, while others turn up dead.
One of the most significant findings of Ergil's study, which, it must be re-
membered, was conducted under the aegis of the government, makes credible the
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claim that the PKK is not a handful of terrorists but a liberation movement with
a wide popular base. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents stated that they did
not think the Turkish army would be able to defeat the PKK. Such statements
may be bravado and reflect an unrealistic appraisal of the state's military capa-
bilities, but they do demonstrate a high degree of motivation and morale among
the Kurds, which will make suppression, especially political suppression, of this
movement difficult.
Eighty-eight percent of the respondents' unhappiness with the present
status is also significant. While those calling for total independence from Turkey
are few (13 percent), the call for new political arrangements is overwhelming. This
suggests that to continue to avoid addressing a political formula to defuse Turkey's
Kurdish problem will only make it worse. Finally, and not surprisingly, 77 percent
of those who had migrated did not expect to be happy in their new situations, and
84 percent did not think they would ever live in peace.
These troublesome findings may change for the better if economic growth
improves the average Kurd's life and if changes in government policy enable
Turkey's Kurds to preserve and to propagate their culture and identities: To do less
will make the resolution of this conflict even more difficult. It is not surprising that
influential businessmen who appreciate the great expenses incurred in the state's
attempts to crush the Kurdish nationalist movement by military means were the
sponsors of Dogu Ergil's study. It may be a trial balloon and merely an attempt to
ascertain what the Kurds want or what they would be satisfied with in order
to make informed policy decisions. One result of better informed policy decisions
could, of course, be continued, or even more, suppression. But even if the strong
rebuff from the nationalists and the military dampen discussion of alternatives,
this study does create an environment that at least suggests dialogue between the
two parties. Whether it will amount to more remains to be seen.
ELECTION OUTCOMES
In the elections of 24 December 1995, the WP came in first with 21.4 percent
of the vote and 158 representatives in the parliament. The MP won 19.7 percent
of the vote but, because of the electoral system, obtained 132 seats. The TPP
won 19.1 percent of the vote and 135 seats. The DLP captured 14.6 percent of
the vote and 76 seats, and the RPP ended up with 10.7 percent of the votes and
48 seats.21
Seven other parties failed to secure the required national threshold of 10
percent and, thus, were awarded no seats. Of these, the most significant were the
National Action Party (NAP), which received 8.2 percent, and the Kurdish-
supported Peoples' Democracy Party (PDP), known as HADEP, that secured only
4.2 percent of the vote. HADEP had made significant gains in the heavily Kurd-
ish populated areas of the southeast but failed to obtain the votes of millions of
Kurds who had moved to cities in the west of Turkey. In rural areas, particularly
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in Mardin and Tunceli, security forces may have intimidated voters against voting
for HADEP. In the cities, new migrants may not have been registered, but this in
itself does not explain fully why HADEP did not do better in the cities in the west
of Turkey.
Because HADEP did not receive sufficient votes to pass the national thresh-
old, the WP scored impressive wins in some of the Kurdish-inhabited provinces.
It won more than 50 percent of the parliamentary seats in Diyarbakir (50 percent);
Bingol (100 percent); Erzurum (75 percent); Van (50 percent); Agri (60 percent);
Bitlis (50 percent); Elazig(60 percent); Siirt (67 percent); Malatya (57 percent);
Mus 50 percent); Mardin (50 percent); and §anhurfa (50 percent). In a five-way
race, the results demonstrate an impressive achievement for the WP. Its strong
showing in the 1995 election will provide the WP with an enhanced organizational
base in future campaigns.
In contrast, HADEP, which staged the largest rallies and secured the sup-
port of 30 to 50 percent of voters in southeast provinces, did not do well with
Kurdish voters outside of this region. The new migrants to western urban areas,
assisted in their transition to urban life by WP's Tammany Hall-like apparatuses,
may not have wanted to risk such support by voting for a party that championed
Kurdish rights and defended Kurdish nationalist aspirations. Many urban centers
had been under WP administration for a number of years. They had organized
their constituents at the grass roots, down to the block level. HADEP decided to
run only a few months before the elections were to take place. Nevertheless, it
seems that their appeals based on Kurdish nationalism and in defense of Kurdish
social and cultural rights could not compete with the WP's concrete assist-
ance programs delivered along with Islamist discourse. Some of the Kurds in the
west may also have made the calculation that the present administration, headed
by Prime Minister Tansu (filler, which is hostile to the Kurds, could only be
brought down by a WP victory. This voting calculus may also have contributed to
HADEP's poor showing.
It seems clear that a True Path Party (TTP)-Motherland Party (MP)
coalition with a Democratic Left Party (DLP), a Republican Peoples' Party
(RPP), or a TPP-National Action Party (NAP) coalition will result in continu-
ing suppression and political impasse. A MP-WP coalition, if permitted by the
military, may attempt a less confrontational approach to dealing with Turkey's
Kurdish problem. If the threat to Turkey's secularism, raised by the WP's partici-
pation in government, is not sufficient, rapprochement with Turkey's alienated
Kurds may precipitate a military intervention. The repeated reminders by chief of
the general staff, General Hakki Karadayi, that "Turkish Armed Forces are the
guarantors of a democratic and secular republic,"22 should not be taken lightly.
President Demirel's statement that "Turkey is a unitary state. There is one state,
one country, one flag and one language; this cannot be changed,"23 may not be
sufficiently reassuring to keep the military in their garrisons if such a coalition
were to come to power.
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Given the demographics of this unhappy population, which does not seem
to be broken in spirit even under today's harsh conditions in Turkey, it is certainly
possible that recruiters for the PKK will not have serious difficulties in making
their quotas from this group. But as the scale of violence between state repression
and Kurdish resistance escalates and the costs become even more burdensome,
other brave souls may come forward. Certainly, weak coalition governments, to
which Turkey seems destined in the foreseeable future, cannot realistically under-
take the needed steps toward change. Unconditional support of Turkey's current
policies by its closest allies also does not encourage the necessary political change.
It seems most likely that even the recently announced limited constitutional
changes would not have been implemented without external pressure. Both inter-
nal and external pressures may be useful, but Professor Ergil's point that "we have
to find the means to integrate them [Kurds] in Turkey while there is still time,"24
is critical.
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KURDISH INFIGHTING:
THE PKK-KDP CONFLICT
Michael Gunter
l\t first glance it might be expected that, given the oft-quoted maxim "The
Kurds have no friends," the various Kurdish groups at least would be natural allies.
A brief survey of the numerous and at times bitter divisions in Kurdish society,
however, would quickly disabuse one of this notion.1 Since 1994, for example, the
two main Iraqi Kurdish parties, Masud Barzani's Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP)2 and Jalal Talanbani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)3 have been
locked in an on-again, off-again struggle that has cost some three thousand lives
while bringing chaos and ruin to much of their domain. In addition, of course, the
divide-and-rule strategies of the neighboring states containing Kurdish popula-
tions have reinforced these differences.
On 26 August 1995, yet another dimension of this Kurdish divide erupted.
With the tacit cooperation of Syria, Iran and the PUK, Abullah (Apo) Oca-
lan's Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)4—the most violent, radical and successful
Kurdish movement to emerge in Turkey in many years—was able to mass up to
twenty-five hundred fighters and suddenly attack some twenty KDP bases and of-
fices in its Bahdiani homeland in northern Iraq. Sporadic but bitter fighting led to
hundreds of deaths throughout the fall of 1995, until the PKK finally declared a
provisional cease-fire early in December 1995. The purpose of this chapter is to
analyze the checkered and often obscure relationship between these two Kurdish
parties that has led to the present situation. In so doing, light will not only be
thrown upon recent events in Iraqi Kurdistan but upon various other aspects of
the Kurdish question in the Middle East.
EARLIER ALLIANCES
Ironically, the PKK and KDP were once former allies. In July 1983 the two
signed an accord called "Principles of Solidarity" under which they each agreed
upon a unified commitment against every kind of imperialism, with American
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imperialism at the top of the list, and a struggle against the plans and plots of
imperialism in the region.5 The two also committed themselves to "cooperat-
ing with other revolutionary forces in the region and the creation of new alli-
ances."
Another provision of their protocol emphasized that the struggle "should
depend on the force of the Kurdish people." Article 10 of the agreement states
that neither party should interfere in the internal affairs of the other or commit
actions that could damage the other. The eleventh and final article declares that if
one of them makes a mistake in implementing their alliance and ignores a warn-
ing from the other, then the alliance could be terminated.
At first the accord worked well for both parties. PKK militants being trained
in Syrian and Lebanese camps were slowly moved to northern Iraq, where new
camps were established. PKK leaders apparently traveled mostly through Tehran
and then to northern Iraq, while the foot soldiers moved from Syria as armed
groups over the Turkish border near Silopi and Cizre. From there they traveled on
foot over the Silopi-S, lrnak-Uludere path into northern Iraq.
Soon the Lolan camp, located in the triangle of land where Turkey, Iran and
Iraq meet, became the PKK's largest base in this newfound sanctuary. This camp
also contained the PKK press and publications center, as well as the KDP's head-
quarters and clandestine radio stations. It was at this time in 1984 that Barzani
and Ocalan actually met each other in Damascus for the first and apparently the
only time.6
Relations between the two began to cool in 1985, however, because of the
PKK's violence against women and children and even members of the KDP itself
considered by the PKK as collaborators with Turkey. In May 1987, the KDP
issued a warning to the PKK, as required under their accord of 1983. In this
caveat, the KDP declared that "it is clear they [the PKK] have adopted an ag-
gressive attitude towards the leadership of our party, towards its policies and the
friends of our party."7
Barzani's KDP denounced what it called "terrorist operations within the
country and abroad and their actions to liquidate human beings" and went on to
observe that "the mentality behind such actions is against humanity and democ-
racy and is not in line with the national liberation of Kurdistan." Turkish pressures
also played a role in ending the PKK-KDP alliance, which was severed completely
by the end of 1987.
A little more than a year later, the other major Kurdish party in Iraq, Tala-
bani's PUK, signed a "Protocol of Understanding" with the PKK in Damascus8
that called for strengthening Kurdish unity and for cooperation and joint action
by Kurdish groups. Indeed, Talabani even threatened to give overt support to
Ocalan if Turkey repeated its earlier military incursions into northern Iraq in
search of PKK guerrillas hiding there.9 Within a year, however, Ocalan declared
the protocol with Talabani "null and void."10
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TURKEY'S ROLE
In May 1988, shortly after the KDP and PKK formally ended their alliance, the
KDP and PUK officially announced the creation of the Iraqi Kurdistan Front
(IKF) between their two parties and at one time or another six other, smaller
groups in Iraqi Kurdistan. As the results of the Gulf war in 1991 began to bring
the Turks and Iraqi Kurds together,11 the IKF declared on 7 October 1991 its in-
tention to "combat the PKK."12 Although the Turkish bombing of PKK camps in
northern Iraq momentarily caused Barzani to consider rescinding this decision,
the logic of the Turkish connection prevailed.
At regular intervals Turkey has renewed the mandate of the U.S.-supported
Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), based in southeastern Turkey, to enforce the
no-fly zone that protects the Iraqi Kurdish enclave from Saddam Hussein. Al-
though by so doing Turkey was supporting the emergence of an embryonic Iraqi
Kurdish state that was anathema to its interests, abandoning the OPC would
simply lead it to regroup elsewhere and thus strip Ankara of any influence over the
course of events. Begrudgingly, therefore, Turkey continued to play its new role as
part-time protector of the Iraqi Kurds.
For their part, the Iraqi Kurds felt dependent on Turkey. Given the catch-22,
double economic blockade imposed on them by both the United Nations and
Saddam Hussein, the Habur (Ibrahim al-Khalil) border crossing point with Turkey
just north of Zakho was the only legal entry point for commerce and customs
revenues, which amounted to approximately 1150,000 per day. Hoshyar Zebari, a
foreign policy spokesman for the KDP, explained: "Turkey is our lifeline to the
West and the whole world in our fight against Saddam Hussein. We are able to
secure allied air protection and international aid through Turkey's cooperation.
If Poised Hammer [OPC] is withdrawn, Saddam's units will again reign in this
region and we will lose everything."13
For his part, Talabani concluded that "Turkey must be considered a country
friendly to the [Iraqi] Kurds."14 By the time he met with Turkish Prime Minister
Suleyman Demirel in June 1992, the Turkish leader was referring to the PUK
leader as "my dear brother Talabani,"15 while Talabani declared that "the people in
northern Iraq will never forget the help of the Turkish Government and people in
their difficult days." Talabani even went so far as to suggest that the Iraqi Kurds
might want to be annexed by Turkey. Given the PKK's longstanding struggle
against Turkey, this pro-Turkish position of the Iraqi Kurds began to cause Ocalan
increasing difficulties.
Talabani apparently made one last attempt to bring Ocalan around by argu-
ing that the "PKK must respond positively to Turkish President Turgut Ozal's
statement [on Kurdish rights] by halting its armed activities and by looking for a
dialogue with the Turkish government."16 Late in November 1991, the PUK leader
reported that the PKK had agreed to a four-month cease-fire so long as Turkey did
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not initiate any further hostilities: "Ocalan will not resort to armed activities until
Nawroz [Nevroz-21 March]."17
The purported offer came after a month of direct contacts between the PKK
and the Iraqi Kurds who were acting for the Turks. One of the PKK negotiators
was even quoted as declaring: "The PKK no longer pursues a claim of indepen-
dence and does not want any further bloodshed."18 Ocalan himself went on to
argue: "They say we are separatists and want to separate. This is nonsense! We
have nine hundred years of togetherness with Turkey."19 Calling Ocalan's offer into
question, however, PKK representatives in Germany denied that the organization
had agreed to a cease-fire and declared that attacks in the southeast of Turkey
would continue.20
P K K - I R A Q I KURDISH POLEMICS
In the middle of December 1991, Ocalan reportedly crossed into northern Iraq
from his safehouse in Syria to meet Talabani at his headquarters. Their meeting
took place amid reports that Talabani's military forces (peshmergas) had arrested
seven members of the PKK Central Committee. Although no statement was
issued by the two Kurdish leaders, presumably they failed to come to an agree-
ment. Shortly afterward Ocalan sarcastically declared that Talabani had written
him from Ankara to "lay down your arms unilaterally, accept a cease-fire, come to
Ankara and sit at the table with obscure people, and be thankful and grateful for
whatever you are given."21
Defiantly, Ocalan declared: "I am allergic to such letters," adding that "if
they try to make us collaborate, we will react with more fervor than they could
muster to defend that policy." Talabani was told "to forget about the 'new world
order, 'U.S. support,' and 'freedom to the Kurds,' slogans," and instead, "join the
militarization and resistance effort" and "not act as a minor broker in dealing with
the people." For Barzani, Ocalan had even worse remarks: "Barzani does the same
job in a more pompous manner."22 The KDP leader "had made very bad business
dealings in Kurdish blood. His is the policy of a broker."
In February 1992, the IKF issued a warning to the PKK that "if it failed to
cease activities against Turkey, it would be purged from the region."23 Talabani de-
clared that "his party does not approve of activities directed against Turkey by the
terrorist organization active in southeastern Anatolia,"24 while Barzani maintained
that "the behavior of the . . . [PKK] has led to the ruin of the reputation of Kurds
everywhere."25 Barzani also denounced the PKK actions during Nawroz [Nevroz]
in March 1992 as "savagery" and "terrorist."26
Ocalan called Barzani a "collaborator, . . . reactionary, feudal person and a
primitive nationalist."27 He accused both Barzani and Talabani of "trying to stab
the PKK in the back by cooperating with Turkey and noted that the two leaders
have signed their own death warrants."28 The PKK leader added that "the first
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thing we must do is remove these leeches. . . . They espouse the views of the fas-
cist Turks. These two leaders are now our enemies."
Ocalan went on to claim that he would challenge Barzani and Talabani both
militarily and politically in northern Iraq and isolate them.29 Indeed, earlier Ocalan
had already questioned the very support Barzani and Talabani had among their
followers: "These organizations and leadership, which have little support among
the people, are . . . a narrowly based clique."30 Now the PKK leader claimed that
his party had "a sister organization"31 in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Liberation
Party (PAK), which would be able to challenge Barzani and Talabani on their own
grounds.
EARLIER FIGHTING
Finally, in the summer of 1992, these intra-Kurdish diatribes began to break out
into actual hostilities following the killing of the Sindi tribal leader Sadik Omer
(Sadik Omer) in Zakho on 29 June.32 Reportedly, Omer had abandoned the KDP
after having supported it for the previous twenty-one years and had become asso-
ciated with the PAK, the new pro-PKK organization mentioned above. The PKK
claimed that the assassination of Omer had been carried out by Sadun Mutni, the
local KDP chief in Dohuk. In apparent retaliation, the PKK then killed KDP
"Commander Mehmet Shefik" and three of his comrades in a rocket ambush
in Dohuk.
In response, the KDP launched large attacks on the Sindi tribe that resulted
in civilians being taken hostage and others fleeing to the mountains. The KDP
carried out further operations against the PKK's urban network in July, detaining
"Tirej," a senior member of the PAK central committee, and blockading the PKK
camps along the Turkish border.
On 24 July, the PKK responded by successfully placing an embargo on trade
between Turkey and northern Iraq. This PKK-imposed ban threatened to cut
the Iraqi Kurds' economic lifeline, as local drivers, in fear of the consequences,
stopped taking supplies to northern Iraq. Soon a shortage of foodstuffs and medi-
cine resulted, and prices doubled and tripled. The PKK asserted that it would lift
the trade ban only if Barzani would remove his blockade of the PKK camps.
Barzani declared that the PKK was challenging the very sovereignty of the
new Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) that had been established that very
summer in 1992. "Ocalan's men acted as if they were the authorities and started
to control roads and collect taxes" and "threatened to expel the government and
parliament from Irbil [the seat of the KRG]. They said they would hang all those
'who sold out the homeland.' They even threatened to expel us from Dahuk and
al-Sulaymaniyah and started to form espionage, terrorism, and sabotage networks
inside cities. It has unequivocally been proven that they are conspiring and plan-
ning to undermine the existing situation in Kurdistan and its experiment [the
KRG]."33 Talabani supported Barzani by charging that the PKK "intended to
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establish a revolutionary authority . . . a state to replace the [Iraqi Kurdistan
Front."34
The KRG added that the PKK "has seized over 30 border villages and has
prevented farmers from returning to their homes."35 Furthermore, by making
northern Iraq a base against Turkey, "the villages, from where they [the raids
against Turkey] are staged, are bombed on the pretext that PKK forces and bases
are located there." The KRG even charged that "the PKK is collaborating with
Iraqi officials," adding that "the Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian governments help the
PKK against the Iraqi Kurdish movement. . . because they do not want our par-
liamentary and governmental experiment to be successful."36
To meet the perceived threat and retain Turkey's support, the Iraqi Kurds,
on 4 October 1992, launched major assaults against the PKK at its main base in
the Khwakurt region where northern Iraq meets Turkey and Iran and further to
the west in the Zakho area across the Turkish border at Habur and Silopi. Since
this was the very day that the Iraqi Kurds also declared a federated state, a procla-
mation which the Turks viewed unfavorably, the importance of retaining Turkey's
trust was obvious as heavy fighting between the Iraqi Kurds and the PKK ensued.
Some twelve days later the Turks entered the battle in force. By 28 October the
fighting supposedly had forced the PKK to surrender to the PUK, a situation that
gradually helped lead to a detente in their relations, while those between the PKK
and KDP remained hostile.
Initially, however, the Turks claimed that "more than 2,000 Turkish PKK
separatist guerrillas have been killed."37 Indeed, several months later the Turkish
Chief of Staff General Dogan Giires, still claimed that "Ocalan's legs have been
broken" and that the PKK had "lost 4,000 to 5,000 men."38 It gradually became
clear, however, that the actual figure was probably no greater than three hundred.39
Based on the tremendous escalation of the PKK guerrilla war against Turkey in
June 1993, it became obvious that its supposed near destruction the previous Oc-
tober had been greatly exaggerated.
N E W DEVELOPMENTS
Many Turkish commentators began to accuse Talabani of having provided a new
base and safehouse for the PKK in the Zaleh camp northeast of Sulaymaniya
where some seventeen hundred PKK fighters had been forced into supposed in-
terment after surrendering at the end of October 1992. Accordingly, the Turkish
air force destroyed the camp in January 1994, but again it appeared that its occu-
pants had largely melted away before the blow fell.
Further illustrating the emerging PKK-PUK detente, Talabani and Ocalan
met in Syria during the second half of February 1993 to discuss a new cease-
fire proposal between the PKK and Turkey. A month later, praising Talabani's
good offices, Ocalan actually proclaimed one, but the death of Turkish President
Turgut Ozal on 17 April and the Turkish belief that Ocalan had been defeated the
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previous November (1992) eventually led to a renewal of the hostilities at the end
of May 1993.
The outbreak of civil war between the KDP and PUK in May 1994 and the
resulting anarchy created new opportunities for the PKK to establish bases in
the Bahinani area of northern Iraq adjacent to the Turkish border. This area, of
course, lay within Barzani's territory as Talabani's writ ran further to the south and
east. Thus the reestablished PKK base only presented a threat to the KDP and
indeed could be seen by the PUK as a second front against the KDP, which was
now its enemy.
In March and again in July of 1995, Turkish troops once again crossed into
Iraqi Kurdistan in attempts to destroy the PKK units camped there. The March
incursion entailed some thirty-five thousand soldiers, the largest foreign expedi-
tion in the history of the Turkish republic. Although both the KDP and PUK
officially opposed these Turkish actions, the KDP partially cooperated with the
Turks since the PKK presence in Barzani's portion of Iraqi Kurdistan is what had
called forth the Turkish incursions in the first place. Inevitably, therefore, the
Turkish incursions furthered the ill will between the PKK and KDP.
PKK-KDP HOSTILITIES
When the U.S.-brokered Drogheda (Dublin) talks in early August 1995 appeared
to be leading to a settlement of the KDP-PUK fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan as well
as security guarantees for Turkey in the form of the KDP policing the border, the
PKK struck out at the KDP in an attempt to derail the truce that would constrain
its freedom to maneuver along the Turkish border in northern Iraq. The PKK also
sought to build on its "pilot regions" in Iraqi Kurdistan by establishing some type
of government in exile or Kurdish federation. A detailed analysis of these events
follows.
The PKK claimed that two leading members of the KDP politburo, Nechir-
van Barzani and Sami Abdal Rahman, had called the PKK a "terrorist" organi-
zation over Turkish TV in early August 1995.40 Cemil (Cuma) Bayik—often
referred to as the number two person in the PKK hierarchy and the commander of
its military wing, the People's Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK)-—person-
ally visited Barzani in an attempt to have the KDP repudiate the accusation that
the PKK was "terrorist." When Barzani refused, the PKK retaliated.
In its weekly paper Welat—published in the PUK-held Iraqi Kurdistan
capital Irbil—the PKK explained that it was attacking the KDP because it refused
to join the fight for a "greater Kurdistan" and added that Barzani's party had "to
be wiped out because it was backing Turkey's bid to crush the PKK rebels."41
Ocalan himself condemned as an "act of treason" the Drogheda agreement be-
tween the KDP and PUK aimed at preventing the PKK from launching cross
border attacks from Iraqi Kurdistan against targets in Turkey.42
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In a lengthy interview the PKK leader termed Barzani's peshmergas (fight-
ers), "primitive nationalist forces"43 who "have for 40 years slaughtered Kurdish
patriotic forces for their own narrow tribal interests and in league with the Turk-
ish intelligence services." Barzani's "collaborationist forces" were guilty of a "be-
trayal of the people of the north" [the Turkish Kurds] and had committed "an
unforgivable crime" by developing "relations with Turkey" and putting "themselves
under the command of its special forces." In reference to Turkey's village guard
program of some sixty-seven thousand Turkish Kurdish supporters of Ankara,
Ocalan also accused the KDP of having "played a key role in the development of
the village guard system in Bohtan" [the area in Turkish Kurdistan south of Lake
Van that extends to the Iraqi border] and of having "tried to set up a village guard
party . . . to strangle our struggle."
The PKK leader maintained that these actions had "prevented many areas
becoming liberated zones" and "killed many [PKK] patriots and our most re-
spected fighters." By attacking the KDP now, the PKK "will play a significant role
in putting an end to this" and "open the way for the people of south [Iraqi] Kur-
distan to move towards a federation." He also added that "we do not expect the
PUK to oppose these developments very much."
In another interview on MED TV—the pro-PKK TV channel that began
broadcasting to Kurdistan from Britain in the spring of 1995—-Ocalan further de-
veloped his theme on how "the notorious collaborationist policy of the KDP was
the most basic internal reason why, during the past 40 years, the Kurdish national
liberation movement failed to develop."44 The PKK leader asserted that his con-
flict with the KDP "started in the 1970s" when "patriotic revolutionaries from
Turkish Kurdistan went there—we can include the Faik Bucak incident of 196545
in that, too—and asked for support and solidarity." The KDP, however, "has con-
sidered the elimination of contemporary and patriotic policies and their leaders as
one of its main missions."
Ocalan then explained that "of course, it was impossible for us to accept this
because we wanted to take progressive steps." Not only did the KDP reject the
PKK's position, but it also "wanted to implement Turkey's demands in northern
Kurdistan as well. In 1985, Barzani asked us to stop. He said: "Your armed strug-
gle is not timely." Ocalan further maintained that "recently the KDP wanted to
implement against our forces in the south the policy it had implemented against
patriots earlier. With difficulty, we managed to save our forces from this danger."
Ocalan's reference was to the proposed KDP role in policing the Turkish-Iraqi
border to prevent PKK infiltration into Turkey.
The Atrus refugee UN camp near Dohuk and the Turkish border in KDP-
controlled territory also played a significant role in the outbreak of conflict be-
tween the PKK and KDP. In May 1994, at the same time that serious fighting
broke out between the KDP and PUK, the PKK encouraged some twenty thou-
sand Turkish Kurds to flee the strife raging in Turkey for sanctuary in northern
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Iraq. Not only was this viewed as a propagandistic ploy against Turkish repression
but also as a chance to establish shelter for PKK fighters amid the thousands of
women and children protected by the UN. In the long run, moreover, these Kurd-
ish refugees from Turkey could serve as the first step in establishing a Kurdish fed-
eration in northern Iraq under PKK control. Reports at the time indicated that
Barzani was wary of the refugee influx, while Talabani favored it.46
Once fighting broke out between the PKK and KDP, Turkish Kurds took
eight UN and other humanitarian workers in the Atrus camp hostage against pos-
sible attack from the KDP. Eventually, however, Barzani's peshmergas managed to
search the camp and supposedly uncovered some PKK fighters, arms and equip-
ment. The KDP declared that "it is high treason to aim weapons at the legitimate
Kurdish administration in the region, the KDP"47 and that the PKK attacks "con-
firmed that Ocalan is the enemy of Kurds"48 and constituted "terrorist and criminal
behavior."49
Barzani himself claimed that, contrary to Ocalan's accusations of KDP be-
trayal in the past, "had it not been for the party's [KDP's] assistance, the PKK
would not have managed to stand on its feet."50 However, "no sooner had they [the
PKK] sensed that they are once again standing on solid ground than they broke
their promise and disavowed values." The "ungrateful PKK has forgotten all the
support and assistance the party [KDP] offered them in 1980 when they fled
Turkey following the military coup."
Turning to the present situation the KDP leader maintained that the
Drogheda principles of August 1995 used by the PKK "as an excuse to justify their
aggression" was "a peace agreement the Kurdish people and all their friends have
welcomed." As to the specific PKK charges that the KDP was supporting Turkey,
Barzani maintained that he had "not asked for any Turkish assistance despite the
Turkish Government's offer. . . .  We are committed to safeguarding only our
people's security and not that of others." He added, however, that "we respect re-
lations with all neighbors and we do not permit that their security be threatened
from our territory."
While Turkey, implicitly at least, supported the KDP against their common PKK
enemy, it seemed likely that both Iran and Syria were supporting the PKK because
neither wanted to allow Turkish influence to expand in northern Iraq. What is
more, neither Iran nor Syria wished to see the U.S.-brokered peace talks between
the KDP and PUK succeed because this would extend U.S. influence in the region.
Supporting the PKK would be a way to sabotage the U.S.-sponsored peace pro-
cess. Finally, the PUK could not help but see the PKK-KDP struggle as in effect
a second front against its KDP enemy.51
Although by late October 1995 the KDP was claiming that most of the
Dohuk region and Khwakurt to the east had been cleared of the PKK52 it was
difficult to believe that Barzani's peshmergas could have crushed in a few short
months an organization that Turkey had been unable to in more than eleven
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years of warfare. A further reckoning between the two Kurdish enemies seemed
likely.
Given this Byzantine background of implicit alliance politics as well as more
than twenty years of intra-Kurdish rivalry between the different actors, the PKK-
KDP fighting came as little surprise. It was difficult, however, to see how this latest
round of hostilities had solved anything. The basic underlying problems remained.
The cease-fire that was announced in early December 1995, therefore, seemed
more likely a pause than any final denouement.
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UNDER THE GUN:
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY AND
THE KURDISH QUESTION
Henri J. Barkey
.Tor the past twelve years, the Turkish state has been grappling with a Kurd-
ish insurrection that shows no sign of dissipating despite the enormous resources
committed to its defeat by Ankara. While this rebellion is primarily domestic in
origin, it is casting a long shadow on the formulation and conduct of Turkish for-
eign policy. This is not to say that all of Turkey's foreign policy priorities have
become subservient to this issue or that other countries' perception of and behav-
ior toward Ankara is determined by it. The prolongation and deepening of the
Kurdish insurrection, however, could potentially bring about this result.
There are four principal reasons that account for the (re)emergence of the
Kurdish question and its potential impact on Turkey's foreign relations. First and
foremost, the continued rebellion in the southeast of the country represents an ex-
istential challenge to the state. It not only contradicts the ideology that has been
dominant since the beginning of the republic regarding the existence of one har-
monious nation, but a successful rebellion could also possibly force a change in the
boundaries and/or organization of the state.
Second, because of the dispersion of traditional Kurdish territories among
at least four states—Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria—the Kurdish question cannot
always be contained within the territorial limits of one state. In addition to its
appeal across Kurdish communities, the temptation for neighboring states to take
advantage of the other's minority problem to score tactical or strategic gains is es-
pecially enhanced during periods of local unrest. Syria's support for the PKK falls
into this category.
A third reason for the internationalization of Turkey's Kurdish problem is
the emergence of an active Kurdish diaspora, especially in Europe. The politi-
cization of a large and concentrated group of Kurdish activists has helped heighten
the visibility of the issue and has also provided the various Kurdish political or-
ganizations in Turkey with financial and other forms of critical support.
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Finally, the transformation of international political balances in the after-
math of the Soviet Union's demise have rekindled some of the long-dormant
ethnic tensions around the globe. Turkey is not an exception. In the post—cold war
environment, the reemergence of the Kurdish question has helped undermine
Turkey's efforts at clearly defining its priorities. To be sure, the Kurdish question
is not the only reason for the lack of coherence in Turkey's foreign policy. Turkey
is not alone among mid-level powers whose firmly established cold war position
has been undermined by the Gorbachev reforms. But, in the aftermath of a sys-
temic transformation, the Kurdish question, with all its attendant implications for
the unity of the Turkish state, has put Turkish foreign policy on the defensive.
This chapter seeks to demonstrate the impact of the Kurdish question on the for-
mulation and implementation of Turkish foreign policy.
ABOUT THE ORIGINS
Not unlike other ethnic conflicts, the Kurdish question in Turkey has deep roots
and evokes strong passions on either side of the issue. The causes and evolution of
the conflict itself, however, are beyond the scope of this chapter, as are Kurdish
viewpoints. The making of Turkish foreign policy, by contrast, is clearly deter-
mined by the different views held by state authorities and populace at large.
The Kurdish question, while new to the Turkish population, especially those
living in central and western parts of the country, is, nevertheless, an old one for
the state. The present insurrection is not the first one. During the Turkish nation-
alist revolt against the foreign occupation of Anatolia that led to the inception of
the republic and, soon after, to its independence, Kurds in Turkey rebelled. The
most important of the rebellions, the Sheik Said rebellion of 1925, set the tone for
future government reaction. It was decisively repressed, its leaders executed and
many of their followers exiled. Other rebellions erupted periodically, with the 1930
Agri and 1937 Dersim revolts being the more notable ones, which were equally
suppressed with much bloodshed. From 1937 onward, however, there were no
other significant revolts. This absence of organized Kurdish violence did not rep-
resent an end to Kurdish political activity, which underwent a transformation of
sorts as it subsumed itself into Turkish politics. But the absence of violence did
not reduce state concerns as Kurdish activists were closely monitored and often
hounded. Government authorities in Ankara, without openly articulating them,
put into effect measures that were designed to curb potential Kurdish secessionary
or other types of activities.
The primary objective of state policy became the assimilation of the Kurds
into the larger Turkish ethnicity. The use of the word Kurd in the press and
elsewhere was abandoned, as were any overt manifestations of Kurdish cultural
expression. Kurds and Kurdishness were, in effect, officially transformed into
non-entities. The policy of assimilation contained both a repressive and an inclu-
sionary dimension. The latter consisted of opening the doors of the state to all
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those who accepted the dominant Turkish identity. This was applicable not just to
Kurds but also other Muslim minorities that either hailed from abroad, such as the
Bosnians or Circassians, or from Turkey itself, such as the Lazs of northeast Black
Sea region.
Immediately with independence, the domestic Kurdish question made its
impact felt on foreign policy. The Sheikh Said rebellion convinced Ankara not to
pursue its claim over the oil-rich Mosul area that the British had decided would
become part of modern Iraq. In fact, Turkish leaders were convinced that the
Sheikh Said rebellion had been fomented by the British in an attempt to demon-
strate the difficulties involved in ruling over a large Kurdish minority, to thus deter
the Turks from pursuing their claim to Mosul. Soon after the conclusion of the
Sheikh Said rebellion, relations with Iran deteriorated as a new set of Kurdish
rebels frequently crossed the border from Iran to mount raids. In turn, Turkish
hot pursuit operations angered Tehran. Ultimately, the two countries succeeded in
managing the tensions by signing a series of agreements, including a 1932 treaty
regulating the borders.
Although the abandonment of the claim to Mosul was significant, it is in the
1980s that the Kurdish question achieved an unprecedented preeminence in for-
eign policy formulation. The recent reemergence of the Kurdish issue in Turkey
was the product of a confluence of two sets of developments, one domestic and
the other international. Domestically it was the failure of the Turkish political left.
This failure manifested itself in what the Kurds perceived as their coalition allies'
disregard for their plight as well as the successful 1980 military coup that targeted
the political left, both Turkish and Kurdish variants, in an attempt to eradicate it.
The disappointment of the Kurds coincided first with the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war
and later with the 1991 Gulf war. The long-lasting struggle between Iraq and Iran
resulted in a decline in the Iraqi state's authority over its northern provinces, where
not only traditional Iraqi Kurdish groups, some with the help of Iran, began to
roam freely but also Turkey's Kurds found the area a good location for basing and
training themselves beyond the easy reach of their own state's military. The Gulf
war and the ensuing Kurdish drama in Iraq, which had hundreds of thousands
of Kurds fleeing Saddam's revenge in the aftermath of their ill-fated rebellion,
focused the attention of the world, including Turkey—one of the two destina-
tions for these refugees—on the unresolved nature of the Kurdish issue in the
Middle East.
The PKK, the Kurdistan Workers' Party, which has emerged as the dead-
liest and most formidable of the Kurdish organizations, has its origins in the twin
failure of the Turkish left and Saddam Hussein's wars against his neighbors. The
organization found resonance and support among the Kurds of Turkey because it
not only articulated long-held grievances of those Kurds who either had resisted
or had been ignored by the state's assimilationist policies, but also because in of-
fering strong military resistance to the Turkish state it succeeded in triggering a
repressive counteraction by the state. In turn, the prowess of the PKK and the
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repression further politicized the region's peasantry. Not inconsequential in the
early days of the PKK was the support it received from a Syrian government anx-
ious to defeat or set back Turkish intentions regarding the mammoth Southeastern
Anatolian Project, known as the GAP, that threatened to significantly reduce the
flow of the Euphrates.
INTERNATIONALIZING THE PROBLEM
The resurgence of the Kurdish question in Turkey has been a difficult one for the
Turkish public to accept. Unaware of the depth of the Kurdish resentment, the
large majority of Turks had taken for granted the state's official discourse on one
homogeneous ethnicity residing in Turkey. In this discourse, Bosnians, Albanians,
Circassians and many other non-Turkish minorities were added to the Turkish
melting pot to be redefined. To the extent that it was cognizant of a Kurdish iden-
tity, the Kurds were viewed by the majority as recalcitrant, backward and, yet,
"Turkish." At the origin of the confusion over ethnic identity lies the Atatiirk's
own, perhaps deliberate, confusion over this issue: At different moments Turkish-
ness was based on citizenship, Islam or race. There is an irony, as one author has
suggested, that the emergence of the PKK and its terror tactics in the 1980s did
more to define Turkish identity than seventy years of republican policies aimed at
the homogenization of the population.1
Primarily because the state's discourse had ignored the Kurds, their resur-
gence as a problem was attributed to the meddling of foreign elements. To the
extent that the Syrians have actively nurtured the PKK, foreign interference has
been extensive. It is not only the Syrians but the Iranians and, at times, Saddam
Hussein who have flirted with the PKK, offering it support and sanctuary. Turks
have also bitterly complained about their age-old nemesis, the Greeks, offering
the PKK at the very least political support if not materiel as well. But the most
puzzling of the accusations have been those directed at the United States and
Turkey's other western allies. The tenacity of the PKK and the inability of the
much-heralded Turkish army to defeat the "terrorists," despite its yearly promises
to eradicate them, have allowed the construction of conspiracy theories that have
captured the imagination of both the public and many of its elected politicians.
Hardly a week goes by that a foreign western power is not accused of meddling in
Turkish domestic affairs or inciting the Kurds to rebel in order to carve up Turkey.2
Such discourse, which brands any criticism coming from abroad as a threat to the
integrity of the state, has resulted in alienating the Turkish public from its allies
and has hamstrung the foreign policy professionals in their dealings with them.
TURKEY'S KURDISH POLICY
The state's response to the Kurdish insurrection has varied between denial and
repression.3 As the insurrection has gathered steam, so has the state's repressive ap-
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paratus. A series of institutional measures together with extra legal ones were put
into effect. Not only was a state of emergency declared in the mostly Kurdish re-
gions, but a system of village guards was invented that sought to take advantage of
intra-Kurdish divisions by arming those pro-regime Kurds against the PKK and
the Kurds of questionable loyalties. While these measures, combined with an in-
creased deployment of the military and the gendarmerie, were aimed at defeating
the PKK, they inadvertently provoked the local population and contributed to the
swelling of the PKK's ranks. With the exception of the latter years of President
Ozal's rule, when alternative political strategies were considered, including over-
tures to Iraqi Kurdish leaders and even the opening of radio and television stations
broadcasting in Kurdish, the state has pursued a primarily military formula.
With Ozal's death (17 April 1993) the alternative strategies were abandoned
as the regime in Ankara hardened its line. It banned pro-Kurdish political parties
on the pretext that they were associated with the PKK. The same fate befell news-
papers and publishers. Intellectuals found themselves in prison charged under
the infamous law against terrorism that liberally construes most forms of speech
on this issue as aiding and abetting terrorism. The state also stepped up its cam-
paign of village destruction in the southeast with the aim of denying the PKK
bases of support but in the process created a large refugee population that moved
into the cities of the south and southeast, swelling their populations. Ankara also
undertook a more aggressive policy with respect to northern Iraq, where it has
always suspected the PKK of maintaining bases and preparing attacks; successive
air raids were followed by large and small incursions into the area, often with
the help of at least one of the two Iraqi Kurdish groups dominant in the region,
the KDP or the PUK.
After the death of Ozal, the state tried to equate all Kurdish aspirations
with PKK activities; by harassing and persecuting non-PKK moderate Kurdish
political organizations, associations and intellectuals, it increasingly sought to po-
larize the issues of ethnicity, language and civil rights. In so doing it has elevated
the PKK and raised its profile. This is not accidental; by associating all Kurdish
activities with the PKK it has aimed at delegitimizing all Kurdish aspirations in
the eyes of both the domestic Turkish public and foreign audiences. In effect, it is
far easier for Ankara to devise a PKK-focused policy than to forge links with those
disaffected Kurds living in Turkey who have not expressed much sympathy for the
PKK and its activities. The risk in Ankara's policy is that it will alienate increas-
ing numbers of Turkish Kurds and drive them into the arms of the PKK. In view
of the "existential" nature of the problem for Ankara, it is not surprising that it is
willing to take such risks.
Turkey has been caught in the horns of a dilemma as far as the PKK is con-
cerned. On the one hand, it perceives the organization as a dangerous enemy that
has managed to inflict significant damage. On the other hand, it has come to be-
lieve its own propaganda about the PKK's lack of support and relatively small size.
As a result the state has overestimated the military dimensions of the conflict
70 / THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
while underestimating its political potential. This has allowed the PKK to cash in
on its "military" success for political gains. In the long run, the more successful the
PKK is politically, the less important its military campaign will be.
FOREIGN POLICY AND THE KURDS
What are Turkey's primary objectives in the a post—cold war environment?4 The
emergence of the Central Asian republics and Azerbaijan from Soviet rule created
at first unrealistic expectations in the Turkish imagination. However, the realization
quickly set in: These states would simply treat Turkey as a first among equals and
not as a leader of a new political-economic bloc, hence the twenty-first century is
unlikely to become the "Turkish Century." This has enabled Ankara to return to
the basics of its foreign policy even though Central Asia remains a potentially
important source of oil and gas as well as a market for Turkish industry. Ever since
its accession to NATO, Turkey has followed a primarily pro-Western orientation.
It needed the protection of the United States and its allies against the rising power
of the Soviet Union. It is with the European Community that it has developed the
most extensive economic relations, and the presence of close to two million hold-
ers of Turkish passports in Germany alone further binds it to the West.
While Turkey's Islamic character has become more pronounced in recent
years, the heyday of its economic ties with the Middle East appear to have passed.
The extensive trade links forged in the early 1980s were the result of unusual cir-
cumstances created by the Iran-Iraq war, and these relations, not surprisingly, have
stabilized at a level commensurate with both the level of development of the
region and the comparative advantages offered by Turkey.
The orientation of Turkish foreign policy increasingly exhibits the same
level of confusion as its domestic approach to the question of identity. Those who
primarily interpret Turkish identity as Islamic have pushed toward closer integra-
tion with the Middle East, while the racialist view supports greater efforts in
Central Asia and the Caucasus.
The dominant strain in Turkish foreign policy, which has advocated closer
integration with the West, has suffered the most from the rise of Kurdish nation-
alism in Turkey. As long as the Kurdish issue was under wraps, the dominant
pro-West element's belief in principles of secularism and citizenship blended well
with those of the West, despite the fact that the Turks have at times kept the West
at arm's length and have generally been uneasy about the extent of their relation-
ship with the United States. In fact, until the Ozal years, Turkish foreign policy
was, for the most part, unimaginative and averse to risk.5 Still, as Ziya Onis points
out, there was a "remarkable degree of consensus" about the desirability of mem-
bership in the European Community (EC) in 1987 when Turkey applied to join.6
As Turkey prepares to enter into a customs union with the European Union, a step
still far from full membership, it has reluctantly agreed under pressure to introduce
reforms in its penal code that are designed to soften some of the restrictions on
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freedom of speech. These changes, as almost everyone accepts, are also specifically
aimed at allowing Kurds to express themselves somewhat more freely.
As far as foreign policy is concerned, Ankara has extended its domestic prac-
tice of associating anything Kurdish with the PKK to this domain as well. While
it has succeeded in equating the PKK with terrorism and other ills in the minds
of U.S. citizens and most Europeans, it has also steadfastly refused to acknowl-
edge the existence of moderate Kurdish groups. Ankara will be facing difficulty in
the future because of the proliferation of such groups, which will emerge as a result
of two developments. First, the PKK itself will spawn groups and associations
such as the present Kurdistan parliament in exile (KPE) in order to put the Turk-
ish government on the defensive. It will also engage in many more initiatives, such
as the cease-fire announced on the eve of the 24 December 1995 national elec-
tions, designed to slowly build up momentum in its favor. Increasing diplomatic
consciousness among Kurds will result in both the PKK feeling politically more
confident and, therefore, more inclined to experiment with political options as well
as non-PKK groups emerging to fill in the space between the PKK and the po-
litical center. One can even argue that the moderation of the PKK may result from
the successful Turkish campaign to demonize it. Such developments will likely
bring more attention and sympathy for the plight of the Kurds in Turkey and
hence more criticism of Ankara's policies.
A closer examination of the four principal areas of Turkish foreign policy
interest—its geopolitical role and standing, its economic relations, its regional role
and standing and its relations with Central Asia and Azerbaijan allows us to assess
the full impact of the Kurdish question.
GEOPOLITICAL ROLE AND STANDING
The most critical factor in Turkey's geopolitical standing is its relations with the
United States, the predominant and only superpower. President Ozal was the first
to clearly chart a new course in Turkish-American relations when he aligned his
country, despite intense domestic opposition to his actions, along the multinational
coalition facing Saddam Hussein. Ozal, just as in the Kurdish question, was more
willing to pursue policy choices outside the conventional and, perhaps because he
had resided in the United States, was less willing to demonize the United States
and the West. However, with his death, Turkish foreign policy assumed its previ-
ous stance of close, yet "distant," friendship.
Despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union, U.S. policy toward Turkey
has remained very supportive. Following the Gulf war it pushed Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia to compensate Ankara for the losses it had incurred during the war as a
result of the shutdown of the Iraqi oil pipeline traversing Turkish territory and the
collapse of transit traffic in the southeast. The United States provided significant
military supplies to Turkey for free as it ran down its European stocks (Greece was
another beneficiary of this policy) and, perhaps most importantly, it successfully
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lobbied vigorously the European Union members to improve the conditions for
Turkey's accession to a customs union. Recently, the United States has moved away
from its pro-Russian policy and supported Turkish demands that Azeri oil (and
later Kazakh oil as well) be transported not through the Russian Black Sea port of
Novorossiysk but rather through the Anatolian mainland to the Mediterranean.
Paradoxically, the Kurdish question may have helped Turkey's relations
with the United States in the short-run. On the PKK, U.S. policy has mimicked
Turkey's: In branding the PKK a terrorist organization at every possible occasion,
the United States has demonstrated its unwavering support for Turkey's basic po-
sition in this regard.7 In the absence of the Kurdish insurrection, it is also unlikely
that Ankara would have faced such difficulties in its attempt to join the European
Customs Union and, therefore, the intensive and successful U.S. lobbying would
have been unnecessary. The United States shares some of the credit in helping sur-
mount these obstacles in the 13 December 1995 vote in the European Parliament,
especially in view of the strong opposition to Turkey's human rights violations.
However, despite the decidedly pro-Turkish positions of the recent U.S. adminis-
trations, the Kurdish question intrudes on the U.S.-Turkish dialogue in two areas:
in regard to the policy toward Iraq, and northern Iraq in particular, and concern-
ing human rights violations.
Ironically, it was the United States' sense of obligation to Ozal's Gulf war
stance that ultimately led to what is now called Operation Provide Comfort
(OPC), a round-the-clock military protective shield for the Kurds of northern
Iraq. The joint military task force-—composed of U.S., British and French aircraft
as well as a small contingent of ground troops, which includes Turks—was created
so as to enable the hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees that had sought
shelter along the Turkish and Iranian borders after the collapse of their rebellion
at the end of the Gulf war to return to their homes. Subject to six-month renewals
by the Turkish parliament, the OPC has become one of the more contentious
issues in the bilateral relations with the United States.
Turkish uneasiness with the de facto autonomous entity in northern Iraq run
by the Kurds is at the source of the resentment toward OPC. Primarily because
the entity in northern Iraq is perceived to have acquired attributes that can poten-
tially influence Kurds living in Turkey, the continued presence of OPC gets
grudging approval from the Turkish establishment. In fact, many, including the
former head of state and junta leader, Kenan Evren, political parties and journal-
ists have openly advocated the removal of the force. The military itself has done
little to bolster the fortunes of OPC, preferring to let the mission hang in the bal-
ance until the parliamentary vote. By contrast, the foreign ministry is cognizant
of the negative repercussions the cancellation of the OPC would have on U.S.-
Turkish relations, especially if it were to be followed by an Iraqi advance toward
the north. The ministry also understands that the removal of the umbrella over
northern Iraq would likely result in a significant refugee flow duplicating the con-
ditions that gave rise to OPC in the first place.
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The United States has been careful to continually reiterate its policy that it
respects the territorial integrity of Iraq; with the exception of senior diplomats and
others well acquainted with U.S. politics, this is a claim that convinces few in
Turkey. The upsurge in fighting among the two Kurdish factions in northern Iraq
has somewhat reduced Turkish anxieties since it demonstrates the inability of the
Kurds to run their own affairs.8 The United States has made sure that Turkey was
directly involved in the negotiations it sponsored in Ireland in the fall of 1995 to
reconcile the Iraqi Kurdish factions. But the complete breakdown of order in
northern Iraq potentially helps the PKK, which can operate with a greater degree
of freedom.
This fear of PKK support in northern Iraq also fuels Ankara's continued un-
easiness with the autonomous region and, therefore, until recently it openly
advocated a return to the status quo ante that prevailed before the Gulf war.
In fact, Ankara has made its displeasure obvious at any arrangement that would
secure a federal or even an autonomous region for the Kurds in a post-Saddam
Iraq. Also claiming that the embargo on Iraq has disproportionately harmed citi-
zens of the southeast, an argument used to explain away some support for the
PKK, Ankara has demanded that it be eased. While Turkey has pulled back from
an open disagreement with U.S. positions on Iraq, it is clear that it would not be
opposed to Saddam's return to northern Iraq. The U. S. has sought to help Turkey
recoup losses it incurred during the Gulf war by not only requesting aid from
the Saudis but by agreeing to the one-time flushing of the Kirkuk-Yumurtahk
pipeline, through which Iraq transported its oil to the Mediterranean and Turkey.
The U.S. has also insisted that most of the oil Iraq is allowed to sell under UN
Resolution 986 be shipped through the Turkish pipeline network.
Unlike some of the Europeans, the United States has been more tolerant of
Turkish incursions into northern Iraq in pursuit of the PKK, including the large
March/April 1995 one noted for its duration and the extent of the operation—
thirty-five thousand men. While this U.S. support was appreciated in Ankara, the
basic interests of the United States and Turkey in Iraq cannot be reconciled; for
the United States, Saddam Hussein remains the primary threat to the region and
its interests, whereas from Turkey's perspective the existence of the Kurdish entity
poses a long-term threat too great to ignore. At the heart of this divergence lies
two different interpretations of the Kurdish problem in Turkey.
However, as reflected in State Department reports on human rights viola-
tions, the U.S. has become alarmed at the repression applied to Kurds in Turkey.
The Kurdish question was first mentioned in the department's 1988 report.9 Since
then, the reports have chronicled state actions in greater detail, all the while criti-
cizing the PKK for its share of atrocities. Nevertheless, the State Department
reports have become an important tool for those in Congress anxious to reduce the
level of aid to Turkey or those opposed to Turkey because of the latter's invasion
of Cyprus or those who dislike being associated with levels of repression un-
becoming a U.S. ally and NATO member. Similarly, the nongovernmental groups
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concentrating on human rights have accelerated their criticism of Turkish policies.
The beginning of the Arab-Israeli peace process and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union have also allowed human rights activists to focus more on previously ne-
glected questions such as the Kurdish one in Turkey. One of their more notable
successes was achieved when they managed to block the sale of cluster bombs
to Turkey.
Because the Kurdish issue evokes the worst fears among the Turkish public
and leadership, the current U.S. administration has chosen to pursue a policy in-
tended to bolster Turkey's confidence in the post—cold war environment with the
hope that a Turkey that is more firmly footed in both NATO and the European
Union, even if this is limited to a customs union, will be able to take steps to ac-
commodate some of the Kurdish demands. The threat of destabilization that the
prolongation of the Kurdish question poses for Turkey is particularly worrisome
to the United States. With its diminished strategic importance, Turkey remains a
valued ally and, perhaps more important, at a time when the Arab-Israeli conflict
is finally on the verge of being resolved, the Unites States does not want the emer-
gence of another long-standing ethnic conflict that could encompass other re-
gional actors. Turkey's weakness does not bode well for NATO even if the primary
enemy against which it was constituted has left the scene.
Can the United States indirectly create the conditions conducive for the
Turkish leadership to engage in political reforms that are inclusive in character
and, therefore, accommodate some of the moderate Kurdish demands? Despite
the Unites States' efforts on Turkey's behalf, Turkish uneasiness remains strong;
suspicions that the United States may be harboring a secret agenda are strength-
ened by the conflicting messages that emanate from Washington, especially during
periods of intense legislature-executive squabbling. This attitude is best captured
by a foreign policy watcher: "If we put aside the improvement in our relations with
the U.S. since 1991 . . . Western European and U.S. policies have given rise to the
isolation of Turkey in the international scene."10 What is the source of this sense
of isolation? In part it is not new; Turkey has always felt it did not receive its fair
share of attention. On the other hand, Ankara has interpreted Western reactions
to both the Armenian-Azeri and the Bosnian conflict as the abandonment of its
own positions without cognizance of the inherent contradictions between those
and its positions on other issues, such as the Kurdish or the question of ethnic
Turks in Bulgaria or Greece. Surrounded by states that have troublesome re-
lations with Turkey, Ankara has a demonstrated ability to exaggerate its own vul-
nerabilities.
FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Turkey's most important economic relations are with the European Union.11 By
abandoning its inward-oriented economic policies in the early 1980s, Turkey has
succeeded in not only diversifying its exports but also in becoming an important
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market for direct foreign investment. The U.S. Commerce Department has in-
cluded it in its list of the ten Big Emerging Markets that warrant special atten-
tion because of their potential for expanding trade relations. Turkey's economic
progress and its proximate location to Europe have given an added impetus to its
primary trade links with Europe, which have blossomed.
At a time when trade blocs account for an increasing share of world trade,
Turkey needs to firmly locate itself in one. This is the reason the achievement of
a customs union agreement with Europe has been such a priority for recent Turk-
ish governments—even though they would have preferred to become full members
of the European Union. Yet it is in the realization of the customs union agreement
that the Kurdish issue has made itself felt most acutely. The European Parliament
made it clear that it would not sanction Turkey's accession to the Customs Union
until certain basic modifications were made to the laws governing the criminali-
zation of speech and constitutional provisions that represented roadblocks in the
furthering of the democratization process. While some members of the European
Parliament would have preferred to push Turkey to make more concessions, such
as the release of jailed DEP (pro-Kurdish Democracy Party) parliamentarians,
others were clearly satisfied with the constitutional changes, though minor, im-
plemented earlier in 1995 and the modification of the infamous Article 8 of the
penal code, which has been used to effectively prohibit any serious discussion of
many controversial issues, but, in particular, the Kurdish one.12
However minor the European demands, they represented an obvious inter-
ference in the domestic affairs of a state and one with which many of the same
countries have had extensive military relations. Still, given the importance of the
Customs Union, Ankara was willing to pay the price to join. While there were par-
liamentarians and others who, in the name of greater democratization, advocated
deeper changes in these provisions, the recalcitrance to alter them lasted until the
very last moment. If Ankara delayed some of the changes until the last moment,
it was for tactical reasons; the sooner these were implemented the greater the like-
lihood that the Europeans could demand further concessions. In either case, the
discomfort with having to adhere to external pressures was made amply evident.
Progress toward becoming part of the Customs Union was almost derailed
by the massive Turkish incursion into northern Iraq in March and April 1995.
The scope and duration of the operation had to be reduced because of the intense
criticism coming from Europe. In fact, Ankara waited until after the ministerial
council of the European Union voted to give the go-ahead for the customs union
before invading northern Iraq.
Will admission into the Customs Union increase or decrease the pressure
Turkey will feel from the European Union member states with regard to democ-
ratization and the Kurdish issue? Although the Europeans no longer have the
Customs Union as a carrot to dangle in front of Ankara, the fact remains that
for Turkey this is an interim step: the ultimate goal is full membership. This very
desire will render Ankara vulnerable to criticisms. More important, membership
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in the Customs Union, as a further step toward the Europeanization of Turkey,
will inevitably mean that Europeans will feel freer to criticize Turkey for human
rights violations.13 Events on the ground will also help shape the nature of the
European concern; continued harsh treatment of the Kurds will also encourage
further European criticism. Already, Germany has been forced by domestic critics
to suspend arms deliveries to Turkey. While these were eventually resumed, the
suspension itself demonstrated the potential capabilities of domestic lobbies.
While Turkey was actively pushing for inclusion into the Customs Union, it
did not shy away from confrontations with European Union member states over
the Kurdish issue. Both Belgium and Holland were severely criticized for allowing
the Kurdish parliament in exile to gather for meetings in their respective capitals.
In the case of Holland, Turkey even placed the Hague on its "red list," meant, pre-
sumably, as a retaliation and a sign that arms purchases from that country would
be reduced. Ankara has overreacted to the parliament in exile, which has subse-
quently met in Austria and most recently in Moscow. The great consternation with
which these meetings are received in Ankara has obliged Turkish leaders to initi-
ate political demarches that far exceed the severity of the political embarrassment
that may be caused by these meetings of the parliament in exile.14 Ironically, these
demarches have served to attract far greater attention to the question.
This is reminiscent of the mid 1980s when Turkish foreign policy almost
came to a standstill as a result of the campaign by Armenians, especially in the
United States and France, to have the Armenian massacres of World War I offi-
cially commemorated. Then, U.S. "congressional supporters of Turkey [were]
bewildered that security assistance seem[ed] less important to the Turkish gov-
ernment than the Armenian question."15 The Kurdish question, admittedly, is
far more threatening to Turkish state interests, but the single-minded manner in
which it has come to dominate the calculations of its decision makers leaves little
room for discussion between supporters of Turkey who are critical of its govern-
ment's policies and the Turkish establishment.
The presence of a Kurdish diaspora abroad and, particularly, in Europe only
serves to accentuate the problem because, once politically mobilized, these groups
will help sustain the pressure on Ankara. Although there is a far larger number
of Turks residing in Europe than there are Kurds, the latter have the advantage
of being underdogs and mobilizing in support of a cause. In fact, the PKK has
been far more successful in organizing the Kurds of Germany, who perhaps number
five hundred thousand out of a total Turkish /Kurdish community that approaches
2 million, than it has the Kurds of Turkey. Despite the German government's ban
on the organization, the PKK has staged large demonstrations, collects and extorts
funds and recruits fighters. With the rise in intercommunal conflict, the Kurdish
question increasingly becomes more of a domestic problem for the German gov-
ernment, which is powerless to resolve it. Therefore, in the long run, it is likely that
the German government will seek to influence Ankara to adopt a more accommo-
dationist stance at home. In the short run, to counter the spread of intercommunal
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violence, Bonn even dispatched a high-ranking intelligence advisor to Chancellor
Kohl to meet with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Syria.16
T H E REGIONAL ROLE
Surrounded by states that are either hostile or potentially hostile to it, Turkey's for-
eign policy is perhaps destined to be distracted and incoherent. The elimination
of cold war era inhibitions on state action and the proliferation of new actors has
further complicated Ankara's task. In fact, Turkey has discovered that its Kurdish
problem has benefited its neighbors with which it has had long-standing disputes
by providing them with an opportunity to embarrass or even harass Ankara.17 The
most obvious example is Syria, which has actively supported the PKK and spe-
cifically given shelter to its leader, Abdullah Ocalan. For Greece, which has feared
Turkey and has long sought to contain its military power and has been at odds
with Ankara over the divided island of Cyprus, the Kurds represent a welcome
source of Turkish weakness that can be readily exploited. Similarly, for Iran, which
regards Turkey as a Muslim state in the service of its nemesis, the United States,
the Kurdish insurrection not only distracts Ankara but makes it solicitous of Teh-
ran's cooperation for border security.
Turkey has yet to discover that it is plagued by a delayed form of post-
empire politics; it had hitherto been sheltered from the backlash to Ottoman rule
in territories formerly controlled by the Ottomans. The changes engendered by
the end of the cold war, however, have revived old antipathies and insecurities that
target Turkey as the self-proclaimed successor to that empire. In addition, the
Kurds, by virtue of their dispersal among the four states, have become a regional
problem. The temptation for the different states to use their neighbors' Kurds in
pursuit of their regional ambitions is matched only by the willingness with which
the Kurds have accepted assistance from neighboring states as a means of eluding
the limits imposed by state boundaries.18
In the long run, the impact of the Turkish-Syrian divide is far more
damaging to Turkey's role in the region. In addition to harboring a long-held
resentment over the loss of Alexandretta to Turkey in 1939, Syria has increasingly
worried about Turkish attempts at developing the southeast through the GAP, the
Southeastern Anatolia Project, which envisages the construction of dams and ir-
rigation networks on both the Euphrates and Tigris. This project has already
diminished the downstream flow of water and, in the future, will also impact its
quality, as fertilizer use is augmented and some of the fertilizer-rich water seeps
back into the river. Despite their long-standing differences, the issue of water is
one that unites Syria and Iraq, since Iraq too is at risk given its dependence on
both of these rivers. The water problem resonates elsewhere in the Arab world,
where the issue has the potential of uniting a number of states behind Syria and
Iraq. Egypt, for one, faces exactly the same dilemma with the river Nile. In early
January 1996, the Turkish government reacted very negatively to the declaration
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issued in Damascus by seven Arab countries, including Egypt, calling on Turkey
to provide Syria with a "just" share of the Euphrates water.19
Although Syria and Iran have cooperated with Turkey over northern
Iraq, they are deeply mistrustful of Ankara's intentions,20 as is Ankara of theirs.
The resurgence of ethnic politics, the diminished importance attached to the in-
violability of state boundaries and the precedent set by cases such as the former
Yugoslavia are threatening to Middle Eastern states that have just witnessed the
Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, where territorial changes were clearly among the aims of
the aggressor. Even though none of these states would like to see an independent
Kurdish state established in northern Iraq, five years after the conclusion of the
Gulf war, Saddam's resilience has perpetuated the status quo. With the emerging
divisions among the Kurds of northern Iraq, Turkey has increasingly relied on
Barzani's faction, the KDP, whose territory abuts the Turkish frontier, to contain
PKK activities. The subtle shift in Turkey's post-Ozal strategy, moving away from
a refusal to cooperate with the Kurds of Iraq to a strategy of almost exclusive re-
liance on the KDP, may have initiated a new conflict of proxies in the region. The
outburst of severe PKK-KDP fighting in northern Iraq in fall 1995 may be an
attempt by the Syrians, who have a great deal of influence over the PKK, to check
the growing influence of Turkey in the area. Similarly, Iran's decision to send a
large number of armed Iraqi Shiites of the Badr brigade into northern Iraq to bol-
ster the anti-KDP forces and even serve as a balance of sorts indicates the growing
direct involvement of the neighboring states in the workings of the enclave.21
Syrian support for the PKK has brought numerous calls for a more activ-
ist policy toward Damascus from the Turkish press as well as parliamentarians,
including members of the ruling party, the True Path Party (DYP) of Prime Min-
ister Tansu (filler. Two factors have acted as constraints: the fear of creating an
anti-Turkish backlash in the Arab world and the impact such a course of action
would have on the Syrian leg of the U.S.-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process.22
On the other hand, the peace process has allowed Turkey to effect a rapproche-
ment with Israel; although this was long desired by Israel, it is Turkey that has the
greater stake in this new relationship. Israel, in Ankara's eyes, can serve as a means
of increasing pressure on Damascus and also curry favor with Washington. Simi-
larly, as long as the peace process between Israel and Syria remains deadlocked,
Israel can correspondingly make use of the same card. These tactics, however, are
of limited use to either side, in part because Arabs are aware that even the talk on
cooperation against terrorism articulated by both sides in their joint meetings
carries different meanings since Turkish and Israeli views of Arab and Kurdish
terrorism vary widely.23 Also, in the context of a regionwide peace treaty, Israeli
interests will significantly diverge from the alliances in the "periphery" that had
characterized the thrust of its regional policy during most of its existence.24 The
Syrians may be playing a similar game by improving their relations with Greece.
Turkey warned Damascus not to enter into an alliance with Greece and was re-
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ported not to have found convincing Syrian assurances that it would not give
Greece any bases on its territory.25
The Turkish-Iraqi relationship deteriorated with the onset of the Gulf crisis
as pipelines carrying Iraqi crude to the Mediterranean were ordered to shut down
by Ozal, who correctly anticipated UN Security Council resolutions. In fact, Ozal
may have accelerated a process of estrangement that began in the waning days of
the Iran-Iraq war when Iraqis bitterly complained of Turkish trade and business
practices and Turks of Iraqis's tendency to accumulate trade arrears. Iraqi concerns
regarding the GAP project further accentuated the uneasiness as Baghdad refused
to extend Ankara the cooperation that had allowed Turkish troops to cross into
northern Iraq in hot pursuit operations against the PKK.26 Recently, despite Turk-
ish efforts to get the Iraqi Kurds to negotiate with the regime in Baghdad, the
U.S.-sponsored intra-Kurdish negotiations in Ireland, in which the Turks par-
ticipated as active observers, have unnerved the Iraqis.
Convinced of the effects of regional demonstration toward the Kurds,
Turkey is faced with difficult choices with respect to Iraq: while its ardent wish is
that the Iraqis regain complete control of their territory, the continued status quo
increases doubts about the viability of a future Iraq.27 Hence, Ankara's fears of the
unknown are intensified. Driven by its concern to control the PKK, Ankara is
being slowly drawn into the management of the enclave. Should there be a change
in the regime in Baghdad, Turkey will find it difficult not to use its accumulated
clout to influence the overall outcome in Iraq and perhaps antagonize not just
Iraqis, Kurds and Arabs, but also other Arab states.
In other words, Turkey may find it very difficult to extricate itself from
northern Iraq. Unable to determine events in northern Iraq, faced with increased
pressure from domestic and foreign—regional and international—sources to alter
its policy on the Kurds, Ankara may genuinely become isolated. Turkey fears two
other possible scenarios in Iraq: the replacement of the Iraqi Ba'ath by a Syrian
Ba'ath, or Baghdad's submission to Iranian influence given the majority Shiite
population in that country. It is then that Turkey would be in need of European
and U.S. support. In effect, Turkish foreign policy will have effected a full circle
because of the Kurdish question. Having tried to go alone, it will have to seek sup-
port from those states that have in fact been its friends all along.
RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL ASIA AND AZERBAIJAN
The impact of the Kurdish question is only indirectly felt in Turkey's relations
with Central Asian states. The Central Asians care little about the issue and
are generally staunchly supportive of any Turkish government. In view of the
presence of the significant and sometimes troublesome Russian minority in their
midst, the leaders of Central Asia sympathize with the plight of Ankara; however,
the Kurdish issue affects Ankara's relations with them in three distinct ways.
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First, it represents a distraction for Turkish foreign policy makers, who have
to expend a great deal of energy and resources on this issue: it is in the resulting
significant opportunity costs that the impact of the Kurdish problem can best be
observed, in the form of delays in the approval of or wrangling over membership
in the customs union, resulting in inharmonious relations with its principal allies.
The issue has also somewhat sullied Turkey's image as a model for these states.
Second, the continued insurrection in the east and southeastern provinces
does cast a long shadow on the security and to a lesser extent on the feasibility of
the pipeline projects envisaged by Turkey to bring in Azeri and Kazakh oil and
Turkmen gas. An undefeated PKK could conceivably create severe problems for
long-term maintenance of such pipelines, although it could not stop them alto-
gether from operating and transporting the oil and gas.
Finally, and most important, the Kurdish insurrection provides the Rus-
sians, who have watched with great uneasiness Turkey's economic and political
moves in Central Asia to supplant them, with a card to exploit. Moscow has been
particularly angered by Turkish moves to obtain international support for the con-
struction of Azeri and Kazakh pipelines bypassing Russian territory and emptying
in the Turkish port of Dortyol in the Mediterranean. Because of Turkish sensi-
tivities over the Kurds, Moscow was successful in muting Ankara's criticisms over
its attack on Grozny. In addition, periodic Russian actions, such as the organi-
zation of Kurdish conferences on its territory, serve as constant reminders of Mos-
cow's potential reach.
Similarly, the Iranian regime, fearful of Turkish irredentist ambitions in
Azerbaijan has used the PKK as a way of reminding Ankara of its own vulnera-
bilities. Iranian anxieties reached a peak with the ascendancy of Abulfaz Elcibey
and his nationalist Popular Front in Baku. Elcibey, who did not hide his dream
of unifying all Azeris, was enthusiastically backed by Ankara. His downfall, en-
gineered in part by Moscow, account for the increased, but measured, Iranian
cooperation with Ankara along the their common border.28
CONCLUSION
The internationalization of Turkey's Kurdish problem was the result of both ac-
cident and design. The changing international strategic balances and their ensuing
impact on regional ones were beyond the control of Ankara, which had since the
constitution of the republic tried very hard to contain its Kurdish problem. How-
ever, once the Kurdish insurrection gained momentum—with the initial help of
foreign powers, notably Syria—Ankara found itself on the defensive. Forced to
acknowledge the existence of an issue it had tried so hard to cover up but one that
also presented a severe threat to its conceptualization of state structure and orga-
nization, the Ankara government decided to externalize the problem.
Turkey's importance to the West, in general, has not been diminished by
the repercussions of the Kurdish problem. The Europeans' overwhelming vote
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(343 for, 149 against, 36 abstentions) in favor of Customs Union membership on
13 December 1995 and the United States' general pro-Turkey attitude are indica-
tions of this. But the Kurdish problem is a dynamic one and has the potential of
changing directions and affecting Turkey's foreign policy.
Refusing to accept any share of the responsibility for the insurrection, An-
kara blamed external powers—friends and foes alike—for the emergence of the
problem. The strategy to equate Kurdish demands with the PKK has worked do-
mestically by solidifying Turkish, as opposed to Turkish and Kurdish, opinion
behind itself. In the long run, this may backfire. Internationally, this strategy
has produced even more limited results. While the PKK has been almost univer-
sally branded as a terrorist organization, the strategy of aggressively attacking the
"Kurdish cause" is increasingly bearing the wrong results. It has created a quag-
mire in Ankara's negotiations with the European Union, creating the occasion for
genuine foreign interference in Turkish domestic matters. As a result, the Kurds
hae won a degree of legitimacy they previously did not enjoy. From Russia, Syria,
Iran and Greece, who are ready and willing to use the issue against Ankara, to its
friends in Europe and the United States, for whom the Kurds may increasingly
appear as underdogs and therefore create a moral dilemma, the government's strat-
egy has enabled all to become active in Turkish and Kurdish politics. In so doing,
Ankara has transformed the Kurdish issue into Turkey's greatest vulnerability. In
effect, the Ankara government is increasingly facing the possibility of being im-
prisoned in a cage of its own making.
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THE KURDISH QUESTION AND
TURKEY'S FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARD SYRIA, IRAN, RUSSIA
AND IRAQ^SINCE THE
GULF WAR1
Robert Olson
A his chapter addresses the Kurdish question and the Kurdish problem and
the role that they play in the foreign policy of Turkey, especially in its relations
with Iraq, Iran, Syria and Russia.2 The Kurdish problem in this context refers to
the challenge of Kurdish nationalism within Turkey itself. Four countries—
Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria—have Kurdish problems, but the stress here is on
Turkey's Kurdish problem. The Kurdish question refers generally to the interstate
dynamics among these four states; but, as I argue in the course of this chapter, it
has spread beyond these four countries since the Gulf war of 1991. In this article,
Russia will be included as a player within the wider parameters of the Kurdish
question. It is clear that, since the Gulf war, the Kurds and their political future
have been high on the agenda of the world community. I argue in this chapter,
however, that the saliency of the Kurdish question, in the sense of international
support for some kind of Kurdish autonomous entity in northern Iraq, let alone
an independent Kurdish state, has diminished during the past two years or so. The
major reason for this diminution has been the challenge of the Kurdish national-
ist movement, spearheaded by the PKK, a Kurdish nationalist guerrilla organi-
zation active in Turkey, which stepped up its military campaign against the Turk-
ish government following the Gulf war. PKK is an acronym for Partia Karkaren
Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers' Party.3 The PKK became the most potent ex-
pression of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey after it launched its guerrilla against the
government in 1984. Its role grew exponentially after the Gulf war.
The Kurds are estimated to number some 20 to 25 million people, living
largely in four Middle East countries: Turkey, which is estimated to have a popu-
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lation of 10 to 12 million; Iran, with 5 to 6 million; Iraq, with 3.5 million; and
Syria, with 1 million. Some seventy to eighty thousand Kurds also live in Armenia
and in Azerbaijan. Recent reports suggest that between three hundred thousand
and 1 million Kurds live within the Russian Federation.4 Since the bulk of Kurds
live in contiguous areas of east and southeast Turkey, north and northeast Iraq,
north and northwest Iran and in east and northeast Syria, they have possessed a
sense of self, community and shared space since medieval times at least. This sense
of identity was reinforced by the emergence of nationalist movements in the last
two decades of the nineteenth century. The Kurds consider themselves to be direct
descendants of the ancient Medes (although modern scholarship doubts this), who,
because of military conquests, defeats and collapses of empires, began to migrate
and locate themselves around two thousand years ago in the mountain fastnesses
of the present states of Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. From these strategic and
almost impregnable locations, the Kurds were able to preserve their communities
while at the same time participating in the great Armenian, Greek, Byzantine,
Arab, Turkish, Iranian and Ottoman empires that dominated this region's history
right up to the collapse and partition of the Ottoman empire at the end of World
War I. The Kurds were promised the possibility of an independent state in articles
62 and 64 of the Treaty of Sevres signed on 10 August 1920.
But there was to be no Kurdish state. The main reason for this was the
emergence of a strong Turkish nationalist state in the aftermath of World War I
and the subsequent suppression of Kurdish nationalist revolts in 1925, 1930
and 1937-38. There was not to be another Kurdish nationalist challenge to the
Turkish state until the emergence of the PKK in the early 1980s. The Kurdish
movement in Iran was also contained by a strong nationalist government in Iran
during the interwar and post-World War II periods. The one exception was the
brief one-year period in 1946, when the Kurds were able to establish a nationalist
government in Mahabad before it fell to the vicissitudes of the emerging cold war.
It was only with the commencement of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1978 and
the 1980s that the Kurds in Iran were once again able to press vigorously their de-
mands for more cultural and political autonomy. The Iraqi Kurds' situation was
substantially different from that of the Kurds in Turkey or Iran because Great
Britain, which became the mandatory power in Iraq in 1920, supported, in vary-
ing degrees, Kurdish nationalist demands for cultural rights and local political
administrative autonomy. The British never advocated or supported an indepen-
dent state in Iraq during the period from 1920 to 1958 when they controlled the
country: they supported Kurdish cultural and some limited political autonomy in
Iraq mainly as a counterpoise to Arab nationalism and the government, largely
Sunni and Arab, in Baghdad. Ever since the British were expelled from Iraq in
1958, the Kurds in the north of Iraq and the Iraqi government have been, inter-
mittently, at war.5
It was only in the wake of the 1991 Gulf war that the Kurds in Iraq seemed
to have gained an opportunity to establish an independent state or, at least, an au-
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tonomous entity federated with the rest of Iraq, as a result of the Allied policies,
led by the United States and Europe, to topple Saddam Hussein from power. To
achieve their goal the Allied forces supported a Kurdish insurrection against his
regime. The defeat of the Kurdish insurrection by government forces and the sub-
sequent flight of the Kurds to the mountainous regions bordering Iran and Turkey,
especially the latter, created further support in the West for some kind of sanctu-
ary for the Kurds in northern Iraq. Of course, the Kurds desired to make this "safe
zone" as autonomous as possible. I will argue that the perceived intent of the
Kurds to create an independent state in northern Iraq led Turkey to conclude a
series of national security agreements between itself, Iran and Syria and also led
to a brief rapprochement with Iraq starting in 1993.
TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH SYRIA
On 19-20 November 1993, Major General Adnan Badr al-Hasan, Syrian interior
ministry chief of security, just after Turkey and Syria signed a security protocol re-
garding the PKK and other "terrorists," stated in an interview that Syria would not
be a thoroughfare for "those who are against Turkey's interest."6 A few days later,
Nasir Kaddur, Syrian state minister for security, in a television interview referring
to the security protocol, stated that Syria had "begun to ban the PKK on President
Hafiz al-Asad's orders." Kaddur added that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and
other "terrorists" would not be allowed to use Syrian territory or pass through Syria
for operations against Turkey. The security chief noted that some PKK members
had already been arrested. He implied further that henceforth Ocalan would be
unwelcome in Syria. Kaddur concluded his interview by saying, "Turkey's stability
and integrity is important for Syria and the region. Therefore there is no room for
any groups perpetrating terrorism and causing trouble for Turkey."7 Turkish offi-
cials were undoubtedly delighted to hear the Syrian security chief characterize the
PKK as a terrorist organization. This was the first time that a high-ranking Syrian
official had done so and marked a significant departure in the foreign policy of
Syria, which had supported the PKK since it commenced its guerrilla activities
in 1984.
On 23 August, Syria participated on the foreign minister level in a summit
conference held in Damascus with Iran and Turkey in which the Kurdish question
figured prominently. The three foreign ministers, Ali Akbar Velayati of Iran, Faruk
al-Shar'a of Syria and Mumtaz Soysal of Turkey, who was to become officially for-
eign minister on 27 August, expressed their unalterable opposition to the frag-
mentation of Iraq and vehemently opposed to the planned elections in 1995 in
northern Iraq, which they declared would contribute to the fragmentation of that
country. The ministers, especially Soysal, expressed their displeasure at not being
invited to attend the Kurdish Conference held on 23 July in Paris, although offi-
cials from Great Britain, France and the United States did attend.
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At the Damascus summit, al-Shar'a did not specifically denounce the PKK
as a terrorist organization as Turkey demanded, but he did say that Syria was
adamantly opposed to the fragmentation of Middle East countries, an apparent
reference to the Kurdish nationalist challenge to Turkey as well as to Iraq. In his
turn, Soysal announced at the summit that Turkey would soon place new restric-
tions, especially on representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), on
entries into Iraq at the Habur/Khabur crossing, the main entry point between
Turkey and Iraq, located at the town of Cizre (Jazirat Ibn ~Umar) on the Turkish
side of the border.8 Some two weeks later the Turkish government did announce
that it was closing the Habur crossing to representatives of human rights' organi-
zations and members of foreign parliaments. Only personnel connected to UN
programs in northern Iraq and Turkish and Iraqi journalists would be allowed pas-
sage. A Turkish authority was quoted as saying:"Northern Iraq is our back yard.
Of course, we will control who comes and goes."9
The August summit meeting in Damascus made clear the direct connection
between the Kurdish question and the distribution of the Euphrates river waters.
The Turks emphasized that they would not pursue earnest negotiations on
the water question until Syria assured them that they would no longer support
PKK activities or shelter Abdallah Ocalan. Until agreement was reached, Ankara
stressed that it would be difficult to move forward on other problems such as the
distribution of the Orontes River (Asi in Turkish and al-'Asi in Arabic), which
flows through Syria before entering Turkey's Hatay province. The Turks want an
agreement that will prohibit the Syrians from severely restricting the Orontes' flow
before it enters Hatay. Ankara also indicated that it sought indemnification for
property in Syria belonging to Turkish citizens, some cases of which go back prior
to World War I. The Syrians are also interested in putting the question of the sov-
ereignty of Hatay/Alexandretta on the agenda. Hatay was a province of Syria prior
to being annexed by Turkey in 1939, with the support of the European powers, in
return for Turkey's hoped for neutrality in the increasingly bitter conflict between
Germany and its European neighbors. The Turkish foreign minister stated, how-
ever, that the two countries should try to solve the least intractable problems first.
Some Turkish editorial writers declared that the August summit marked "a new
era" in Turkish-Syrian relations. All three foreign ministers declared their unalter-
able opposition to the creation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq.
Prior to the Damascus summit and just after being appointed foreign minister,
Soysal announced publicly that he believed that it was the West's intention to es-
tablish an independent state in northern Iraq.10
In late 1994 and early 1995 relations between Turkey and Syria took a
brief upswing. On 5 December, Yalim Erez, president of Turkey's chamber of
commerce and stock market and a close adviser of prime minister Tansu Ciller, led
a one-hundred-person delegation to Damascus to engage in trade discussions.
Syrian foreign minister Muhammad Imadi made it clear that Syria was interested
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in improving trade relations with Turkey, especially if Syria's $300 million trade
deficit with Turkey could be reduced, and he suggested that one way to reduce the
trade deficit would be for Turkey to import phosphates from Syria, which had an
abundance for export, rather than from Tunisia. Erez indicated that Turkey would
strive to reduce the trade deficit. Turkish press editorials were largely in favor of
improved relations with Syria. Ankara was hopeful that, when signed, a peace
agreement would open up greater trade opportunities for Turkish trade and busi-
ness ventures, especially for its construction companies in Syria, Lebanon, the
West Bank and Gaza. The Turkish delegation stated emphatically that their coun-
try wanted to participate in the reconstruction and development in the Arab
region. Editors close to government circles stressed that better relations with Syria
were a key to Turkey's participation in the "millions" that would be spent on re-
construction and development in the region and that if Ankara and Damascus did
not improve their relations, the West would "eat all of the pasta (desert)."11
By February 1995, despite differences over the issue of Damascus' contin-
ued support for the PKK and the agreement that greater trade was desirable, the
amount of water released by Turkey from its upriver dams on the Euphrates re-
mained a bitter issue between the two capitals. In early February 1995, however,
Prime Minister (filler announced that Turkey was ready to sign a "water protocol"
with Syria guaranteeing a flow of at least 500 million cubic meters per second, if
Damascus would abandon its "protection of PKK terrorists."12
By mid-summer, however, reports that the PKK was attempting to establish
an organizational structure in Hatay once again soured what seemed to be im-
proving relations. In July the commander of the People's Liberation Army of
Kurdistan (ARGK), the military wing of the PKK, announced that PKK guerrillas
were engaging in operations in the Taurus mountains and in Hatay. The com-
mander stated that the PKK first stationed forces in these regions in 1994. He
claimed that Turkish intelligence first became aware of the PKK presence in early
1995 and that the Turkish National Security Council met to discuss methods
of eliminating the PKK presence and decided to send "thousands of soldiers to
the region and hoped to achieve a victory over us [ARGK] by means of military
operations. Because they could not achieve such a victory, they built up a system of
contra-guerrillas and village guards in urban centers such as Cukurova, Hatay and
Adana." The commander went on to report that in the first six months of 1995,
ARGK killed twenty-five Turkish soldiers, village guards and fascists, which, in
the PKK lingo refers to those individuals and groups who collaborate with the
Turkish military and security apparatuses. The ARGK spokesman said only two
of its fighters had been killed. He added that the Turkish people had shown a great
deal of interest in the struggle of the PKK.13
The story of the PKK presence in Hatay first broke in the Turkish press
on 17 September. Hiirriyet reported on that date that Abdullah Ocalan had pro-
claimed that he "would turn Hatay into Bohtan." Bohtan is the area south of Lake
Van, extending into areas in northern Iraq, in which bloody battles have occurred
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during the past decade between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces. Hatay,
too, said Ocalan, "must be turned into a bloody lake."14
According to Hurriyet, the PKK first attempted to infiltrate into the Adana,
Mersin and Hatay regions in the early 1990s but won over only a few recruits in
the hinterlands of Adana and Mersin. By the early 1990s these cities were already
swelled with Kurds fleeing the scorched earth policies of the Turkish armed forces
in the southeast. But the PKK had tough sledding in Hatay because of the tight
security blanket thrown over the entire region by the Turkish security apparatuses.
In spite of setbacks, the PKK persisted in trying to establish themselves in the
region, as Hatay shares a border with Syria, where the PKK have sanctuary. The
PKK operatives tried to ensconce themselves along the road from Lataqiya in
Syria to Samadag, a village in the Amanus mountains in Hatay. This is a road used
heavily by smugglers and drug traffickers, which the PKK hoped to exploit to their
advantage.
There are no reliable figures regarding the ethnic and religious profile of
Hatay, so an estimation of its demographic composition has to be based on guess-
work. The population does include a large number of Arabs, both Sunni and
Alevi/Alawite. The Turkish population is predominately Sunni. The Kurdish
population that has taken refuge in the province during the past decade is prob-
ably largely Sunni as well, but may include 15 to 20 percent Alevis, which is
approximately the proportion of Alevis among the Kurdish population of Turkey.
As mentioned above, Hatay shares a border with the Syrian province of Lataqiya,
which has a predominately Alawite/Alevi population. The Alawites of Syria have
been in control of the higher echelons of the Syrian Government since 1970.
Hafiz al-Asad, the president of Syria, is an Alawite.
The Htirriyet account emphasized that the PKK hoped to exploit the reli-
gious and ethnic diversity of Hatay. One of the first operations of the PKK was to
attack the Sunni-Turkomen villages. When the Turkish government then armed
the Turkomen, the PKK countered with propaganda that the state was arming
Sunnis against Alevis—Arab, Turk and Kurd. When, again according to Hurriyet,
the PKK found themselves unable to exploit the religious and ethnic differences,
they attempted to ingratiate themselves with the local population by purchasing
food provisions at prices substantially higher than the market price. All transac-
tions were carried out in German marks. Prices were high. For example, one egg
sold for two marks or 65,000 Turkish lira; a 50-kilo sack of flour was going for
1,000 marks or 33 million lira. By their largess the PKK hoped to establish sup-
port and receive protection from the indigenous population.
In addition to exploiting the different religious and ethnic groups in Hatay,
the PKK, the Hurriyet alleged, also tried to take advantage of the traditionally
strong leftist sentiments in Hatay by proclaiming themselves a Marxist organiza-
tion, while they abandoned this strategy in the southeast to portray themselves as
a moderate leftist-Islamist—oriented organization to take advantage of the Islamist
upsurge among segments of the population during the previous decade. Reports
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of further clashes between the PKK and Turkish armed forces during the first days
of December 1995 suggest that there was truth in the comments of the ARGK
commander and in the report in Hurriyet.
If the above mentioned reports are correct, they indicate the PKK's inten-
tion to expand its guerrilla war from the region of the southeast to the shores of
the Mediterranean. An increase in guerrilla war in Hatay would suggest that the
PKK is willing, bold enough or feels sufficiently compelled, whether from per-
ceived weakness or strength, to take its war against Ankara out of the southeast
region, which is predominately Kurdish. The choice of Hatay is as significant as it
is sensitive. The province was part of Syria until 1939, and its sovereignty is still a
contentious issue between Turkey and Syria and one of the sore spots in their
relationship. The attempt of the PKK to enlist the minority Alevi/Alawite, espe-
cially Arab, and economically marginalized population against the dominant Sunni
and Turkish population is bound to create more friction between the two capitals.
Reports in the summer of 1995 of the PKK's attempts to move into Hatay further
iced relations between the two countries. When the PKK attacked the KDP in
northern Iraq on 25 August as a result of its unhappiness with the results of the
first Drogheda conference, Turkey was quick to announce that Damascus, as well
as Iran, encouraged the PKK to attack.
It would be easy to understand Turkish suspicions that Damascus is behind
the PKK's attempts to establish bases in Hatay. But the PKK's movement into
Hatay, if proved to be true and to be substantial, is bound to plunge relations
between the two countries to another nadir. Such a development would further
confirm Ankara's position that Damascus supports the PKK and the Kurdish na-
tionalist movement in Turkey as instruments to weaken politically, militarily and
diplomatically its big northern neighbor.
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss all of the reasons for Syria's
slight change of policy vis-a-vis the PKK in 1993-94, but obviously its continued
negotiations with Israel and with the United State and its desire to participate
in the Middle East peace process have played major roles in this change of
policy. Anti-terrorist remarks and positions were also obviously preparation for the
summit meeting between President al-Asad and President Clinton in Geneva,
Switzerland, 16 January 1993. Syria no doubt thought its anti-terrorism remarks
would result in its removal from the U.S. State Department's list of countries
supporting terrorism and bring with it the benefits that would entail. The removal
of Syria from the list was again discussed by President al-Asad and U.S. Secre-
tary of State Warren Christopher during meetings in July and December 1994,
March 1995, and in 1996. Improved relations between Turkey and Syria depend
a good deal on the Middle East peace process. If Syria does not sign a peace
accord with Israel, it will obviously be less amenable to allowing Turkish compa-
nies to participate in the reconstruction and development of the region.
There is, however, another dimension to Syria's anti-terrorism remarks with
reference to the PKK. This is the realization on the part of Syria that Europe and
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the United States do not want the destabilization or weakening of Turkey as a
result of Syrian support for the PKK. When the Arab states, the Palestinians and
Israel finalize their peace negotiations, Syria may well have a role to play in the in-
terregional sharing of water schemes, which now abound. Any pipeline carrying
water from the upper reaches of the Euphrates and the Ceyhan and Seyhan rivers
located in south central Turkey would have to traverse Syrian territory. Syria will
want to extract as much diplomatic, political and economic leverage as possible
from such a potentiality. Such a role demands, however, that it no longer pursue
policies against the course of wider regional water, trade and economic agreements
and geostrategic understandings. In turn, this would mean less support of PKK
activities against Turkey. Another aspect of such policies is that Syria would be less
able to use the Kurdish card against the Ba'thist regime in Baghdad. In short, the
emerging geopolitic and geostrategic trends in the Middle East indicate that
Syria's continuing support of the PKK may in the future be less of an asset in
achieving its foreign policy goals.
The issue of Syria's support of the PKK reared its head again in late 1995,
when Ocalan had contacts with high-ranking German political and intelligence
officials in Damascus. On 30 September, Heinrich Lummer, a political ally of
Chancellor Helmut Kohl, met with the PKK leader in the Syrian capital. After
the Lummer visit, German media announced that several high-ranking intel-
ligence officials had met with Ocalan before Lummer's visit.15 The stated reason
for the German visit was to discuss German concerns that PKK demonstrations
and political activities in Germany were creating more disorder than Germany
thought tolerable. The Germans also brought to Ocalan's attention their unhap-
piness with the PKK's involvement in drug trafficking in Germany. For his part,
Ocalan stressed his desire that Germany recognize the PKK as a legitimate en-
tity and that it stop characterizing PKK as a terrorist organization. The fact that
Damascus was the site of such negotiations, which, if they come to fruition, would
prove very detrimental to Turkey's policy of delegitimizing the PKK by referring
to it as a terrorist organization, is notable.
One of the major questions concerning Turkish-Syrian relations in 1995
and 1996 is: If Syria's headquartering of Ocalan in Syria and its support for
the PKK is so strong, and if one of Syria's objectives is to support the PKK as a
bona fide nationalist organization, why doesn't Ankara take stronger actions, even
military ones, against Syria? The answer seems to be twofold: Ankara undoubt-
edly does not want to attack a major Arab country, especially just as it seems closer
to signing a peace agreement with Israel. Such an action would hurt Turkey's re-
lations with the entire Arab world, albeit in varying degrees. The second reason
seems to be that even if such an attack were carried out, it might be ineffective.
An ill-planned attack on the PKK in Syria could yield little in the way of des-
truction of PKK facilities. On the other hand, it could produce a diplomatic
brouhaha that could persist for some time. At the end of 1995, Syria's sheltering
of Ocalan and its support for the PKK, and especially its support for the PKK
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move into Hatay, remained the principle reason for the sour state of relations be-
tween the two countries.
TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH IRAN
In 1993 and early 1994 a rapprochement between Turkey and Iran over the mutual
challenge of Kurdish nationalism, especially from the PKK, continued. In May
and June 1994, the diplomatic and national security meetings were frequent. By
1 September 1994 approximately ten major meetings had taken place. The two
countries signed a joint security protocol on 30 November 1993. The protocol
stipulated that neither country would permit any terrorist organization [read PKK]
to exist on its territory. Golam Husseini Bolandijian of the Iranian delegation and
the authorized representative of President Rafsanjani stated that Iran would take
military measures against the PKK. The 7 December 1993 issue of the Turkish
conservative newspaper, Sabah, had a banner headline proclaiming, "Iran issues
order for PKK members to be shot." Bolandijian reportedly stated: "Iran has issued
an order for any PKK member to be shot regardless of whether they are wearing
PKK uniforms or are smugglers." The article concluded, "At the end of seven [se-
curity] meetings between the Iranian and Turkish delegations a protocol to take
action against terrorism was signed."
On 4 May 1994, Turkish interior minister Nahit Mentese announced that
Iran had turned over to Turkey twenty-eight members of the PKK, ten of whom
were corpses. On 13 June, Ankara requested of visiting Iranian interior minister,
Mohammad Besharati, that Turkey be allowed to bomb PKK bases located around
the areas of Mounts Ararat and Tendiirek in and near Iranian territory. On
14 June, President Suleyman Demirel even took time out from his summer vaca-
tion to announce that Ankara and Tehran had agreed to cooperate against the
PKK, and the Turkish press announced on 16 June that Iran had given permission
to Turkey to bomb PKK bases located in Iranian territory. The 16 June declaration
centered on three major points of agreement: to prevent the passage of PKK mem-
bers from northern Iraq to Iran; to prevent PKK passage to Armenia and hence to
Russia; and—a Turkish request—to bomb roads in Iranian territory that were used
by the PKK to replenish supplies for the camps in Iran from which it launched at-
tacks against Turkey. In a press conference Besharati did not officially acknowledge
that Iran would give permission to Turkey to bomb PKK bases located in Iranian
territory, but he did state that Iran would cooperate with Turkey in every way
against "their common enemies." In return, Ankara announced that it would move
"against" the Mujahidin-i-Halq opposition to the Iran government in Turkey.
Mentese stated that Turkey would not allow any group operating from Turkish ter-
ritory "to give harm" to the Iranian government.
The national security concerns between Turkey and Iran over the Kurds
were given prominence when President Demirel met with President Rafsanjani on
15-27 July, the first visit by a Turkish president to Iran in decades. In press inter-
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views prior to the meeting, Rafsanjani gave assurances that Iran was fully cooper-
ating with Turkey against the PKK, and he stated that the creation of a Kurdish
state was "impossible."16 Although Rafsanjani did make a point of claiming that
the Islamic Republic had solved its Kurdish problem within the "spirit of Islam,"
this reply was probably meant to imply his approval of the religiously oriented
Welfare (Refah) Party (WP) in Turkey, which is in opposition to Demirel's True
Path (Dogu Yolu) Party (TPP). The Demirel-Rafsanjani meeting received wide
coverage in both the Iranian and the Turkish press, but it was more limited in
Turkey because of the hullabaloo over the disclosure of Prime Minister Tansu
filler's and her husband's personal wealth and the fact that the couple had some
four or five million dollars invested in real estate in the United States. Foreign
Minister Hikmet Cetin was also forced to resign during Demirel's visit in Tehran.
While it is still unclear as to all of the reasons compelling Cetin's resignation, his
handling of the Kurdish question and Turkey's Kurdish problem and its many
manifestations may well have played a role in his forced resignation. Cetin him-
self is an ethnic Kurd and perceived to be "soft" on the Kurdish issue. Nahit Men-
tes,e, the Turkish interior minister, stated that he was confident the new security
agreements between the two countries as well as agreements with Syria would lead
to the capture of PKK leader Ocalan, who, like the recently apprehended Carlos
the Jackal, could not escape justice forever.17
Turkish and Iranian relations continued to improve in early 1995. Much of
the improvement centered on Iran's potential participation in an international con-
sortium of companies and countries slated to build a natural gas pipeline estimated
to cost $6 billion from Turkmenistan to Turkey. In its initial stages, one proposed
route for the pipeline was to cross 1,200 kilometers of Iranian territory after tra-
versing the Caspian Sea. Iran was to finance the portion of the pipeline that would
cross its territory in exchange for a percentage of the total gas transferred.18 Im-
mediately in the wake of the national gas pipeline negotiations, Iran moved to
settle a $200 million debt it had with Turkish exporters.19
The importance of the Iranian route for the proposed pipeline and a pro-
jected trunk line through Turkey is clear: It would mean even greater cooperation
between Turkey and Iran against the Kurds. Since the pipeline would have to cross
regions largely inhabited by Kurds in both Iran and Turkey, this would engender
even closer national security cooperation between Ankara and Tehran to prevent
Kurdish and Iranian opposition forces, such as the Mujahidin-i-halq, from sabo-
taging the pipeline.
The emphasis placed on preventing the emergence of an independent Kur-
dish state in northern Iraq was again the major topic of discussion by the foreign
ministers of Turkey, Iran and Syria on 8 September in Tehran, during their 7th
Triparitite meeting since the Gulf war. At the meeting, the three foreign minis-
ters reaffirmed their previous proclamations: They were opposed to the division of
Iraq's territorial integrity; they were against "terrorism" but gave no names; and
they were all three concerned about the stockpiling of weapons in northern Iraq.20
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When Iranian Minister of Economic and Financial affairs, Morteza Mo-
hammad Khan, met with President Demirel on 7 November 1995, the president
stated that he fully agreed with the decisions reached at the 7th Tripartite talks
held in Tehran. He remarked, "Western countries intended to form a Kurdish
government with the help of separatists."21 Demirel also repeated that Turkey and
Iran are not in competition with each other. In turn, Mohammad Khan stressed
the need for greater economic cooperation between the two countries. On 1 De-
cember, the Turkish Foreign Ministry's undersecretary Onur Oymen visited Iran
and held talks with President Rafsanjani in which the President noted the good
relations between Tehran and Ankara, but he, too, indicated Iran's desire for more
economic cooperation.
The national security agreements between Turkey and Iran are important
in several ways. They indicate the serious challenge of Kurdish nationalism, es-
pecially of the PKK to Turkey, to both countries; they suggest that Ankara and
Tehran are probably more willing than heretofore to cooperate regarding their re-
spective policies toward countries in the Caucasus, especially Armenia, Azerbaijan
and the accompanying problem of Norgorno-Karabagh and, by extension, the in-
creasingly strong role and presence of Russia in the region; they may indicate that
the two countries are also prepared to be more cooperative in their policies toward
the Central Asian states and; 4) they point to the need for Turkey to maintain close
coordination with Iran in order to prevent the emergence of an independent Kurd-
ish state in northern Iraq and all of the geopolitical and geostrategic headaches
that this would bring to the two capitals.
From the Gulf war to the end of 1995, Turkish and Iranian relations re-
garding the Kurdish question went through many fluctuations. In spite of the
cooperation evinced by the numbers Tripartite meetings among the big three—
Iran, Turkey and Syria—the emergence of areas in northern Iraq no longer under
the control or authority of Baghad means necessarily greater competition between
Ankara and Tehran in that space. The problem is where the lines of the two coun-
tries' spheres of influence will be drawn. This very problem was exacerbated from
1994 to 1995, as the two largest Kurdish nationalist groups, the KDP and the
PUK, respectively, drew closer to Turkey and Iran as the result of their internecine
fighting.
An example of the creation of spheres of influence in Iraqi Kurdistan was
the reported agreement of Jalal Talabani to allow amassing of three to five thou-
sand troops (some sources put the figures much lower) consisting of Shi'a who had
earlier fled Iraq and are now under the control of Ayatollah Bakr al-Hakim, a
member of the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI).22
Talabani announced that the force would be used in joint operations with his pesh-
mergas against Saddam Hussein. Safa'in Diza'i, the KDP's representative in An-
kara, emphasized that the KDP had nothing to do with the deployment, which
was entirely Talabani's decision. He noted further the KDP was following closely
developments in the PUK-controlled region, which by the end of 1995 included
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half of the territory of northern Iraq and 70 percent of the regions' population.
Diza'i noted further that the decision to deploy Iranian troops in northern Iraq
should have been a decision of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) and not solely
that of the PUK.
Aziz Kader, leader of the Turkomen in northern Iraq, claimed that the force
was paid for entirely by Iran and that Talabani requested the force as a result of the
increasingly close relations between the KDP and Turkey, a development feared
equally by Tehran. PUK and Iranian fears increased after the PKK attacked KDP
forces on 25 August 1995, and the KDP was compelled to coordinate many of its
military operations against the PKK with Turkey.
The deployment of troops ostensibly under the control of an Iranian Aya-
tollah in the PUK-controlled territory of northern Iraq indicated a further
diminution of the agreements reached at the Drogheda conferences in Ireland in
August and September. The major result of the first conference was that the PKK
used it as a reason to attack the KDP, which it characterized as a puppet of the
United States and Turkey. Ocalan was also apparently impatient to test whether
some the Kurds in Bahdinan, the KDP-controlled area in northern Iraq, were as
unhappy with Barzani as he thought. The PUK was also unhappy with aspects of
the Drogheda conference, but it did not come to the aid of the KDP when it was
attacked by the PKK on 25 August. It is not clear just why Talabani felt the need
for the Iranian-controlled reinforcement of his peshmergas, unless he believes that
they will be useful if the KDP attacks his forces, if and when they repel the PKK
challenge. He might also find the Badr brigade, as the Iranian force is called, useful
in reducing further the territory held by the KDP.
In conclusion, it can be said that since the Gulf war, Turkish-Iranian re-
lations have improved overall and that the geopolitical necessity of the two capitals
to cooperate against the growth and spread of Kurdish nationalism has been an
essential factor in their relationship. The creation of an independent and inter-
nationally recognized state in northern Iraq is perceived by the two states as a po-
tential disaster and a challenge to the two states as presently constituted, physically
and ideologically. Both countries have substantial Kurdish problems within their
own borders. In the case of Turkey, the Kurdish nationalism movement is the
preeminent factor in both domestic and foreign policies. In Iran the Kurdish ques-
tion is inextricably linked with the Azerbaijan question.23 Given the fact that
neither country deems it militarily or politically possible to subdue the Kurds in
all of northern Iraq, both countries seem, at the end of 1995, to have adopted a
policy of carving out respective spheres of influence in Iraqi Kurdistan.
In this regard, another reason for Talabani's acceptance of the Iranian Badr
brigade, other than his announced reasons, is that he hopes to send a signal to
Tehran that he wants closer economic relations and more trade between the PUK-
controlled area and Iran. Since fighting between the KDP and PUK broke out over
disagreement on how to allocate the money received for the truck traffic entering
the KDP-controlled territory in northern Iraq from Turkey at the Habur crossing,
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it seems possible that Talabani hopes to increase his revenues by fostering greater
trade with Iran. Thus, there is an emerging situation in which the KDP-controlled
territory is being brought under the Turkish sphere of economic as well as political
influence and the PUK-controlled territory is being tied economically and politi-
cally more closely with Iran. In return for reducing the barriers for a greater flow of
trade, Tehran might well have demanded from the PUK leader an Iranian presence
in his region for its own geopolitical reasons. For the first time Iran has acknowl-
edged sending troops into Iraq since the Iraq-Iran cease-fire of August 1988, and
Iran at the end of 1995 and in early 1996 was challenging a bit more aggressively
the United States and European "dual containment" policy in the Gulf region.
TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA
In 1994 and early 1995, the Kurdish question also began to figure strongly in
Turkey's relations with Russia. The Turks protested when they learned that
Moscow would be the site of an international conference to discuss the problems
of the Kurds in the Russian Federation, whose population was estimated at 1 mil-
lion, and the Kurds of Turkey. The tensions between the two capitals increased in
January 1995 when Ali Yigit and Necdat Buldan, two former Kurdish members of
the Turkish parliament who had fled to Europe to escape imprisonment, visited
Moscow in order to the ascertain Russian authorities' views regarding the possi-
bility of establishing a Kurdistan parliament in exile (KPE) in Moscow. Attempts
to establish the parliament in Brussels had been rejected by the Belgian govern-
ment. While the Russian foreign ministry stated that Russians would not "open
their arms to the PKK," they did seem inclined to allow a Kurdish House (Kurt
Evi), in which the PKK would obviously participate, to be established in Moscow.
The Turks were not satisfied with the Russian foreign ministry statement; a large
portrait of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK leader, hung over the speakers' table. The
Moscow conference rang alarm bells in Ankara, and exactly one week later Turk-
ish Interior Minister, Nahit Mentes,e, and a coterie of other high-ranking national
security officials were in Moscow. After two days of negotiations, Turkey and
Russia signed a "Protocol to Prevent Terrorism" in which the two countries agreed
to exchange intelligence information to prevent "terrorism." The Russian interior
minister stated that the PKK would "not be a legal organization in Russia."24
In late February, two more high-ranking Russian delegations visited Turkey
in order to strengthen further intelligence cooperation between the two countries.
Turkey's efforts to curtail PKK operations in the Russian Federation were high on
the agenda. Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Russian foreign intelligence service,
and Sergei Stepashin, head of the Russian Federation counterintelligence service,
arrived in Ankara, accompanied by five high-ranking Russian generals. Before
becoming director of the Russian Federation intelligence service, Primakov was
the top national security advisor to former Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev;
earlier Primakov had been a journalist for Pravda and an analyst of Middle East
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politics. One of the leading Turkish newspapers reported that the main topic of
discussion was that, in return for Turkish support for its policies in Chechnya,
Russia would not allow the PKK or a Kurdish House to be set up in Moscow.25
The Russians reportedly received a promise on the part of the Turks that Ankara
would not allow volunteers to go and fight in Chechnya and would not sell arms
to the Chechens. The Russians also wanted Turkey to exercise its influence on
Dzhokar Dudayev, the Chechen president, and his advisors so that they would
agree to negotiate with the Russians. In return the Russians promised they would
not allow any "activities" in Russia against Turkey.
The agreement between the two countries included other matters, such as
cooperation against international drug trafficking, but it was clear that the main
topic of discussion was Russian succor to the Kurdish nationalist movement and
particularly to PKK efforts to establish offices in Moscow and other cities within
the Russian Federation. In return for their not recognizing the KPE, the Rus-
sians demanded that Ankara proclaim Russia's war against Chechnya an "in-
ternal affair."26 The agreement seemed to imply that Turkey would take a low
profile regarding Russian efforts to reassert its presence in the entire Caucasus
region, including Azerbaijan and Armenia and those two countries' conflict over
Norgorno-Karabagh. Less than one month after the security and intelligence
agreements, Russia commenced its beefed-up pacification of Chechnya, and
Turkey mounted a large attack into northern Iraq.
The ferocious Russian attack on Chechnya, which continued throughout
1995 and 1996, brought loud protests from the Turkish government, although
some of them seemed intended only for public consumption. In spite of its
protests and undoubtedly real consternation, Ankara seemed to abide by the Janu-
ary and February agreements, as did Moscow. There were, however, continuing
disagreements between the two capitals. On 16 March, in a media interview in
Baku, Walter Shoniya, the Russian ambassador to Azerbaijan, noted that "Turkey
has been fighting the Kurds for ten years and the Russians have said nothing. . . .
If the Turks want to help the Chechens, when they talk to Dudayev every day on
the telephone, one day let them [the Turks] say, 'Surrender'; that is how the
Chechens will be saved from war."27 On 24 April two members of the KPE,
Rustam Broyev and Asiri §erif, after being rebuffed by the Russian administration
in their attempts to establish a Kurdish office in Moscow, sought support from
members of the Duma. Mikail Burlakov, a member of Vladamir Zhirinovsky's
Liberal Democratic Party, stated that he supported the Kurdish cause. He said
that the Turkish army was annihilating the Kurds in northern Iraq and added,
"We don't see Turkey as an independent country but rather as a pawn of NATO
and we request that Turkey be thrown out of the alliance because of its aggression"
[against the Kurds].28
On 17 July the Turkish press reported that Russia would send Albert
Chemishev, one of its top diplomats, who had spent seven years in Turkey as Russ-
ian ambassador in the late 1980s and early 1990s and is quite fluent in Turkish.
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Chernishev's mission was to request that Turkey curtail the activities of the Cau-
casian and Chechnya solidarity associations in Turkey, which were supporting the
Chechens by sending them food, arms and volunteers. There were also uncon-
firmed reports that Turkey was training Chechens within Turkey itself. Chernishev
arrived in Ankara on 20 July and proclaimed there was no "Chechen question
between Turkey and Russia." But he added, obviously referring to the Kurdish
question and Turkey's war against the Kurds, "We must understand one another.
People who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones."29 Chernishev stressed this
point by saying it in Turkish. After meeting with Foreign Minister Erdal Inonii
and President Demirel, the Russian envoy stated that his anxieties regarding
Turkey's policy toward the war in Chechnya had disappeared. He announced that
the Turkish government had assured him that the Caucasian and Chechnya soli-
darity associations would not be able to harm relations between Turkey and Russia.
Chernishev noted that Turkey had received similar assurances that Russia would
not allow Kurdish organizations sympathetic to the PKK to operate in Russia.
He emphasized that Russia and Turkey had a profound understanding between
themselves on the subject of the Chechens and the Kurds. The Russian envoy con-
cluded his remarks, again in Turkish, by saying, "Turkey and Russia are in the same
boat. If the boat sinks, we both sink. It is necessary that we find the means for both
of us to stay on the surface."30
Turkish-Russian relations took a nosedive in October and November 1995,
when members of the Russia Duma, led by Viktor Ustinov, director of the Duma's
Geopolitical Affairs Committee, agreed to host on 30 October through 1 Novem-
ber, a third international conference of the KPE. The conference was not officially
recognized by the Yeltsin government, but it appeared to the Turks that the con-
ference would not have taken place if the Russian foreign ministry had not given
its tacit approval. The Turkish foreign ministry labeled the affair as a "deep wound
that only Russia can bandage."31 The Turkish press called the conference an act
of "Russian treachery."32 Russian perfidy was compounded by the fact that four
former Kurdish members—Ali Yigit, Nizamittin Toguc, Remzi Kartal and Mah-
mut Kihc—of the Turkish Parliament who had fled Turkey in 1994 under threat
of being jailed, were in attendance. This semiofficial recognition of the KPE broke
the agreements that had been reached in February and July.
The harshness of Ustinov's words suggested deep dissatisfaction with
Turkey's support of the Chechens. Ustinov stated boldly that the Lausanne Treaty
of 1923, which did not mention the Kurds, unlike the Treaty of Sevres, signed in
1920 in which articles 62 and 64 recognized the conditions for the possibility of
the creation of a Kurdish state, should be canceled. "The Lausanne Treaty," he
said, "has given birth to unjust consequences." Furthermore, Ustinov continued,
"If Turkey, for the sake of Chechnya, is meddling in Russia's affairs, we know
how to prevent it."33 By this he apparently meant that Russia well knew that the
Achilles heel of all of Turkey's foreign and domestic policies is its preoccupation
with the consolidation and spread of Kurdish nationalism. Official Russian recog-
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nition of the KPE would be a significant victory for the PKK, which has strong
representation in the KPE, and would open the doors to recognition of other CIS
states. The KPE has already been recognized officially by the Netherlands and has
its headquarters in The Hague. Major conferences of organizations affiliated with
the KPE have been held in Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Norway. Although
Yeltsin spokesmen and the Russian foreign ministry denied official support,
KPE president Ya?ar Kaya deepened Ankara's suspicions when he stated at a news
conference at the end of the meeting that although the Russian foreign ministry
announced that the conference was illegal, it had done nothing to stop the con-
ference and had not interfered with the proceedings. Kaya said the KPE received
"help" from many countries, even though those countries did not recognize the
PKK as a "state."
The Turkish foreign ministry made it clear that it was "unsatisfied" with the
Russian response. It stated that the "healing of the wound" opened by the KPE
conference was Moscow's responsibility. If Russia "did not bandage the wound,"
Turkey would be obliged to take actions that were "inescapable."34 The Turks were
as good as their word. On 4 November, Ankara announced that it would begin to
concentrate troops on its borders with Armenia and Georgia in order to pressure
Russia to abide by the Conventional Forces Reduction Agreement (CFRA), in
which Russia agreed to reduce its forces on NATO's northern and southern flanks.
Russia was supposed to have carried out these the reductions by 17 November
1995, but it has continued to delay the agreed reductions on the southern flank of
NATO, i.e. Turkey. The Turks requested that President Clinton bring their con-
cerns to the attention of President Yeltsin when the two met in New York in late
October. According to the Turks, Clinton did not raise the issue because he did
not want to offend either Turkey or Russia.
The Turks could have hardly been surprised by Clinton's action. Ankara al-
ready knew by the time of the Clinton-Yeltsin meeting that the Americans would
not put pressure on Russia to meet the concerns of the Turks. In a September
meeting of NATO's defense ministers, in which Russia participated, Turkey re-
ceived little support from its NATO allies for its request that Moscow abide by the
CFRA. Pavel Grachev, the Russian defense minister, made a speech in which he
said that he saw nothing in Russian actions that should offend the Turks. Grachev
made the argument that the South Caucasian countries were happy (he did not
mention Chechnya!) with the number of Russian troops deployed in the region.
He saw no reason for the reduction of forces called for in the CFRA. In the
communique issued after the meeting, Turkish officials were unable to place in the
text a "reminder" to the effect that the CFRA was being violated in the "wings"
of NATO. The reminder referred obviously to the southern wing, since the re-
duction of forces in the northern wing were being carried out, albeit somewhat
reluctantly.35
In mid-January 1996 the Chechnya question again intruded directly into
Turkish-Russian relations. On 16 January a Turkish ferryboat plying the route
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between Trabzon, a Turkish town on the northern coast of the Black Sea, and
Sochi, a Russian resort town on in the Crimea, was hijacked by nine individuals,
all, apparently, of Turkish citizenship, but all of Caucasus origin—Abkazian, Cir-
cassian (Cherkess) and Adegyian. While the hijackers claimed not be connected
directly with the Chechen resistance forces of General Dudayev, they were all, ap-
parently, members of the Chechen-Caucasus Solidarity Association (CCSA),
which has some ten thousand active members in Turkey and claims to represent
the 2 to 3 million people of Caucasus descent living in Turkey. The CCSA is the
very organization whose activities on the part of Chechnya high-ranking Russian
officials tried to get Ankara to curtail during the high-level meetings held between
the two countries in 1995.
The ferryboat hijacking did not seem to affect the 1995 security agreements.
The presidents of Turkey and Russia made charges and countercharges during the
incident, which reflected the chill in relations between the two countries regard-
ing their respective policies in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Balkans. Yeltsin
accused Turkey of prolonging the incident in order to give the Chechens more fa-
vorable international exposure, especially in the wake of the brutal Russian attack
on the village of Pevomoskoye, in Daghestan, which the Russians had destroyed
just prior to the hijacking. The Russians justified the destruction of Pevomoskoye
as necessary to dislodge the Chechens there, who had taken several hundred of the
townspeople hostage in a hospital in an attempt to use them as bargaining tools to
negotiate a solution to the Russian war in Chechnya. Ankara replied to Yeltsin's
charge that it needed more time to bring the hijacking to an end without blood-
shed, which it managed to do on 19 January.36
There is strong support for the Chechens in Turkey. The CCSA is very
active and lobbies strongly for Chechnya. But the dilemma of Turkey was epito-
mized by Dogan Gures., the former Chief of the General Staff of the Turkish
armed forces. Giires,' mother was Chechen, and he still claims to speak the lan-
guage. He acknowledged the legitimacy of the Chechens' cause, but he said that
Turkey could not abide the hijacking because according to international law it was
a terrorist act. The Turkish media seemed to take their cue from Gures and after
his remark referred to the hijackers as "terrorists." The discourse used against the
PKK foe now of necessity had to be used against friend.
The Kurdish question and the Chechen question have played important
roles in Russian-Turkish relations in the 1990s and continue to do so. Russian
Control of Chechnya is vital if it is to maintain control of the Caucasus and of
Central Asia. Loss of Russian control of Chechnya would greatly encourage the
nationalist forces in the Caucausus, especially in the republics and regions that are
predominately Muslim. The north Caucasian republics of Daghestan, Chechnya-
Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkar, Karachai-Cherkess, Adygeya and Azerbaijan are
predominately Muslim, and, if organized into a united North Caucasian Front,
they would form a Muslim belt across the northern Caucausus separating the
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Christian republics of Georgia and Armenia from Russia. Such a development
would make Armenia and Georgia not only dependent on their relations with
their northern Caucasian neighbors but on the big Muslim states of Turkey and
Iran to the west and south.
The Russian war against Chechnya caused deep fissures in the Russian gov-
ernment, fissures which at times challenged Yeltsin's hold on power. It created deep
divisions in the military and between the armed forces and the civilian government.
The war demonstrated the weakness of the Russian armed forces and the in-
subordination that was rife in all ranks. The war also strained relations between
Russia and the West and encouraged European and American groups who wished
to expand NATO eastward. The Russian officials who advocated war against
the Chechens—Sergi Stepashin, federal counterintelligence service head; Oleg
Soskovets, first deputy prime minister; Nikolai Yegorov, deputy prime minister;
Oleg Lobov, security council secretary; Alexsandr Korzhakov, head of Yeltsin's pri-
vate security—also had major roles in formulating Russia's policy toward Turkey
and the Kurds and in determining the potential routes of the gas and oil pipelines.
Michael McFaul argues that the difference between those officials eager to prose-
cute the war against Chechnya and the traditional core of Russia's reformers may
have created a divide that cannot be bridged.37 In addition, like Turkey's war
against the Kurds, Russia's war against Chechnya proved to be expensive. By
May some estimates put the cost of the war at $6 billion, a figure close to what the
Turks were estimated to be spending in their war against the PKK.38 The cost of
the war and the corruption it entailed imperiled further Russia's economic and
political reforms. Turkey has been unable to take advantage of the Russian pre-
dicament in Chechnya because of its own war against the PKK and the cost of its
efforts to suppress the Kurdish nationalist movement in Turkey, which reached
new heights in 1995.
In short, the challenge of the PKK and of Kurdish nationalism has domi-
nated Turkey's political agenda, both foreign and domestic, throughout the 1990s.
The larger interstate Kurdish question and the Turkish policy toward the Kurds in
northern Iraq added to the maelstrom.39 The point I wish to stress here is that the
great strain and challenge of the PKK and of Kurdish nationalism to the Turkish
state and the costs of suppressing them has affected greatly Turkish relations with
Russia. It is not a coincidence that Russia sent Albert Chernishev, a former Turk-
ish speaking Russian ambassador, to Ankara at the height of the Russian onslaught
on Grozny. Chernishev, perhaps more than any other Russian diplomat, is deeply
aware of the profound consequences of the Kurdish problem in Turkey and its
affects on Turkish domestic and foreign policies. He was acutely aware of the
fear of Turkish officials that Russia will officially recognize the KPE and allow
Kurdish nationalists to establish offices in Moscow and in other cities of the
CIS. Russian recognition of the KPE would open the floodgate to a number
of other countries, especially European, to recognize the KPE. Turkey wanted
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to avoid this possibility at all costs. And, as mentioned above, the price of Russian
nonrecognition of the KPE was Turkish noninterference in Russia's war against
Chechnya.
There is no doubt that the challenge of the PKK and of the Kurdish na-
tionalist movement in Turkey has restricted severely Turkey's ability to play a
strong role, even diplomatically, in the Balkans, especially in the Bosnia conflict,
in Europe, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. It is in Turkey's interests to reduce
Russian military and political presence in the Caucasus and in Central Asia and
Azerbaijan.40 Chechnya'a Declaration of Independence in autumn 1991 provided
an excellent opportunity for Turkey to lessen the presence and authority of Russia
in the Caucasus, but it was unable to take advantage of this opportunity because
of its war against the PKK and against the Kurdish nationalist movement and its
challenge to the Turkish state as presently constituted.41 At the end of 1995, Russia
was able to play its "Kurdish card" much more effectively against Turkey than
Turkey was able to use the "Chechen card" against Russia.
TURKEY'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ,
Turkey's relations with Baghdad began to improve in 1993 from their icy state in
the aftermath of the Gulf war, a trend that gathered momentum throughout 1994
and early 1995. As early as December 1992, Biilent Ecevit, the Democratic Left
Party (DLP) leader, conducted talks with Iraqi leaders in Baghdad. This is the
same Ecevit who announced on 1 August 1994 that "the fundamental goal of the
United States was to create an autonomous (ozerk) region in southeastern
Turkey."42 In April 1993, Ankara established diplomatic relations with Iraq at the
level of charge d'affaires with ambassadorial rank. Economic, business and even
military delegations, both official and unofficial, came and went continuously be-
tween the two capitals in 1993, 1994 and early 1995. Even the assassination of
Caglar Yiicel, administrative attache of the Turkish embassy, in Baghdad on 11 De-
cember 1993 did riot affect developing relations between the two governments.
There were no allegations by Ankara that the Iraqi government was involved in the
assassination. Neither government wanted the assassination to impede ongoing
negotiations to improve trading and economic cooperation. By early 1994 both
capitals were pressing the UN and other governments, including the United States,
to allow the reopening of the two oil pipelines running from Iraq through Turkey.
Prime Minister Tansu Ciller pushed hard in her talks with U.S. officials
during her October 1993 visit to Washington to allow the pipelines to be reopened
under some formula allowed by the UN sanctions. In spite of U.S. reluctance to
grant such permission, negotiations between Ankara and Baghdad and other par-
ties regarding the reopening of the pipelines continued from 1994 into 1996.
Iraq apparently hoped that negotiations to open the oil pipelines would also open
the way to better relations between the two countries on a host of other issues, in
spite of profound Iraq resentment of Turkey's influence in northern Iraq and its
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deep suspicions of Turkey's intentions. The most pressing problem between the
countries was and is, of course, the Kurdish question.
By summer 1994 the tempo of meetings and consultations between Bagh-
dad and Ankara were becoming daily events. In late June, Murat Karayalcin,
assistant prime minister and leader of the Social Democrat Party (SDP), which
was the main coalition partner with (filler's TPP until its merger with the Repub-
lican Peoples' Party (RPP) in February 1995, visited Baghdad and had extensive
talks with the highest-level Iraqi officials, including Saddam Hussein.43 Karayalcin
undertook the visit in spite of opposition from members of his own party, espe-
cially those from Turkey's east and southeastern provinces, some of whom are
of Kurdish ethnicity. Some six weeks after Karayalcin's visit, the Habur/Khabur
crossing, as mentioned earlier, was officially opened on 28 August. While trucks
from Turkey going to Iraq were declared to be carrying only food and medicine,
as allowed by UN sanctions, it was widely reported that they were transporting
other goods and materials as well. The Turkish press reported that the trucks were
returning from Iraq carrying two to three tons of oil per truck.
During the last days of August there were more high level meetings between
Turkish officials, including powerful members of Turkey's business community.
The meeting was of particular importance because the Turkish delegation was led
once again by Yalim Erez, which emphasized that the trip had the blessing of the
government. Erez was accompanied by seventy-seven well-connected business-
men, which suggested further the Turkish government's conviction that Saddam
Hussein was going to remain in power for the foreseeable future, contrary to the
U.S. position that he would not be able to do so. This U.S. position was the of-
ficially proclaimed reason for maintaining U.S. support of the Provide Comfort
force in southeastern Turkey, whose role is to monitor the UN imposed "no-fly"
zone over northern Iraq.
The Erez delegation came to significant understandings with Iraq, and the
two governments signed a protocol stipulating that Turkish businessmen would be
given every opportunity to do business in Iraq; that Iraq wished to buy all kinds of
goods and materials from Turkey; that, because of Iraq's lack of hard currency and
funds, the bulk of the trade would be bartered; and that acceptance of the above
was dependent on the Turkish government's approval. It seemed clear that Iraqi
oil would be bartered for Turkish goods. At the conclusion of Erez's stay, Prime
Minister Ciller was invited to visit Iraq, and Taha Yasin Ramadan, one of Saddam
Hussein's chief advisers and the person who extended the invitation, indicated his
desire to visit Turkey—and the sooner the better.44
In another goodwill gesture to Baghdad, Turkey's foreign ministry an-
nounced on 11 September that all persons entering Iraq from Turkey, with the
exception of UN personnel involved in the distribution of aid in northern Iraq,
diplomats, foreign journalists in Turkey, Turkish and Iraqi journalists and Turkish
and Iraqi citizens, would have to obtain a visa from Iraqi authorities. Kurds who
were identified as being from Iraq would also be allowed passage. In those cases in
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which Iraq was unable to grant a visa, right of entry was to be determined by
Turkish authorities.45
Turkey's opening to Iraq was met with approval in the media. Editorial writ-
ers proclaimed that by its actions Ankara was sending the strong signal that
Baghdad was "the owner" of northern Iraq. It was another in a series of actions to
persuade the Kurds to abandon their attempts to establish an independent state in
northern Iraq. The editorials stated that Ankara's actions were also a signal to the
Western countries to abandon their desire to establish an independent Kurdish
state in northern Iraq and, furthermore, that all Western efforts to aid the PKK
should cease. At the same time, Turkey claimed that it had suffered $20 billion
in lost trade as a result of the UN sanctions. In a recent article, Eric Rouleau, a
former French ambassador to Turkey and a well informed analyst of Turkish and
Middle East affairs, put the figure at "between $10 and $20 billion."46 Approval
was especially strong on both the left and the right. Biilent Ecevit, leader of the
DLP, and Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of the WP, voiced their strong approval
of the government's new policy. But government spokesman and one of the prin-
cipal architect's of the opening to Baghad, Undersecretary of State Ozdem San-
berk, stressed that Turkey's negotiations with Baghdad were "conducted in close
consultation with our Western allies. . . . Turkey is acting as a catalyst and is in a
unique position to play such a regional role."47 Sanberk's remarks suggested that
Europe and the United States were, at least, informed of the content of the nego-
tiations, if not privy to every detail. Sanberk's remarks gave the further implication
that most countries in Europe were not opposed to an easing of the sanctions.
Sanberk's remarks were echoed by Rouleau. In a statement to the Turkish
media in early September, Rouleau stated that Turkey's policy of easing the em-
bargo against Iraq was not contrary to the policy that the UN and its Provide
Comfort force was pursuing in northern Iraq. Rouleau stated that Turkey's policy
was aimed at preventing the Balkanization of the countries of the Middle- East and
that this policy had the support of Europe as well as other countries. The former
ambassador suggested that the main purpose of Provide Comfort was largely to
reduce the influence of Baghdad in northern Iraq. Rouleau stressed that Provide
Comfort did nothing but watch the fierce fighting among contending Kurdish
forces, especially those of Jalal Talabani and Ma'sud Barzani, that had taken place
in August, in which hundreds had been killed. Rouleau speculated that the United
States' strong position against the easing of sanctions was no longer aimed at top-
pling Saddam Hussein from power but rather indicated U.S. anxiety that the
reentry of Iraqi oil into the world oil market would cause oil prices to fall and
would make it difficult for the two major producers, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, to
repay some $30 billion they owed the United States for arms purchased after the
Gulf war. Another reason for U.S. opposition, in Rouleau's view, was that lower
oil prices would increase the competitiveness of the United States' two major eco-
nomic rivals: Germany and Japan, both of whom lack oil resources of their own.48
Given the fact that Turkey and the United States have close political relations and
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cooperate on intelligence matters concerning the Middle East, it seems likely
that the United States was informed of Turkish intentions to reduce substantially
the embargo sanctions against Iraq. This, in turn, makes Rouleau's comments
credible.
In late 1994 and early 1995 Turkey and Iraq continued to improve their re-
lations. Iraqi deputy foreign minister Tariq Aziz was invited by Foreign Minister
Miimtaz Soysal to visit Turkey in late December. Aziz's visit was, however, subse-
quently canceled because of Soysal's resignation and his replacement by Murat
Karayalcin, deputy minister and head of the SDR There was speculation that U.S.
pressure had contributed to the cancellation of Aziz's visit.
But high-ranking Iraqi visitors kept coming. Iraqi foreign minister Muham-
mad Sa'id al-Sahhaf arrived in Turkey 9 February 1995. This was the first visit
by an Iraqi foreign minister to Turkey since the Gulf war. At a press conference
al-Sahhaf stated that Iraq and Turkey were continuing to negotiate to achieve
agreement on the opening of the oil pipelines. Both foreign ministers emphasized
their countries' desire for better relations. Karayalcin reiterated Turkey's support
for Iraq's territorial integrity.49 Editorials in the Turkish press stressed that after
four years America had not brought peace to the area; only Turkey and Iraq would
be able to do so.
One of the issues discussed during al-Sahhaf s visit was undoubtedly the na-
tional security positions that the two governments would take against the fighting
between the KDP and PUK forces in northern Iraq. Unable to reach agreement as
to the distribution of power and attempting to consolidate their respective politi-
cal and territorial positions before the UN-proposed elections in the spring or early
summer of 1995 in the Kurdish-controlled zone in northern Iraq, serious clashes
between the two groups started in December 1994 and continued throughout
1996. It was reported that seven to eight hundred people had been killed in the
clashes. By March 1995 it appeared that northern Iraq had been divided into three
parts, with the KDP in possession of much of the territory north of the 36th par-
allel and the PUK pushed almost completely to the south of the 36th parallel.
Major fighting occurred in and around Arbil. Subsequent KDP possession of the
region of Arbil, with the exception of the city itself, virtually excluded the PUK
from territory north of the 36th parallel. A third area of northern Iraq, south of
the 36th parallel and east of the territory controlled by the PUK and adjacent
to Iran, was in the hands of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK), which
has close ties with Iran.50 The IMK was subsequently defeated and the territory it
controlled was taken over by the PUK. The rift between the two Kurdish groups
seemed to become irreparable when Barzani accused the PUK of setting off a
bomb in the money changers' market in Zakho on 28 February, killing seventy-six
people, eleven of them children. Barzani claimed that the bombing was a heinous
act and that the KDP had evidence that Talabani was behind the explosion. The
KDP leader charged the PUK with seeking revenge for their defeat at the hands
of KDP forces during the previous two months.sl
106 / THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
The fighting between the rival Kurdish groups, however, illustrates the
dilemma of Turkey. Fighting between the two major Kurdish organizations and
the weakening of one posed the inevitable challenge that the weaker of the two
would seek closer cooperation with the PKK. Indeed, Ankara accused PUK leader
Jafar Talabani of exactly that. While Talabani denied the accusation, it was con-
ceivable that it would be in the PUK's interest, given the setback that it was
receiving at the hands of the KDP, to seek closer relations with the PKK. In late
February 1995, Talabani appealed to Turkey not to compel the Kurds to negotiate
with Baghdad and demanded that Turkey close the Habur/Khabur border cross-
ing. Talabani claimed that Ankara was putting great pressure on the Kurds in
northern Iraq to negotiate with Baghdad. He also stated that if the PKK was a
close ally of the PUK, it would have come to the PUK's aid in its clashes with the
KDP. Despite Talabani's denials of a close relationship with the PKK, Ankara re-
mained firm in its belief that the two Kurdish organizations were in close contact
and cooperating with one another.52
The second demand of Talabani was that Turkey close the Habur/Khabur
crossing. He claimed that fifteen hundred vehicles, mostly trucks, some with trail-
ers, carrying 2 to 3 tons of food, pharmaceuticals and other materials on their
entry into Iraq and 2 to 3 tons of oil on their return were crossing the border every
day. He asserted that the KDP was assessing a tax on all of this traffic and that the
collected revenue was being used by the KDP to buy the weapons that were fuel-
ing the fight against the PUK. In return, Ankara announced that it would reduce
the number of trucks crossing the border, although by the early spring of 1996
there seemed to have been no reduction this traffic.
By the spring of 1995, the eventual consequences of the fighting between the
DKP and the PUK were unclear. But the de facto partition of northern Iraq into
two parts seems to have sounded the death knell for the possibility of creating a
unified automonous Kurdish region in northern Iraq, at least, in the short term.53
The partition could herald a situation in which the Kurmanj-speaking area of most
of the northern portion of Iraq, under the control of the KDP, will increasingly
come under the influence of Turkey and the portion south of the 36th parallel,
Sorani-speaking and under the control of the PUK, will draw closer to Iran. Ironi-
cally, the areas proclaimed as safe havens for the Kurds in 1991 would fall almost
completely under the control of the KDP and, thus, indirectly under the influence
of Turkey. The area of northern Iraq under KDP control could come to resemble
the security zone that Israel established in southern Lebanon in 1978. The estab-
lishment of such a zone in northern Iraq would create the buffer between the PKK
and the PUK forces that Turkey desires for its perceived national security needs.
The hostility of the PKK and the PUK toward the KDP and of the PUK toward
the KDP would also make the KDP more dependent on Turkey. Baghdad may
find itself impelled to accept a Turkish-influenced KDP region north of the 36th
parallel. Such an agreement might mean that the PUK-controlled regions would
be more vulnerable to pressure and attacks from Baghdad. Indeed, in early March
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1995 there were reports that Iraqi forces were reinforcing their positions and de-
ploying tanks and equipment in the vicinity of the city of Kifri, which is controlled
by the PUK.54 PUK leader Talabani claimed on 4 March that Iraqi airplanes were
bombing towns in and around Kifri and that Arbil was also bombed. He stated that
it was Iraq's intention to recapture the province of Kirkuk, which, with the excep-
tion of the city itself, was under the control of the PUK. Kirkuk city is south of the
36th parallel and is controlled by Baghdad's forces.55
The KDP claimed that Talabani exaggerated the Iraqi government build up
in order to enhance the PUK's position in the inter-Kurdish power struggle and as
a face-saving excuse for the PUK's military defeats at the hands of the KDP in
recent fighting.56
It was in the context of the inter-Kurdish war between the KDP and the
PUK that in late March 1995 Turkey sent a reported thirty-five thousand troops,
accompanied by dozens of tanks and aircraft, some 25 to 35 miles into northern
Iraq along a 150-mile front. Ironically, the territory included nearly the entire
region that was declared a safe haven for the Kurds of northern Iraq by the Allied
forces in 1991.57 The attack was the largest since 1992, when Turkey launched a
similar attack against PKK bases. The biggest difference between the 1992 and the
1995 attacks is that in the 1992 attack Turkey had the cooperation of the KDP
and the PUK. The 1995 attack had only the support of the KDP. The preoccu-
pation of the KDP and the PUK with their internecine fighting had allowed the
PKK to further consolidate its bases and presence in northern Iraq, from which
it launched attacks into Turkey. This was a situation completely unacceptable to
Ankara. Even without the deteriorating circumstances of the inter-Kurdish fight-
ing, it seemed likely as early as fall 1994 that Turkey would send large forces into
northern Iraq in the spring. Turkish military and intelligence officials had made
numerous comments to the press that PKK bases in northern Iraq had to be
"cleaned out" if Turkey was ever to have "security." The inter-Kurdish fighting
from December 1994 throughout 1995 provided Turkey with a golden opportu-
nity to move militarily into northern Iraq. The big question posed once again by
the invasion was: What kind of military and, by extension, political presence
would Turkey maintain in northern Iraq? It seems most likely that eventually the
bulk of Turkey's military forces will pull out of Iraq and deploy along the interna-
tional border. It also seems likely, given Ankara's political need to emphasize that
it has dealt a severe blow to the PKK, that substantial liaison troops, commandos
and intelligence personnel will remain in portions of northern Iraq for some time
to come. At the end of 1995, hundreds of Turkish military and intelligence per-
sonnel remained in northern Iraq. It would be accurate to say that they were
"stationed" there in agreement with the KDP.
The improvement of relations with Turkey, albeit meager, on the part of
Saddam Hussein's regime may indicate that while Baghdad is resentful of Turkey's
relationship with the leaders of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), espe-
cially with the KDP, and its influence in northern Iraq, Baghdad does not think
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that Turkey wants to annex or militarily occupy northern Iraq but rather that it
wants to remain the dominant political influence there. If this is Baghdad's posi-
tion, the Iraqi leadership may think it can conduct negotiations with Turkey on a
number of issues other than the political status of northern Iraq. A further im-
provement in relations between the countries, which seemed in the offing in 1996,
could well mean that Ankara would tolerate the Iraqi regime's incremental at-
tempts to regain territory on the southern fringes of the KRG as long as Turkey's
dominant political and military position in the north and its relationship with the
KRG leadership of Ma'sud Barzani and Jalal Talabani is not jeopardized. Such a
relationship between Turkey and Iraq would effectively neutralize the leadership
of Talabani and Barzani, unless the PUK seeks a closer political and military al-
liance with the PKK. This would imply recognition on the part of Baghdad that
Turkey's position in northern Iraq was dictated by its need to control the Kurdish
national movement within Turkey itself and not a desire on the part of Turkey to
militarily occupy northern Iraq.58 Thus the policies of Turkey since the Gulf war
have come full circle: from unequivocal support for the West and the United States
to tepid rapprochement with Iraq as well as with Syria and Iran—a rapproche-
ment, however, that was largely driven by Ankara's needs to constrain the Kurdish
nationalist movement in both its intrastate and its interstate dimensions. It is ironic
that Turkey is compelled to favor a policy of lifting the sanctions against Saddam
Hussein, whom it tried, along with its Western allies, to topple from power during
the course of the Gulf war. But the increased activities of the PKK after the Gulf
war and the great expense of combating the Kurdish nationalists in Turkey, many
of whom find sanctuary in northern Iraq and Iran, compelled Turkey to seek some
accommodation with its southern neighbors.
On 28 October 1995, Turkey's parliament voted to extend the mandate for
Provide Comfort for another three months instead of the usual six months. But
developments in 1995, especially the large Turkish attack into northern Iraq in
March 1995, suggest that Provide Comfort has become little more than a flaccid
symbol of the internationalism represented by the Allied coalition in its war effort
against Iraq in 1991. Its main purpose by the end of 1995 seemed to be to act as
a deterrent to any attempts by Saddam Hussein to challenge the consolidating
status quo in northern Iraq. If Turkey seeks to establish its own national security
zone in northern Iraq, Provide Comfort can be seen as a mechanism supporting
such a development. Developments in 1994 and 1995 demonstrated to Ankara
that Barzani and Talabani, largely as a result of their own disputes, were unable to
do this. Whether Provide Comfort should be extended beyond 1996 will be a
hotly debated issue in Turkey, especially since a vote against its extension would
be contrary to U.S. policies in the region. The future of Provide Comfort could be
affected by the new government that will come to power after the 24 December
1995 election. In 1995, the UN, under pressure from the United States, agreed to
extend the economic sanctions on Iraq until the demands of the United States
and Great Britain are met: that Baghdad return all property stolen from Kuwait,
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account for missing Kuwaitis, and stop mistreating citizens in the north and south
of the country, the latter including thousands of people living the marshes in the
south of the country. But it seems likely that the United States will agree to ease
the oil embargo sanctions in 1996.
By August 1995 Baghdad began to show dissatisfaction with what it viewed
as Turkey's increasing presence and role in northern Iraq. On 19 August, Bagh-
dad announced that it was closing its consulate in Istanbul. Iraq also requested
that Turkey close its consulate in Mosul. This was a sharp blow to Ankara, as
the Mosul consulate served as its major contact with the Turkomen population
in northern Iraq, numbering five hundred thousand or so. In addition, Iraq an-
nounced a reduction in staff at its embassy in Ankara and requested that Turkey
reduce the number of staff at its embassy in Baghdad. While Iraqi officials stated
that the the closures and cutbacks were due to lack of funds, it seemed clear that
Ankara's lack of response to a series of diplomatic initiatives by Baghdad, includ-
ing one to lift the UN-imposed economic sanctions and open the oil pipeline, was
the real reason.59
On 4 September, Miimtaz Soysal, who had served as Turkey's foreign min-
ister for six months in 1994, paid a quick visit to Baghdad. The main reason for
his visit has to quiet Baghdad's fears regarding Turkey's long-term objectives in
northern Iraq. Baghdad was upset by the Drogheda conference held in August
under the auspices of the United States to settle differences between the two war-
ring Kurdish factions. Baghdad's ire was raised by the fact that Turkey was also an
invited participant. No Syrian, Iranian or Iraqi representatives were invited to
attend. Turkey's increasingly enhanced role as a arbiter of the disposition of power
in northern Iraq posed a challenge to any hope that Baghdad may still entertain
of regaining influence in the region. Soysal was apparently sent because during his
stint as foreign minister he was an advocate of greater cooperation with Baghdad
in order to prevent the emergence of an strong Kurdish political entity in north-
ern Iraq. Soysal's visit seemed to have little effect, however, on the policy that was
being pursued by the government.60 Relations between the two countries were
soured further throughout 1995 by Demirel's sporadic statements that the inter-
national boundary between Turkey and Iraq should be changed, and he left no
doubt that the change should be southward.
By late 1995 other factors were mitigating the need on the part of Turkey for
improving relations with Iraq. On 9 October, it was announced that the Azerbai-
jani International Oil Consortium (AIOC) had agreed to transport some of the
oil from its Caspian fields through Georgia to Turkey. Turkey had to fight to secure
the route in the face of strong Russian opposition. But with the strong support of
the United States, one of the routes for the Azerbaijani oil was seemingly secured
for Turkey. The possibility of obtaining long-term oil supplies from the Caspian
oil fields will lessen Ankara's need to improve relations with Baghdad in order to
secure oil from that country. It also reduces Turkey's need to expend its diplomatic
capital to try to get the oil pipelines from Iraq to Turkey reopened. At the end of
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1995, with the potential of satisfying a good portion of its oil needs from the
Azerbaijan and Caspian oil and natural gas fields, the most important factor im-
pelling Turkey to better relations with Baghdad, other than the need to control the
Kurdish nationalist movement, was somewhat reduced.
The end of the cold war had made Turkey a less significant military ally for
the West. However, Turkey will obviously want to keep as close military and eco-
nomic relations as possible with Europe and the United States. Its admission to
the European Customs Union (ECU) on 13 December by the overwhelming vote
of 343 in favor, 149 against and 36 abstentions demonstrates the solidity of the in-
creasingly strong economic and trading relations between Turkey and Europe. The
vote also emphasizes, as Philip Robins writes in his contribution to this volume,
that the impact of the Kurdish issue on European-Turkish relations is "more ap-
parent than real." The vote states emphatically Europe's desire to have Turkey as a
trading and economic partner in the EU. But the profound dimensions of the
Kurdish question may mean that Turkey will still have to consider carefully its
Western-oriented military and defensive alliances. The Kurdish question demands
that Turkey pay closer attention to its relations with Syria, Iran, Iraq and, even
Russia, than it has in the past. There is some irony in the fact that Turkey's trade
with its Arab neighbors and with Iran represents only 17 or 18 percent of its total
trade, whereas its trade with the OCED countries is over 60 percent. Turkey's ad-
mission into the ECU means that this percentage may well shift even more in
favor of European trade. Without the alarms and worries of the Kurdish question,
there would be less need to foster closer relations with Syria, Iraq and Iran.
In late December 1994, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller, responding angrily to
Greek statements that it would veto Turkey's entry into the ECU, stated: "Beware,
Turkey is coming with its 60 million people, and behind them with the 200 mil-
lion Turkish speaking people."61 In the end Greece was unable to prevent Turkey's
admission into the customs union, but neither has Turkey been able to resolve its
Kurdish problem and the interstate Kurdish question. As I have argued in this
chapter, the voices of the 260 million Turkish people have been made less audible
by the cacophony of some 23 million Kurdish voices.
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MORE APPARENT THAN REAL?
THE IMPACT OF THE KURDISH
ISSUE ON EURO-TURKISH
RELATIONS1
Philip Robins
I n February 1994 a meeting on Turkish foreign policy was convened at
Chatham House, the home of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, in
London. The organizers at the Institute had expected the audience to be addressed
by one speaker, Professor Emre Gonensay, advisor to the Turkish prime minister.
In reality, a large official delegation of Turkish personalities turned up2 and col-
lectively insisted that the meeting be addressed in turn by five of their number, to
the evident embarrassment of Professor Gonensay. Furthermore, when the Turk-
ish team did take the lectern they ignored the scheduled subject of the meeting
and, instead, each speaker insisted on addressing an aspect of the country's Kurd-
ish problem. After the meeting, the Turkish ambassador to London apologized
personally to the chairman of the event3, pleading that Ankara had sent instruc-
tions to take every opportunity to put forth its side of the story on the issue.
Although only an anecdote, this story illustrates some of the dynamics
in the Euro-Kurdish-Turkish relationship as they had appeared by the beginning
of 1994. First, it shows to what extent the Kurdish issue had emerged as a major
problem in relations between the state of Turkey and some of the leading mem-
bers of the European Union. Second, it shows how a small number of European
cities had become the focus of debate on Turkey's Kurdish problem. Third, it in-
dicates how ill prepared the Turkish government is to resist the increasingly
well organized and professional publicity machine in support of Turkey's Kurdish
nationalist movement. In the case of the meeting at Chatham House, the Turk-
ish officials, who can usually be relied upon to observe scrupulously any pre-agreed
ground rules, effectively hijacked the meeting. In doing so, they risked offending
an important institution, which hitherto had shown itself interested in cultivating
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close links with Ankara.4 In doing so, their ploy backfired; the distinguished au-
dience that had assembled to hear a lecture and discussion on Turkish foreign
policy was greatly irritated at the change in substance of the meeting.
Taking this vignette as its point of departure, this chapter aims to explore
the relationship between Western Europe and Turkey, in the light of the Kurdish
issue. Western Europe will be analyzed both in terms of individual states and as a
collective in the guise of the European Union (EU).5 This chapter will consider
why the Kurdish issue, as the story above indicates, has emerged as a significant
problem in bilateral relations. It will also consider Western European responses
toward Turkey over the issue. Finally, it will consider whether the Kurdish issue,
for all the rhetoric and newspaper headlines, has actually damaged in a material
sense the relationship between Turkey, the leading European states and the EU.
In other words, has the Kurdish issue really been a barrier in Euro-Turkish rela-
tions, or has its impact been more apparent than real?
T H E EMERGENCE OF THE KURDISH ISSUE
The intrusion of the Kurdish issue into relations between Turkey and the EU is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to the mid 1980s there was little popular con-
sciousness in the continent of Europe as to the Kurdish people. A threshold in
popularizing the Kurdish issue in Western Europe was the use of chemical
weapons by the Iraqi military against the Kurdish town of Halabja. The gas attack
took place shortly after the Iraqi army had lost control of the town in 1987. Reve-
lations about the use of chemical weapons, together with the painful death suf-
fered by some five thousand victims, elicited great sympathy for the Kurds.
This image of the defenseless Kurd at the mercy of the repressive states of
the region received a powerful boost in the aftermath of the international coali-
tion's victory against Iraq in February 1991. Fearing a new gas attack as the Iraqi
state struggled to repress uprisings across the country, hundreds of thousands of
Kurds fled Iraqi Kurdistan in panic. Some 750,000 of them ended up on the Turk-
ish border. Though Turkey was the passive object of this exodus, unfavorable pub-
licity almost inevitably attached itself to Ankara. While the Turkish government
resisted the massive influx of Kurdish refugees for fear of the demographic and
economic implications of their possible semi-permanent residence,6 journalists
at the scene became ever more impatient with Turkey's handling of the affair.
Criticism was particularly sharp over Ankara's priority of raison d'etat over hu-
manitarianism.
Though the flight of Iraqi Kurds to Turkey after the Gulf war was brought
to a satisfactory and speedy end, the news reporting of the event as a whole helped
to enforce popular cultural stereotypes in Western Europe about Turkey and
the Turks. Turkey's reluctance to allow the Iraqi Kurdish refugees to come down
from the mountain ridges reinforced a view of Turks as heartless and brutal,
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underpinned by historical images of Ottoman repression. The images of the Turks
perpetuated in popular Western culture, through films like Lawrence of Arabia and
Midnight Express, were confirmed.
The tendency to equate these images of callous violence by the Turks with
images of the Kurds as victims was further reinforced by two trends: the grow-
ing Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Turkey against the Turkish state and the
growing presence of an effective Kurdish lobby in Western Europe. The Kurdish
insurgency inside Turkey commenced in 1984 at the instigation of the Kurdistan
Workers' Party (PKK). When it began, the PKK was small in size and extremist
in ideology—in short, a fringe organization with little prospect of success.7 Its rise
was facilitated and accelerated by the Turkish state in the 1980s, which, in the
wake of the generals' hard-line policy against the Kurds, helped to eradicate the
center ground in Kurdish politics. The result was political polarization. Increas-
ingly, Kurds in the troubled areas of Turkey were forced to face a stark choice:
support either a repressive state or a militant body committed to violence as a
mechanism to bring about political change.
Since 1989 the insurgency has grown in strength, as have the casualties sus-
tained by, in all probability, all sides.8 During the first decade of fighting, around
fourteen thousand people were killed. In 1995 a U.S. State Department report
estimated the number of the PKK's full-time guerrillas at ten to fifteen thousand,
some five to six thousand based inside Turkey, with a further sixty to seventy-five
thousand part-time operatives.9 Such figures suggest that, for all the claims of im-
minent eradication from Ankara, the PKK's ability to sustain the insurgency
remains substantial.
As the insurgency has grown more serious and the brutal methods used by
the PKK more widespread, the Turkish state has resorted to instruments com-
mensurate with what the military and much of the political establishment regard
as a challenge to the very integrity of the state. These instruments have included
the increased use of sometimes extended cross-border raids into northern Iraq,10
the application of intensive and often indiscriminate conventional firepower on
civilian areas within Turkey,11 the forced relocation of villagers followed by the
destruction of their former dwelling places,12 and the introduction of death squads
targeting Kurdish political activities in the southeast.13 All of these acts have
become widely known among human rights activists in Western Europe. The scale
of the insurgency and the widespread nature of the methods used to try to sup-
press it have resulted in a growing fusion of human rights questions with the
Kurdish issue. While other human rights abuses, such as the near routine use
of torture in some police stations,14 clearly do continue to take place in Turkey
and while the victims are certainly not exclusively Kurdish, during the 1990s it
has become increasingly difficult to separate the Kurdish issue from the human
rights issue. Liberal Turks who argue that all citizens of Turkey suffer from human
rights abuses and a democratic deficit and that such problems are not confined to
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Turkey's Kurds find the argument increasingly difficult to sustain, especially to an
international audience.
The second factor that has helped to bolster the image of Turks as op-
pressors and the Kurds as victims is the growing Kurdish expatriate presence in
Western Europe and its increasingly sophisticated political organizations, espe-
cially with regard to the use of information. Again, the Turkish state has to take
much of the blame. It was the state's uncompromising policies and brutal meth-
ods that forced many Turkish Kurds to flee. Even those who had not been subject
to systemic persecution or who were merely economic migrants found a receptive
atmosphere in Western Europe to their applications for political asylum, based on
the activities of the Turkish state throughout much of the 1980s.
Consequently, there is now a substantial presence of Turkish Kurds in the
countries of Western Europe. Of course, it is near impossible to calculate how
many arrived for political reasons. Indeed, it is difficult to establish what percent-
age of the Turkish community living in Europe is Kurdish, for reasons similar to
the difficulty of judging the size of the Kurdish population in Turkey itself, which
explains why estimates have differed so widely. In Germany, for example, statistics
for the number of Turkish Kurds in the country have ranged from seventy-five15
to four hundred thousand.16 The PKK is believed to have some forty-eight hun-
dred activists in Germany.17 In Britain, official sources put the number of Kurdish
refugees at twenty thousand.18 The number of Kurds in France is estimated at sixty
thousand.19
Of greater importance than the numbers involved is the effectiveness of the
organization of the Turkish Kurds in Western Europe and the extent to which
their bodies are funded. There are, of course, a plethora of Kurdish expatriate or-
ganizations in Europe. It is, however, interesting to note that the organizational
plurality among the Kurds is largely a characteristic of Iraqi Kurdish communities.
While there are many different bodies among Turkey's Kurdish emigres, includ-
ing social, cultural, media and political organizations, the best organized and most
effective appear to be those linked to the PKK, often indirectly through affiliated
organizations such as its predominantly political wing, the National Liberation
Front of Kurdistan (ERNK).
A few disparate examples will help support the point. At the political level,
the Kurdish parliament in exile (KPE) convened in The Hague in April 1995 was
dominated by the PKK.20 In Brussels, the former Democracy Party (DEP) MPs in
exile, having effectively admitted their close links with the PKK, have established
a "DEP Solidarity Office" in the Belgian capital. The PKK has pursued a policy
of trying to open representative offices across the continent. ERNK offices are
now to be found in Athens, Copenhagen and Madrid in Western Europe, while
Kurdistan solidarity and information centers, associated with the PKK, are found
elsewhere, such as in London. In the media field, the PKK news agency, Kurd Ha,
was a constant source of information on the Kurdish issue in Turkey; in April 1995
118 / THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
the MED-TV station was set up principally to broadcast to Turkey's Kurds from
Brussels.
A number of factors may be advanced to explain the rapid emergence of the
PKK as the dominant political organization among Turkey's Kurds. One set of
factors refers to the political situation in Turkey. With moderate Kurdish organi-
zations not allowed to function normally, the suppression of two Kurdish par-
liamentary parties—the Democracy Party (DEP) and the Peoples Labor Party
(HEP)—in less than a year21 and the armed operations of the PKK as the only
force capable of resisting the Turkish state, there is no convincing alternative po-
litical vehicle for Kurdish nationalists from Turkey to support. A second set of
factors relates to the organizational nature and methods of the PKK. A key factor
in the emergence of a more monolithic political structure among Turkish Kurds in
Western Europe has been the consistent refusal of the PKK to tolerate the growth
of rival political organizations. As befits an organization that has survived exten-
sive repression in Turkey and has had to operate against a backdrop of logistical
problems and political uncertainties, the PKK, like the PLO before it, has devel-
oped strong sinews. The PKK has also developed an apparently healthy financial
base. The organization says that its financial success is a result of donations from
businessmen and ordinary Kurds who share its political aims. Its opponents point
to racketeering among Turkey's Kurdish community in Western Europe and in-
volvement in the international drugs trade22 as the main sources of these funds.
British security sources indicate that while the charges of extortion, though hard
to prove, do ring true, there is no evidence that the PKK is involved in illicit drugs
in the UK.
TURKEY, THE KURDISH ISSUE AND THE STATES OF WESTERN EUROPE
Ankara's relations with the states of Western Europe can best be divided into two
realms—relations with the smaller states of Europe and relations with those larger
states whose extensive foreign interests prompt them to play a more active role
in foreign relations. These smaller, predominantly northern states tend to have
relatively little direct involvement with Turkey. Trade is nominal. Senior, bilateral
contact is relatively infrequent. The absence of both broader interests and the pro-
jection of diplomacy and power tends to mean that single issues, notably human
rights, rank higher on the list of foreign policy concerns for these states. These
states have a more liberal refugee and asylum policy. Their traditions of open, lib-
eral refugee government make them susceptible to influence by well organized
political associations.
By contrast, the larger states have a more wide-ranging set of interests
in their foreign relations. They have substantial trading relations with Turkey,
are more likely to have made significant levels of direct investment there, and are
generally cognizant of Turkey beyond the simple image of a state that routinely
indulges in political repression. Moreover, strategic questions are also of greater
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importance. Regular visits at the senior level are paid, with frequent contact taking
place at diplomatic, business and military levels. The notion of Turkey as an im-
portant ally, fostered by decades of close contact through the various branches of
NATO, is embedded more deeply in the bureaucratic psyche than is the case with
the smaller states. Furthermore, states such as the United Kingdom, France and
Spain have all suffered from acts of terrorism in recent years and therefore were
always likely to be sympathetically disposed toward Turkey's presentation of the
PKK as an exclusively terrorist organization. Human rights is of course considered
an important issue but only one issue among many. The lobbying efforts of emigre
organizations and the local groups that befriend them are, in turn, countered by
pressures from other more sympathetic constituencies, such as business and the
military.
SMALL PLAYERS
The impact of the Kurdish issue on relations between these smaller states and
Turkey tends to manifest itself in one of two ways. First, as will be seen later,
it creates an indirect impact, through the institutions of the EU. The smaller states
are a constant and vociferous lobby within the EU for human rights and de-
mocracy to be placed high up the agenda of the Community's foreign affairs.
In the absence of a clear Community foreign policy, this is obtained through the
harmonization of the positions of the members states. Community policy, pur-
sued by the External Relations directorate of the Commission and the country
that holds the presidency of the Council of Ministers, supported by the Troika,23
is thus subject to a series of trade-offs that take into account the views and depth
of feeling of the members. The second way in which the Kurdish issue impacts
is through the direct bilateral relations of the smaller states with Turkey. Be-
cause of the minor importance of these states, contacts with Turkey tend to be
spasmodic. Mindful of its EU membership aspirations, however, Ankara does tend
to be periodically attentive to such states. For example, in December 1994, Presi-
dent Siileyman Demirel paid a visit to Portugal, even though the two countries
have little contact and bilateral trade is worth less than SI00 million annually.
The aim of the visit was to ensure that relations were smooth as they approached
an important period in EU-Turkish relations, namely the conclusion of a cus-
toms union.
With bilateral contacts fitful in nature, the spotlight usually only focuses on
bilateral ties during periods of sudden and intense strain. Over the past five years
the Kurdish issue has most frequently provoked such interludes. Two examples il-
lustrate the point. When Turkey launched a major military operation in Iraqi
Kurdistan in March 1995, the smaller states of the EU were the most critical. As
a result, a number of the smaller states were willing to impose sanctions as a
symbol of their disapproval. In the case of Denmark, these sanctions took the
form of an arms embargo, which then, predictably, led to retaliation from Ankara
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in the form of putting such countries on a "red list," effectively reciprocating the
arms embargo.
The second example relates to the establishment of the Kurdistan parlia-
ment in exile (KPE). In spite of its name, the assembly, which met for its in-
augural session in The Hague on 12 April 1995, almost exclusively consisted of
Kurds who had originated from Turkey. The assembly was heavily influenced by
the PKK, thereby prompting one of the few Kurdish organizations abroad that
exist independent of the PKK, the Kurdish Socialist Party (KSP) led by Kemal
Burkay, to eschew involvement. The fact that Dutch authorities were unable or
unwilling to stop the convening of the assembly placed an immediate strain on bi-
lateral ties with Ankara. The Turkish government banned imports of Dutch arms
in protest.24 The Netherlands were heavily criticized in the Turkish media for what
was considered "an unfriendly act."25 Other accusations spilled easily from the pens
of the Turkish press, including the charge that the Dutch and the Belgian26 gov-
ernments had "turned a blind eye" to the actions of the PKK on their territory,
including the use of intimidation as a means to raise funds.27 It should be noted,
however, that once the deliberations of the assembly had finished and the initial
anger had subsided, the foreign ministries of the two countries quietly set about
trying to rehabilitate bilateral relations. As early as mid-May, Turkish foreign min-
ister Erdal Inonii had met his Dutch counterpart, Hans van Mielo, with a view to
stabilizing and improving ties.28
Greece too is clearly an example of a smaller state within the EU. Its re-
lationship with Turkey is, not surprisingly, somewhat different from the others.
As a close neighbor of Turkey's in a relationship of almost constant strain, re-
lations are far less fitful than with the other smaller states of Western Europe.
Moreover, there is clearly a long agenda of problem issues that preoccupy Ankara
and Athens, from the Cyprus issue through the position of their respective mi-
norities through a clutch of issues concentrated on the Aegean Sea and the
potentially unstable situation in the Balkans. For Greece, the Kurdish issue pales
in significance. However, the issue does periodically erupt, such as over Turkish
concerns over the opening of a PKK office in Athens in February 1995 and ac-
cusations that the Greek government condones and even expedites the activities
of the PKK.29
Within a multilateral European context, Greece has been forthright in
drawing attention to Turkey's human rights abuses, which, as has already been ob-
served, has tended to become synonymous with its handling of the Kurdish issue.
For instance, when Greece formally sought the postponement of a key EU As-
sociation Council meeting, which was to lay the groundwork for a conclusion of
the Customs Union, it did so on three grounds: the Turkish occupation of north-
ern Cyprus; the bilateral problems that existed between the two states; and, of
particular note, Turkey's human rights record.30 Interestingly, and as a further ex-
ample of the periodic bouts of small state antipathy toward Turkey, Athens was
supported in this blocking maneuver by Luxembourg.
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BIG PLAYERS
In contrast, bilateral relations between three of the EU's four major players—
Britain, France and Italy—have remained remarkably unaffected by the Kurdish
issue, in spite of the mounting intensity of the issue inside Turkey during the
1990s. Of the three, relations between Italy and Turkey have been the least sub-
ject to turbulence. Italy has sizeable commercial interests in Turkey. Fiat opened
its first joint venture factory in Turkey as long ago as 1968; Italy topped the league
for foreign direct investment in Turkey in 1993 with $419 million worth of capi-
tal;31 in 1993 Italy exported nearly $2.6 billion worth of goods to Turkey. The
Kurdish issue appears to have little resonance with the Italian public. The two
countries have concluded an agreement to cooperate against drug trafficking, or-
ganized crime and terrorism. In March 1995 President Oscar Luigi Scalfaro visited
Turkey on a trip that went smoothly. Though his visit virtually coincided with the
Turkish army incursion into northern Iraq, President Scalfaro still felt able to give
explicit support in its fight against terrorism, while appealing for respect for human
rights.32 .
Relations between Turkey and both Britain and France have, by contrast,
been subject to some strain in the recent past, although in neither case has this
been as a result of the Kurdish issue. Ties between Britain and Turkey had few
blemishes before 1993. This solid relationship was based on a common perception
of security priorities, which laid a premium on the continued existence of a strong
NATO and an Atlanticist orientation, and was skeptical of a more European ap-
proach to security. This similarity of views was complemented by a growing com-
mercial relationship, which saw British exports top the $2 billion mark for the first
time in 1993. More than two hundred British firms are active in Turkey in joint
ventures.33
Political relations reflected these close links at the security and commercial
levels. It was to the United Kingdom that Siileyman Demirel paid his first visit
to Europe on becoming prime minister in November 1992.34 British foreign sec-
retary Douglas Hurd took a special and sympathetic interest in Turkey during
his tenure in charge of British foreign policy. Hurd was a regular visitor to Ankara
and formed a special relationship with his Turkish counterpart, Hikmet Cetin.
On such occasions the human rights issue was raised but was not given a central
prominence and was certainly not allowed to cloud relations. Hurd's public pro-
nouncements on such matters during his visits to Turkey were of a low key, subtle
nature, urging the Turks to introduce "quality democracy and human rights."35
Indeed, during the British presidency Hurd set about giving substance to the
promise of enhanced political cooperations between the EU and Turkey made
during the Lisbon summit. This was to result in an Association Council meeting,
under British auspices, which prescribed high-level bilateral meetings between the
two sides, a status that hitherto was only enjoyed by Canada, Japan and the United
States.
122 / THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
When Turkish officials expressed some misgivings over the Edinburgh
summit, which occurred at the climax of the United Kingdom presidency, it was
over the "insufficient" nature of the statements on Bosnia rather than any trace of
criticism over the Kurdish issue. Indeed, Bosnia was then in the process of emerg-
ing as the issue that has partially blighted Anglo-Turkish relations over the suc-
ceeding two or three years. Only since the spring of 1995 and the successful
application in London of a broadcasting license for MED-TV, which Ankara
holds is nothing but a propaganda arm of the.PKK, has the Kurdish issue emerged
as a problematic issue in bilateral relations.
If Bosnia has been responsible for an uncharacteristic turbulence in Anglo-
Turkish relations, it has been less of a problem between France and Turkey. How-
ever, relations between France and Turkey had been retarded since the 1970s by
other factors, principally the Armenian issue—the three hundred thousand ethnic
Armenian voters in France, it is claimed, acting as a powerful influence on policy-
making in Paris. So cool were relations that when President Francois Mitterand
visited Turkey in 1992 he was the first French head of state to do so since Charles
de Gaulle in 1968.36 After the Armenian issue, the Kurdish problem has been the
second most important problem area since 1988,37 especially in view of the pro-
Kurdish activism displayed by President Mitterand's, admittedly estranged, wife,
Danielle. So bad had ties been at one stage that formal relations had been down-
graded to the level of charge d'affaires.
France began to make a serious effort to placate Ankara over the Kurd-
ish issue toward the beginning of 1992, paradoxically at a time when Turkish loss
of life and a hard-line state security policy were both on the increase. The arrest
of two members of the PKK, who were accused of using unacceptable methods to
raise funds, was used to trumpet what was heralded as a "a new approach" in the
French government's stance toward Turkey.38 This tougher approach toward the
PKK was further stiffened with the crackdown on the organization and its affili-
ated bodies led by the hard-line interior minister Charles Pasqua in November
1993. The French government banned two Kurdish groups that it claimed were
front organizations for the PKK. Police raids were undertaken in Paris, Lyon,
Marseilles, Strasbourg, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Rouen and in Brittany, and more than
one hundred suspects were arrested.39 It appears probable that the increasingly vio-
lent activities of militant Kurds in France the summer before, which had included
the holding of six hostages at the Turkish Consulate in Marseilles, together with
the seizure by the PKK of four French tourists in southeastern Turkey had helped
to precipitate the backlash. Ankara duly expressed itself to be very happy with the
French action.40 On his next visit to the Turkish capital French foreign minister
Alain Juppe appeared to tread carefully around the Kurdish issue, calling for
Turkey to "carry out a dialogue" but without being drawn out who should be
included in such a process.41 Ankara's fondness for Juppe was to deepen during the
French presidency of the EU Council of Ministers, when the final negotiations on
the Customs Union were concluded. It was because of the close association with
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Juppe that Ankara welcomed the election of Jacques Chirac as French president in
May 1995.
The only one of Western Europe's four major players that found it hard to
maintain relations with Turkey on an even keel during periods of heightened con-
troversy surrounding the Kurdish issue was Germany. Instead, relations between
the Federal Republic and Turkey have been subject to frequent periods of angry
outbursts and recrimination, often directly as a consequence of the Kurdish issue.
Granted, Germany has since the early 1990s formally labeled the PKK a terrorist
organization. Bonn has, however, frequently been the subject of sniping from
Ankara as to what it is prepared to do to give substance to this position.42 While
the PKK was "not visible" in Germany, it was claimed that it worked through or-
ganizations that were, such as the Patriotic Artists Association of Kurdistan and
the Federation of Kurdistan Patriotic Workers Cultural Associations.43
From time to time this general uneasiness over the issue would decline pre-
cipitously. The use of German arms by the Turkish military against Kurdish
targets proved to be a particularly sensitive subject. In March 1992 Germany
halted all arms sales to Turkey44 after it was asserted that armored personnel carri-
ers sold to Turkey had been used in the anti-insurgency operations in the south-
east.45 The gravity of the issue was never in doubt. The subsequent bureaucratic
error that resulted in fifteen Leopard tanks being delivered in spite of this ban was
the cause of the German defense minister Gerhard Stotenberg's forced resigna-
tion. The affairs provoked tit for tat retaliation that saw Turkish education minister
Koksal Toptan cancel a visit to Germany and call for a boycott of German goods,46
while German labor minister Norbert Bluen canceled a visit in the opposite direc-
tion. An accompanying war of words included then prime minister Suleyman
Demirel contrasting the position of Bonn with that of London, it being said that
Britain had praised Turkey's "restraint" in its approach to its internal security prob-
lem. Turkish foreign minister Hikmet Cetin was later quoted as saying that at the
time relations with Germany were at a "freezing point."47 The bad atmosphere was
relieved on that occasion by the resignation of the long-serving German foreign
minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who, it was argued, had been the root cause of
difficulties in bilateral relations.48 The Bundestag Commission for Foreign Affairs
rescinded the embargo just over one month later.
Tension flared up again in October of the same year, during the Turkish
military's extended ground and air operations in northern Iraq. Reports that a
PKK fighter had died after being hitched to the back of a German-made armored
car appalled opposition politicians. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) subse-
quently put the Bonn government under "increasing pressure," in the course of
which they demanded a severing of relations with Turkish police and intelligence
bodies and the substitution of economic for bilateral military aid.49 German mili-
tary aid for the next three years was subsequently halved to $86 million, while
German chancellor Helmut Kohl apparently found it prudent to delay a planned
visit to Turkey.50
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Though ties warmed up once again during 1993, the nervousness of the
German government in the face of accusations of the improper use of German
weaponry by the Turkish military resurfaced again in the spring of 1994. Bonn
actually halted shipments of German arms merely on the suggestion that German
tanks had been used against Kurdish insurgents in southeastern Turkey,51 a move
that resulted in a predictably angry response from the Turkish foreign ministry.52
These charges, it was subsequently admitted, were false, and the embargo was
consequently lifted.53 What was particularly revealing was that Bonn so readily
believed the initial accusation and that the overriding need was for the federal gov-
ernment to protect itself against domestic criticism rather than trying to evade
Turkish anger.
German government opprobrium was again provoked by the second ex-
tended intervention by the Turkish military in northern Iraq in March 1995. Bonn's
first reaction was, as in the past, to restrict sales of military hardware; in this case
the withholding of grants promised to help in the purchase of two frigates. With
President Demirel implying in a piece of loose talk that the Turkish military might
remain on Iraqi soil for up to one year, German foreign minister Klaus Kinkel
threatened a total halt in military aid if Turkey did not withdraw quickly.54 Against
a backdrop of renewed calls from the SPD to cease military sales to Turkey,55 a ship-
ment of military hardware, provided for according to a 1990 agreement made under
the Cascading Initiative,56 was suspended.57 The fact that the extended nature of
the Turkish intervention in northern Iraq resulted in growing public protests by
Germany's Kurdish population, notably a twenty-thousand-strong demonstration
in Dusseldorf on 1 April,58 brought home to the Bonn government the growing do-
mestic cost that such behavior by the Turkish state could bring about.
Though there is still no such thing as a European Union foreign policy, the
EU does have foreign relations with nonmember states such as Turkey. A number
of institutions have a role in helping to mould these foreign relations. The discus-
sion here will be limited to those institutions that have political responsibility for
conducting and developing such relations. The Presidency of the Council of Min-
isters and the Troika, which is an extension of the presidency, will be considered
as the leading institution at the heart of government. The European Parliament,
which now has formal responsibilities with respect to foreign relations, will then
be viewed as an example of an EU institution that has a peripheral relationship
with the political center.
A T THE CENTER: T H E PRESIDENCY
The Presidency of the Council of Ministers is occupied by each member of the
EU in turn for a six-month period. The state that holds the presidency is the lead
country in terms of the formulation and implementation of policy, with the ple-
nary session of the Council of Ministers holding ultimate power. The presidency
has responsibilities in many different areas, including trade policy, the deepening
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of community institutions, the expansion of the EU to include new members and
relations with nonmember states. The presidency is assisted by the Troika, which
gives added ballast to the presidency, especially if it is held by a small state with
limited bureaucratic resources, narrower interests and less gravitas in the interna-
tional system.
In the main, relations have been viewed in a strictly bilateral way be-
tween the EU and Ankara. Turkey does not figure prominently in statements on
the widening of EU membership, especially compared to the EFTA and Visegrad
countries. However, Turkey is routinely mentioned in the six-month summit
declarations, though more as a reflection of the "almost paranoid" concerns of An-
kara59 than any evolution in the substance of the relationship. The emphasis on
the bilateral aspects of relations means that Turkey rarely features prominently as
an EU matter, other than in areas of direct importance. In the 1990s these areas
were: the strategic issue of anchoring Turkey to the West; the economic rela-
tionship, most frequently expressed through negotiations over the establishment
of a customs union; and the conduct of the Turkish government, with human
rights and Turkey's extra territorial actions giving the greatest cause for concern.
The nature of successive presidencies toward Turkey has shown a remark-
able consistency. This has owed much to the convergence of thinking among the
big players on Turkey and the relatively pliant nature of smaller states during their
presidency terms. For instance, it was during the Portuguese presidency that
Britain, which was by this time a member of the Troika, began to develop the idea
of a special relationship between Turkey and the EU, akin to that which prevailed
with the United States and Japan.60 Douglas Hurd then pushed this idea at the
EU foreign ministers meeting, resulting in the Portuguese foreign minister asking
Hurd to "draw up a framework for relations between Turkey and the Community."
The goal was pursued without any linkage, or apparent reference, to human rights
or the Kurdish issue. This vision was given substance at the Lisbon summit of
June 1992, which prescribed an enhanced political dialogue. With the ideas and
the framework developed during the Portuguese presidency, nothing further was
required from the British presidency that followed, other than to implement it.
A second example of the role played by the big players came during the
Greek presidency. Leading states, such as Britain, France and Germany, were con-
cerned that Athens might seek to exploit its presidency to spoil EU relations with
Turkey. The best that Ankara could hope for was that relations would not be dis-
rupted during this period, an objective that was realized due to the activities of the
big players. In order to ensure that this was indeed the case and to draw attention
to the close ties with Turkey, Britain and Germany undertook a preventive ma-
neuver just prior to the start of the Greek presidency.61 It was announced that
regular trilateral meetings would be held at a senior level between government fig-
ures from the three states. These high-level meetings were subsequently opened
up to France. Again, the human rights situation and the Kurdish problem did not
prevent the implementation of such an initiative; Britain and Germany instead
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used the occasion as an opportunity to talk about such subjects. While meetings in
such a form have since lapsed, the mechanism was successful when judged against
its own objective of taking responsibility for political relations with Turkey out of
the hands of Athens during the Greek presidency.
As well as maintaining the focus on bilateral relations with Turkey during
their own and the smaller states' presidencies, the big players have also been in-
strumental in seeking to limit the damage caused by individual events on Turkey's
relations with the EU. In doing so, the big players have had to pursue a well judged
line. On the one hand, they have sought to take a firm attitude toward Ankara.
Pressure from opposition politicians (in the case of Germany) and special interests
groups (in the case of Britain, for instance), together with pressure from the
smaller states has obliged such a stance. In the case of the Kurdish issue, this atti-
tude has been amplified by a general sense of uneasiness as to whether the security
policies being pursued by the Turkish state are really in the long term interests of
stability in Turkey. On the other hand, the big players have sought to ensure that
any one issue does not come to dominate bilateral relations and that issues such as
human rights and the Kurds are balanced against other interests.
An excellent example of such factors in play came with the Turkish in-
tervention in northern Iraq in March 1995, in the middle of the French presi-
dency. The first reaction of the French presidency was a statement by the then
French foreign minister Alain Juppe in which he attempted to give a balanced
though clear reaction. He stated squarely that the EU viewed the PKK as a terror
organization but said that Ankara had to abide by principles of legality and human
rights as an associate member of the EU.62 He further stated that the EU supports
"in Turkey, as elsewhere, the principle of territorial integrity and sovereignty,"
but that, in the case of "the current incursion," Turkey had "violated basic princi-
ples of international law."63 While the French attempted to manage the situation
through a balanced approach, the overall EU stance appeared to be tougher be-
cause of the altogether milder language used by the U.S. government at the time.64
As if to confirm the centrality of the big players in driving EU policy in this
matter, a diplomatic offensive by Ankara to explain the nature and causes of the
intervention in northern Iraq targeted London, Paris and Bonn. While Foreign
Minister Erdal Inonii traveled to the German and French capitals, deputy prime
minister Hikmet Cetin flew to Britain. With the diplomatic offensive also taking
in the United States, neither man visited any of the other European capitals.
O N THE PERIPHERY: T H E EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
The European Parliament (EP) has long been an institution without a role. In an
effort to make itself more important and to give itself some function, the EP in-
creasingly sought to be active on the issue of human rights. Moreover, until the
signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European Parliament was an "out-
sider" body, both devoid of power and short on influence with those institutions
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that wielded real power. The Maastricht Treaty was a threshold in the develop-
ment of the EP. Concerned at the so-called "democratic deficit" at the heart of the
EU, Maastricht sought to bring the EP in from the outside, yielding to it certain
responsibilities. Chief among these was to ascribe to the EP responsibility for
passing the EU budgets and endorsing treaties with external parties. Consequently,
it was widely agreed within Western Europe that the EP has to endorse the Cus-
toms Union with Turkey in order for it to be formally adopted by the EU.6S
The EP has long been interested in and critical of the human rights situation
in Turkey, especially as it applies to the Kurdish issue. For instance, after the wide-
spread clashes and loss of life during the Nevroz (New Year) festival in March
1992, the EP was highly critical of Ankara in expressing its overwhelming con-
demnation at the excessive use of force by the Turkish military. Not only was its
language much more directly critical than the coded phrases used by member
states, but the EP proposed a raft of measures to penalize Turkey for its actions.
These included demands for an international investigation of the Nevroz events;
the Commission and the Council of Ministers to take the initiative to find a solu-
tion to the Kurdish issue through the UN; and the EU-Turkish joint parlia-
mentary commission to monitor the human rights situation inside Turkey. The
EP resolution was certainlynot without balance: it condemned the PKK's use of
violence; it also stopped short of requesting a general arms embargo to be imple-
mented by member states.66 This attempt at balance cut no ice in Ankara, which
was particularly angered by the EP s references to Turkey's Kurds as a minority, im-
plying that they should have the political rights of a minority.67 The Turkish
government simply dismissed the report on the grounds of bias, an important step
in the development of a somewhat disdainful attitude that the Turkish establish-
ment has routinely displayed toward the EP.
A second example of the uneasy relationship that has prevailed between
Turkey and the EP was the case of the Kurdish MPs, who had their parliamentary
immunity lifted and were subsequently tried, found guilty and sentenced in Turkey
in 1994. Members of the EP, who were in any case sensitive to the treatment of
fellow elected representatives, were livid to discover that some of the charges
brought against the MPs related to statements that they had made during a visit to
the EP.68 Increasingly concerned at the prosecutions, the EP Political Affairs Com-
mittee decided not to convene a meeting of the joint EU-Turkish Parliamentary
Committee while the case was still in progress.69 When the guilty verdict was re-
turned and the sentencing took place, the EP passed a strongly worded resolution
recommending that work on the Customs Union should be suspended and a meet-
ing of the Association Council, scheduled for 19 December, should be post-
poned.70 This prompted a predictably tough retort from the Turkish side, with
Tune Bilget, co-chairman of the joint committee, saying that there was no dif-
ference between the postponement of the Customs Union and an unconditional
no. He further observed that the EP had never passed a favorable resolution on
Turkey.71 In a public exposure of the limited importance of the EP, the Commis-
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sion and the Council of Ministers ignored both the parliament's recommen-
dations.
The tendency displayed by the insider institutions of the EU and the Turk-
ish government to brush aside the pronouncements of the EP ended once the final
negotiations at the conclusion of a Customs Union were completed in March
1995. The matter then formally passed to the EP for ratification. From the be-
ginning of 1995 the EP started to come under tremendous pressure from the
Commission and member states to adopt the Customs Union.72 Euro MPs were
subject to an intensive campaign, which carried both personal inducements and the
threat of institutional penalties. The former included an invitation to visit Turkey
on a "study tour" paid for by Ankara.73 The latter involved the implicit threat of a
diminution of the EP s standing through the use of the 1996 Inter-Governmental
Conference, which will re-examine the powers of the EP. The Commission also
initiated a vigorous media campaign in the EU in support of the CU, as an indi-
rect method of influence.74 Throughout, the arguments used to win over MEPs in
support of the CU were that the Customs Union was in the EU's best material in-
terests, and the EU's leverage over Ankara in the area of human rights could only
be sustained if there was a successful conclusion to the Customs Union.75
In the end, following much uncertainty and an approximately nine-month
delay on voting, the EP endorsed the Customs Union. The initial deferment was
made due to Turkey's incursion into northern Iraq, which the EP condemned in
language significantly stronger than that used by the Troika.76 As a result, meet-
ings of the joint parliamentary commission were frozen. After the withdrawal of
Turkish forces in May, the EP waited for Ankara to take substantive action over
the issues of democratization and human rights. The Turkish government, now
taking the EP significantly more seriously than it did in 1992, realized that it had
no choice but to act if the CU was to come into force on time. In a display of con-
siderable political will, the Ciller-led coalition managed to take substantive,
though limited, action in three areas. It steered a democratization package through
its parliament, gained amendments to the notorious Article 8 of the Anti-terror
Law, and, through a process of judicial appeal, secured the release of two of the
six Kurdish MPs still in prison. This laid the base for what ended up as a de-
ceptively easy endorsement of the CU by 343 votes to 149 (with 36 abstentions),77
with a record turnout of MEPs.78 In spite of the Turkish establishment's antipa-
thy, the EP had enjoyed some success in gaining concessions from Ankara over the
human rights and Kurdish issues during the short period when its powers were of
a decisive importance to the interests of Turkey.
The Kurdish issue has clearly emerged as a visible and controversial factor in rela-
tions between the EU and Turkey in the 1990s. For the smaller states of the EP
and a marginal institution such as the EP, it has also emerged as an issue of sub-
stance. For such actors, the Kurdish issue has increasingly been perceived as being
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synonymous with the issue of human rights. Both the smaller states and the EP
have repeatedly criticized the Turkish state for its actions toward the country's
Kurds. In doing so, they have acted largely unfettered by wider interests and con-
siderations. Ankara in turn has been largely dismissive of such criticisms, choosing
instead to rely upon the larger states backed up by the Commission to determine
the substance of EU policy toward Turkey.
These tempestuous moments, therefore, have had only a limited effect on
both relations between the larger states of the EU and Turkey and Ankara's deal-
ings with central institutions, such as the presidency and the Troika. The larger
states, with their more extensive and complex relations with Turkey, have not al-
lowed the Kurdish issue to dominate bilateral ties; official statements have always
been balanced and the language used has been measured. Indeed, with the excep-
tion of Germany, the bigger players of the EU have largely been able to cocoon
the Kurdish issue from the process of policy-making. At the level of EU institu-
tions, the big players have had a moderating effect on the smaller states.
Only over the ratification of the Customs Union by the European Parlia-
ment has the balance between the center and the periphery of power within the
EU been disturbed. In 1995 the Turkish government was forced to take seriously
an institution that it had come to revile. Though the EP came somewhat reluc-
tantly to approve the CU, it did not do so before having obliged the Turkish state
to make three sets of compromises in the direction of greater liberalization. In one
of these cases, that of the imprisoned MPs, the Kurdish issue was an explicit
factor; in the other two, which involved matters of democratization and human
rights, the Kurdish issue was an implicit factor. For the first time the impact of the
Kurdish issue on Euro-Turkish relations may be said to have been as real as it was
apparent.
NOTES
1. I am grateful to the Leverhulme Foundation, whose generous financial assistance
has enabled the work on which this article is based to take place. I am also grateful to
Angela Gillon and William Hale, both of whom read earlier drafts of the chapter, for their
valuable comments.
2. In addition to Professor Gonensay, the delegation consisted of two members
of the Foreign Ministry of ambassadorial rank and two who were not officials: the Social
Democrat Populist Party deputy Professor Miimtaz Soysal, who was to have a short tenure
as foreign minister later on in the year, and a Turkish journalist.
3. The author was the chairman of the meeting in question.
4. Over the preceding seven years the Institute had led the way in the study of
Turkey in the UK with, for example, three bilateral roundtable meetings with the Ankara-
based Foreign Policy Institute, two research projects on different aspects of Turkish foreign
policy and a one-day conference on Turkey, convened in February 1993.
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5. Throughout, the acronym EUwill be used, even though the name of the col-
lective has periodically changed, being, for instance, the European Community prior to late
1993.
6. Such concerns on the part of the Turkish government were entirely justified. In
1987 Turkey had dealt with an earlier, smaller influx of Iraqi Kurds by allowing them to
find refuge on Turkish soil and mounting an appropriate relief operation. This won the
Turkish government plaudits among officials in the West. However, this humanitarian as-
sistance soon turned into an open-ended commitment, as the Iraq Kurds refused to return
home, while other states were chary of assisting in their settlement.
7. For a history of the PKK, see Ismet Imset, The PKK (Ankara, 1992).
8. Casualty figures have to be treated with some skepticism, as they are issued by
the state, while the complete news blackout on the southeast of the country make verifica-
tions extremely difficult. It may be assumed that casualty figures for the rebels are greatly
exaggerated, while those for the security forces are underestimated.
9. Report in Turkish Daily News (henceforth TDN), 1 May 1995.
10. The most obvious examples of this phenomenon were the extended raids that
began in October 1992 and March 1995; this period was, however, punctuated by more
limited bombing and commando raids.
11. Examples include the 1992 Nevroz celebrations, during which, according to the
Turkish Human Rights Foundation, ninety-two people were killed, and the onslaught
against the town of fjirnak in August 1992
12. Though such figures are difficult to verify, by the beginning of 1995 more than
2 million people in the southeast had been displaced due to village burnings and evacua-
tion; TDN, 3 Jan. 1995. A report in the same newspaper a little over five months earlier
(TDN, 28 July 1994) quoted the Turkish Human Rights Association as stating that more
than 1,360 Kurdish villages had been destroyed. By 1996 Amnesty International reported
that some twenty-three hundred villages had been destroyed.
13. The emergence of the death squads came toward the end of 1991 and led to
conduct by the Turkish state described by one Western human rights activist as being South
American in form.
14. Recently we have witnessed the somewhat curious case of police being accused
of having tortured policemen who themselves were suspected of involvement in the death
in custody of the journalist Mete Goktepe. See Independent, 1 Feb. 1996.
15. Mehmet Ali Birand in Sabah, 20 March 1995, reprinted in TDN, 21 March
1995.
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Peace-Building in the Middle East, Fourteenth IPRA Conference, 27-31 July 1992, Kyoto,
Japan.
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18. International Herald Tribune (henceforth IHT), 6-7 Nov. 1993.
19. Ibid.
20. Independent, 1 Dec. 1993.
21. The Turkish Constitutional Court formally closed the HEP in mid-July 1993;
the DEP was closed in the spring of 1994.
22. This is an accusation persistently leveled against the PKK by the Turkish state.
As one European intelligence source was quoted as saying: "It suits the Turks to blame
the [drugs] trade on terrorists." It seems widely agreed, however, among knowledgeable
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24. TND, 4 May 1995.
25. Editorial by Ilnur Cevik in TND, 14 April 1995.
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28. TDN, 16 May 1995.
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31. Turkish Probe, no. 148, 13 Oct. 1993.
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lenged the German government to implement its rhetorical position and oust the PKK. See
TDN, 18 Feb. 1992.
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THE KURDISH NATIONALIST
MOVEMENT AND ITS IMPACT
ON TURKEY'S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICIES

7POLITICAL CRISIS AND THE
KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY
Hamit Bozarslan
X his chapter analyzes the link between the Kurdish issue and the crisis of
the political system in Turkey. The connection can only be understood if we take
a long-term period as our research framework. Such an approach will enable us
to observe that, due to its pluralist future, its pressure groups and a complex mech-
anism of clientelism, the Turkish political system distinguishes itself from other
Middle Eastern political systems. But we will also notice that the autonomy of the
"civilians" in Turkey is rather restricted by the army and by the bureaucratic and
judicial establishment. These institutions constitute a suprapolitical power. The
doctrinal "normativity" of this power is formulated in a quasi-metaphysical
manner in the successive constitutions, namely in that of 1982, and poses the
ultimate limits of autonomy of civil actors.1 We will also observe that, as far as
sensitive questions, such as the Kurdish issue, are concerned, the consequences of
the restriction of civilian politicians are very grave.
Despite the predominance of the army in the management of this ques-
tion and despite the imprisonment of the Democracy Party (DEP) deputies in
1994,1 will argue that the Kurdish political actors are not passive agents of a sys-
tem imposed by Ankara. Various mechanisms of subordination, clientelism and
participation link them to the center of Turkey-wide political formations. Those
links imply negotiation and a constant game of legitimization between them
and the center as well as the political parties. The terms of these negotiations and
the legitimization game are determined, among other elements, by army pressure,
Kurdish radicalism and ongoing guerrilla warfare since 1984, evolution of clientel-
ists groups and the transborder nature of the Kurdish issue. Through these pro-
cesses, the Kurdish dynamic imposes itself as a constituent element of the Turkish
political system. More than in Iraq, Iran and Syria, the evolution of this issue itself
depends on the balances and tensions determining the Turkish political space.
Other elements have an obvious impact on the evolution of the Kurdish issue, in-
cluding the internal contradictions of the political system, splits among the political
parties, the relationship between civilians and the armed forces and the integration
or the exclusion of other minority groups.
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The study of the articulation of the political system and the Kurdish issue
cannot be linear or reduced to only one dimension. Such a study will be under-
mined if it emphasizes only the impact of the army on political life or only the
conflictual relations between Kurdish political actors and the Turkish parties.
Without underestimating the elements of exclusion, we must also question the ex-
isting channels of integration, or the channels that had worked for a long period
before becoming anachronistic. Bearing in mind this necessity, I will analyze a few
aspects related to my subject. First, I will question the official doctrine, which is
supposed to establish the borders of political life and determine the border of licit
and illicit activity in this field. Second, I will try to elucidate the processes of frag-
mentation within the Turkish political space, namely its two traditional poles:
conservatism and social-democracy. Consequently, I will analyze the reasons be-
hind the success of the Welfare Party (WP) in the Kurdish regions. Third, I will
concentrate on the evolution of the independent Kurdish actors and their impact
in the political arena. Finally, I will evaluate the impact of the constraints of the
Kurdish issue on the state and particularly on its political space. I will then provide
some prognostications for the future.
DOCTRINAL IMPERATIVE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION
According to the Turkish constitution, Kemalism is the official doctrine, and it is
protected by a series of juridical and coercive instruments. The political parties are
obliged to adhere to it or to accept banishment by the Constitutional Court. Given
this context as well as the sanctions against its opponents,2 one could conclude that
Kemalism constitutes the common doctrinal and juridical basis of the entire po-
litical space. However, this conclusion would not entirely reflect reality. A political
doctrine is juridically never delineated sufficiently to have precision. Moreover, the
definition of Kemalism remains highly problematic.3 In fact, if we take Kemalism
as it is imposed by the Turkish constitution, i.e. as an almost religious doctrine,
it can be used in order to legitimize virtually every kind of political practice—
pluralism and democracy, military dictatorship, communism, fascism, even a
theocratic system. The reason for this is quite evident: the constantly republished
Kemalist mantras are contradictory. They do not build a corpus of abstract rec-
ommendations because they are products of particular historical contexts. Not
surprisingly, almost every politician uses them. Turgut Ozal, whose political
program was to bury Kemalism as an official doctrine could describe himself as
Kemalist. A political party quite remote from the Kemalist discourse, the Refah or
Welfare Party (WP) can also find some useful material in it ("Atatiirk would have
been a member of our party if he were still alive"). Even some Kurdish actors use
the abundant correspondence of Mustafa Kemal in order to give, not without a
certain malignity, a legality to their claim of "equality between the Kurds and
Turks." This places constitutional court judges, bearing other phrases in mind, in
a particularly difficult situation. In other words, it is obviously impossible to trans-
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form Kemalism into a research subject, and, even less, into a viable judicial system.
The researcher can, at most, try to understand the surviving cult of Mustafa Kemal
and/or his place in the popular and bureaucratic imagination.
However, if we adopt a methodology that consists of historicizing Kemal-
ism as a doctrine and a practice of political power as well as a juridical system as
it was elaborated during the 1930s—secular reforms as well as instrumentalization
of religion, six principles (arrows) of the single party, fusion of party and state,
anthropological nationalism, the cult of "Eternal Chief," and rejection of the
Ottoman past—we would naturally conclude that Kemalism did exist. But, in
such a perspective, we will almost admit that, as most single-party experiences
of the interwar period, it was already dead in 1945.4 It is true that some of Ata-
tiirk's reforms, which prolonged the secularization movement of the late Ottoman
Empire, have survived. Nevertheless, nobody in Turkey can imagine a future
political system in which "only the head of human society is worthy of being sanc-
tifying."5 In a similar way, no politician can make an apology of political and eco-
nomic etatisme, measure the skeletons to prove the racial superiority of the Turks,
propose the fusion of the state with a party, nominate deputies or force the pro-
fessors of history to recognize, over a table covered with alcoholic drinks, that they
are "ignorant." The strict application of Kemalism (and of the constitution) would
bring a dejure banishment of all political formations, with the exception of the
MHP or Nationalist Action Party (NAP).
We can then conclude that Kemalism is either nonexistent or anachronis-
tic. However, this does not mean that Turkey has no official doctrine: it does, but
it is not Kemalism. It is rather the vague system elaborated from the 1910 through
the 1920s by Ziya Gokalp. In the 1970s, a club of right-wight intellectuals (Home
of Intellectuals—Aydinlar Ocagi) resurrected this doctrine as "The Turkish-
Islamic Synthesis." This synthesis has been consequently adopted by the generals
of the 1980 coup.6
As it was elaborated by Gokalp, this doctrine had three aims: to eradicate
the claims of the Ottoman liberalism of Prince Sabaheddin (Ottomanism, private
initiatives and decentralization); to arrive at a synthesis between the Westernizers,
Islamists and Turkish nationalists; and finally to homogenize the unionist pro-
gram and discourse. This system, which enabled the Unionist regime to obtain an
alliance of different intellectual groups, had three slogans. The first one, "Turki-
fication," was the raison d'etre and the main aim of the Turkish nation; the suffix
tion proved that it was a process rather than a given fact. This aim was to remain
unchanged through the years, independent of other social, cultural or political
variables. The second aim was "contemporanization," which signified "Western-
ization." It was supposed to enable the Turks to enter into the most developed
stage of civilization. It necessitated a radical program and the leadership of an
elite. Finally, "Islamization," also a process rather than a given fact, emphasized
that religion was the soul of any society. It should be Turkified and cease to be un-
derstood as unity of the 'umma. It was expected to enable the populace (avam) to
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combat the unavoidable but necessary harms that civilization would bring. Just as
the program of "civilization" was to be determined and applied by the elite, the
"nationalized" religion was a domain reserved for the populace.
In spite of certain hesitations, such an aggressive anti-religious policy, or,
during the 1930s, a sliding from cultural nationalism to a racial interpretation of
the nation, Kemalism perpetuated the Gokalpian synthesis but sacrificed the pres-
tigious name of its founding father. As it was re-elaborated by the Home of
Intellectuals, the synthesis neither excluded Westernization nor put a particular
emphasis on it. The new version included some eclectic references from the pre-
Ottoman, Ottoman, Unionist and Kemalist periods. It still possessed contradic-
tory aims, however. Its goals were to bring maximum legitimacy to the state by
assuring the alliance of the Turkish and Sunni populations and to persist with the
leadership of the Westernized bourgeoisie and elites. Thanks to this transmogri-
fication, Kemalism could be bequeathed a metaphysical position in the constitu-
tion and become, more than before, a taboo, while the synthesis was offered the
place of the official doctrine. In turn, it enabled President Kenan Evren (1980-88)
to use interchangeably the Quran and the Speeches and Discourses, a compendium
of Mustafa Kemal's political ideas.
One can hardly deny that the Turkish-Islamic synthesis legitimized the
military regime. Later, civilian governments also used it to legitimize themselves
simultaneously, by Turkishness, their Ottoman past, Kemalist symbolism and
Westernization. However, as far as the evolution of political space is concerned,
the success of the synthesis seems to be limited. The first obstacle to its realization
is that its different terms do not accept the place offered to them by Ziya Gokalp
and by the Home of Intellectuals in their nomenclature of values. (Turkishness is
not the main objective of all Turkish groups; Westernization and Islamization
fight each other to have the leading place.) And, if each term is able to obtain the
support of one section of the population, it provokes, at the same time, the exclu-
sion of others and reduces political participation. Turkification excludes the Kurds
and does not offer them any solution other than assimilation. It is obvious that this
policy did not succeed in convincing the Kurds that Turkification should be their
main aim. This failure obliged all the political parties, with the exception of the
NAP, to introduce a small dose of "Kurdishness" into their discourse. Islamization
is based on the postulate that the Alevis, both Kurdish and Turkish, are Mus-
lims. This is not only seriously ignorant, it is, moreover, inefficient. Obviously, the
Alevis do not adhere to the constraints of Islamization that are imposed on them,
and even the WP is obliged to develop locally a specific discourse to earn their
trust. Finally, the Westernization imposed from above provokes marginalization
as well as strong reactions from the Turkish-Sunni population of the Anatolian
provinces and the inhabitants of the shanty towns in the big cities. The ban during
the late 1980s on the so-called Islamic veil in the schools has given ample evidence
that a section of the university youth either did not accept the Westernization
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coming from above or, at least, did not understand it as Mustafa Kemal did. It is
true that the Westernization of Turkey seems to be an irreversible process, and
even the WP adheres to it by its practice if not its discourse. But the Kemalist
practice of Westernization reinforces the weight of Islam as political opposition
in a way that Ziya Gokalp could not, of course, foresee.
T H E TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM FROM BIPOLARITYTO FRAGMENTATION
We can conclude that the Gokalpian doctrine that delineates the borders of
the political space has evaporated with the emergence of new segments of the
Anatolian population as political actors. It is true that the newcomers share ele-
ments of political culture with the old actors—the mechanisms of clientelism, the
game of negotiating and bargaining and the defection of members and depu-
ties from one party to another—but they do not accept the terms of the official
doctrine or, at least, not all of them. But their emergence, which inevitably en-
larges political participation, also changes the other datum of the system, con-
demning it to a fragmentation or to a painful and long period of recomposition.
As Idris Kuciikomer noticed in the late 1960s, since 1908, the political
system has been characterized by a bipolarity that did not conform to the ideolog-
ical criteria (revolutionaries versus reactionaries) of the Unionist and Kemalist
elite. The CUP (Committee Union and Progress), dominated by the army and the
bureaucrats, later gave birth to the Republican Peoples' Party (RPP) of Ataturk
and Inonii.7 The liberal tradition, on the other hand, emanated from society. Since
the days of its founding father, Prince Sabahaddin, it had given birth to the con-
servative formations of the Democratic Party (DP) and the Justice Party (JP).
The "ideal-type" of Kiicukomer, which explained a long period of Turkish political
history, could, however, not be confirmed during the next decades because the ge-
nealogy ceased to be at that point linear. The 1960s and 1970s were dominated by
an extraparliamentary opposition, which had a strong capacity for mobilization.
Moreover, independent of their durability, the emergence of other formations,
such as the YTP or the Party of New Turkey (PNY), the Turkish Workers Party
(TWP), and the Union Party of Turkey (UPT), changed the facts of the politi-
cal space and threatened the monopoly of the RPP and JP. Finally, the two poles,
that I will name "traditional," because of their places as references in the left and
right wings, were weakened during these decades by internal tensions and schisms.
This process of fragmentation became more serious after the 1980 coup. The mili-
tary regime wanted to create a narrow political space that it could easily control.
The banishment of the old politicians was expected to transform the political field
into a "Rosary." However, this measure did not have sociological viability. The old
politicians, depositors of political legitimacy, returned as powerful as they had been
before the military coup. Nevertheless, thanks to this measure, other organizational
structures and clientelist networks emerged and offered a real autonomy to new
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actors and to the old dissidents of the former political parties. This result acceler-
ated the processes of fragmentation.
Several factors have deeply transformed the political system:
• The RPP-CHP has considerably weakened. It no longer represents a bu-
reaucratic power. Under the pressure of the students' and workers' move-
ments and also because of the contacts of the Kemalist intellectuals with
Marxism during the 1960s and 1970s, the RPP tried to formulate a syn-
thesis between Kemalism and social-democracy. The historical mission
of this effort suggests the impossibility of such a synthesis. This failure de-
prived the RPP of the support of the armed forces and of the population,
condemning it to a fragmentation, including two or three parties such
as the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the RPP, currently fused with the
SDP, and the Democratic Left Party (DLP).
• The army and the bureaucracy were, during long decades, organically
liked with the CUP or the RPP, or they were subordinated to them. Sub-
sequently, they were able to earn real autonomy and were able to become
suprapolitical arbiters of the political arena. The position of the army in
political life was reinforced by legitimization of the "patriotic" and "pro-
gressive" missions of the army by the political actors' role of the "guardian
of internal stability" offered to it by the constitution, the impact of the
1960 military coup, which was supported by the intellectuals, and the blan-
dishment of the threat of the military intervention by the civilians in their
internal conflicts. It is true that it in many fields the army can no longer
impose (or even express) its opinions and is obliged to admit the suprem-
acy of the civilians. Moreover, as it is a bad manager, it does not want to
occupy a visible position in the political arena. Nevertheless, this does not
signify that it has also renounced its role as arbiter. It played this role with
great energy during the 1980s and 1990s by accepting confrontation with
almost every political leader.8
• Adopting a defensive position toward the army and frightened by the
social movements of the 1960s and 1970s, the liberal movement in Turkey
passed through a rapid transformation and become clearly conserva-
tive. In spite of reformist figures such as Turgut Ozal, it seeks the status
quo, if not government, as a mode of survival. In its opposition to the left
during the 1970s it instrumentalized the extreme right. This enabled it to
have the support of some officers and bureaucrats, but, in turn, this has
reduced its autonomy and credibility. Nowadays, the attraction of power
makes possible similar alliances. Finally, since the 1960s this camp has
passed through an accelerated fragmentation including the emergence of
the Motherland Party (MP), the True Path Party (TPP) and half a dozen
minor formations. This fragmentation can partly be explained by the coup
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d'etat, which favored the MP, and by the difficult sharing of the inheri-
tance of Turgut Ozal, who died in 1993. But it seems also to be a result
of different contradictory imperatives {status quo versus reform, rural Ana-
tolia versus the bourgeoisie of Istanbul etc.).
• Political Islam emerged as a parliamentary force. Political Islam is not a
new phenomena in Turkish history. As an organized force, it has existed
since 1908. It was a powerless spectator of the conflict between Unionism
and Ottoman liberalism, to which it was close. It reemerged during the
Independence War but was later condemned to an illegal, intellectual and
marginal opposition. It survived in a diffuse and disorganized way. Over
the last two decades it has passed through a vertiginous transformation to
become a mass movement. Oscillating between contradictory messages
and imperatives, it has shown nevertheless its ability to develop pragmatic
policies enabling it to profit from the fragmentation of other movements.
Its later avatar, the WP, constitutes its only unified current in Turkish po-
litical life.
• The pan-Turanist tradition survived as a racial nationalism during the
1940s and as the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) since the 1960s. It gave
birth to the radical right during the 1970s. It has some affiliations with
Kemalism, but at least on two points it distinguishes itself: explicitly in the
past and implicitly nowadays, it is affiliated to the Sunni populations and
it interprets Turkish nationalism clearly as a doctrine of civil war. This is
its force and its weakness—its force because it can obtain a solid clientele
group between the Sunnis, namely in the mixed Sunni-Alevi regions, and
its weakness because elsewhere it has very little credibility. However, one
should note that its radical opposition to Kurdish nationalism can assure
it a new electorate outside the mixed provinces.
T H E KURDISH PROBLEM AND THE TWO TRADITIONAL POLES
One can conclude from the above that the Kurdish issue evolves in a political space
that suffers from two processes of "disintegration" of the official doctrine and of
the political system. Together with political Islam and Alevism, it also participates
fully in both processes. In fact, as early as the 1946 election, the political parties
tried to obtain a Kurdish clientele group and abandoned the theory of national
sovereignty that should have been incarnated, according to both Ziya Gokalp and
Mustafa Kemal, by the elites and the Kurdish chiefs. The integration of the tra-
ditional Kurdish actors, namely in the case of the family of Sheikh Said,
symbolizing two banned ideologies from the republic—Kurdish nationalism and
religious opposition—signified a real enlargement of the political space. Later,
with the notable exception of the NAP, all the formations have obtained Kurdish
representation implicitly recognized as such, even if no deputy could legally de-
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scribe himself or herself as Kurdish. Even the NAP tried to find Kurdish religious
clients and, in the mixed Alevi-Sunni regions, took advantage of a Kurdish Sunni
electorate.
The political system was in fact competent and elastic enough to integrate
traditional Kurdish actors. In turn, those actors played a key role in the legiti-
mization of the system. For decades, participation in the elections was higher in
Kurdistan than in the rest of the country. Access to local and national power has
become a key in the Kurdish regions, giving birth, in some cases, to vendettas or
to shifts of entire villages from one party to another.
The military's claim to stop what Kemalist terminology calls feudalism and
to eradicate traditional Kurdish representation, according to them incompatible
with national sovereignty, succeeded only during the coups d'etat periods. At other
times, the Kurdish actors imposed themselves as valued electoral factors. More-
over, the political formations succeeded in finding a juste milieu between two im-
peratives: to have some Kurdish representation and to manage the susceptibilities
of the army and the establishment. However, from the 1970s to today, the politi-
cal game has become more complex. The terms of negotiation, which before in-
cluded largely clientelism have changed under the pressure of two simultaneous
evaluations.
First, the pressure of Kurdish radicalism is a durable fact in the Kurdish
political arena. This pressure was obvious during the 1977 municipal elections. It
gave birth later to the guerrilla movement of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party)
and to the organizations such as HEP (Peoples Labor Party) and DEP (Democ-
racy Party). As I will explain later, it would be groundless to confuse these two
organizations. However, they are products of the same radical response to a system
that failed in integrating genuine Kurdish representation.
Second, the Kurdish actors who were traditionally well integrated into
the system could not remain indifferent to this radicalism. Their desire to remain
integrated and to gain access to the resources it ensured was still dominant. Never-
theless, under threat of extinction, they had to accept the minimum nationalist
demands—to end the state of emergency, to stop the destruction of the Kurdish
countryside, to respect human rights and to recognize cultural rights. The im-
plicit recognition of their Kurdishness, as in the past, was no longer enough to
enable them to preserve their own clientele groups, especially their impact in
the urban centers. We observe this transformation in the composition of HEP and
the DEP political parties. Some of their key members, such as Ahmet Turk, were
affiliated before with the JP or the RPP. But this was also true in the cases of
Kurdish deputies such as Abdiilmelik Firat, Azimet Koyliioglu and even Kamran
Inan, who belonged until recently or still belong to the traditional Turkish forma-
tions. All the Kurdish political actors did not desert the Turkish political arena,
but the traditional formations, perceived as responsible for the Kurdish policy of
Ankara, have been largely boycotted in the Kurdish regions. This situation obliged
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the Kurdish members of those formations to distinguish themselves from the
leaders.
In short, the terms of negotiation between the Kurdish actors and the
center, but also between them and the parties, have changed since the late 1970s.
The sine qua non condition of policy-making in Kurdistan was then to enlarge
the political space and redefine it, by inclusion of the Kurdish actors qua Kurd-
ish and by recognizing their claims. Their inability to understand this trans-
formation and the pressure of the army and the Kurdish guerrillas condemned the
social democratic and conservative poles to certain immobility and to an unman-
ageable series of paradoxes.
Quite independently from their doctrinal affiliations, both the conservative
and social-democratic parties faced or face such paradoxes. The conservative camp,
for instance, is often described as Turkish nationalist as well as politically etatiste.
The declarations of main conservative leaders (Yilmaz, Ciller, Demirel) might
have led us to accept this assumption. In fact, as I have already mentioned, this
camp has become, against its own will, the defender of the Kemalist inheritance,
which it dislikes,9 and of the status quo with the army and the establishment that
enabled it to gain access to power. It has been a target of the army over the last
forty years and at the same time, due to its position, it has had to apply and assume
responsibility of the politics decided by the armed forces, to outbid them in de-
fending law and order, and to give more and more guarantees to the armed forces
to convince them of its good faith. Meanwhile, it still shares some of the aspira-
tions of late Ottoman and Turkish liberalism, such as decentralization and less
state control. It draws its sources from an ethnically pluralist society. Finally, its
principle of balance of power with the armed forces remains the same: the double
legitimization of the army, champion of civilization and patriotism, can be coun-
terbalanced only by a superior legitimization—i.e. popular legitimization. The
leader of one of the minor liberal parties, Cem Boyner, explains this as "having a
government which is stronger than the state."10 This imperative necessitates the
enlargement of political participation and representation.
Given those paradoxes, one can easily understand why this camp so strongly
defends a unitary Turkey and is so suspicious toward Kurdish nationalism while at
the same time so willing to have a Kurdish clientele or even to integrate the Kurds
into the system. The cases of Adnan Menderes (prime minister, 1950-60, exe-
cuted in 1961) and Turgut Ozal, two historical figures of Turkish liberalism, as
well as Aydin Menderes (son of Adnan Menderes), Yusuf Bozkurt Ozal (brother
of Turgut) and Cem Boyner (radical liberal leader of the New Democracy Move-
ment) show that the conservative camp is not monolithic and that some of its
members desire a Kurdish representation qua Kurdish, a rather positive condition
according to them, consolidating ties between this minority and the center. One
should also add that some members of this camp (namely Ozal and Boyner) pro-
posed or propose to found a Second Republic and bury Kemalist symbolism, to
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introduce a large administrative autonomy and largely autonomous regions, as well
as to legalize the banished Kurdish parties.
At the same time, the attachment to the status quo, the fear of the army and
the fragmentation that implies an exaggerated emphasis on the nationalist dis-
course has immobilized this camp, reducing it, at most, to a position of manager
of the crises. Since 1984, the temptation of neutralizing the armed forces by con-
taining them in a civil war and by offering any required financial means has been a
strategy that Ozal until 1990, and Demirel and (filler since 1991, have assumed.
In a similar way, the competition between its leaders also includes the instrumen-
talization of the military threat and an preemption of in the Kurdish issue, as
far as political Islam is concerned. This means that every step toward a political
solution taken by a conservative leader is stopped by the opposition of another
conservative leader. If Mesut Yilmaz, the leader of the MP, makes what is inter-
preted to be an anti-Kemalist proposition, Ciller will become a champion of
Kemalism and vice versa. Even Husamettin Cindoruk, former speaker of the Par-
liament, who is one of the most open-minded liberal politicians, has played this
game. Finally, political survival pushes this camp to alliances with nationalist lead-
ers, as we observed through the rapprochement of (filler to Alparslan Tiirkes,
leader of the NAP, and Biilent Ecevit, leader of the DLP, during the formation of
the minority government in the fall 1995, through the inclusion of figures of the
extreme right (namely Baki Tug and Ayvaz Gokdemir) or those close to the army
(Coskun Kirca) in this government. It is worthy to note that all this happened
shortly after the report prepared by Dogu Ergil was published in the spring of
1995."
The social-democratic parties also face similar paradoxes. On one hand,
they are the organic heirs of the RPP of Mustafa Kemal and still keep its six
principles. On the other hand, they attempt to integrate the claims of a largely
non-Kemalist left as well as the Kurdish left. When they are in government, the
social-democrats give guarantees to the army that open them to claims of being
too far to the left, but they are also obliged to have a Kurdish electorate. In the
1970s, Biilent Ecevit, who espoused nationalist positions, qualified as "racist" the
claim of recognition of Kurdish ethnicity. He was, however, obliged to integrate
Kurdish nationalists (namely Ahmet Turk and Nurettin Yilmaz) both locally and
nationally. That was also the case of the SDP, the social-democratic party of the
1980s, which was led by Erdal Inonii, son of Ismet Inonii, the very Kemalist
second president of the Republic. This party has made concessions to the es-
tablishment and the army and has supported the banning of the Kurdish depu-
ties who participated in the 1989 International Conference on the Kurds, held in
Paris. This exclusion had a very heavy price: the SDP was eradicated from the
Kurdish towns where it was the main political formation. However, during the
1991 elections, it was obliged to accept Peoples Labor Party (PLP) or HEP mem-
bers on its list once again and, in 1994, while in government, it was obliged to
oppose the lifting of the parliamentary immunity of the Democracy Party (DP)
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or DEP deputies. In a similar way, it has published several reports on the Kurdish
issue. All of this, however, did not prevent it from joining the coalition govern-
ment and sharing the responsibly of its Kurdish policy, which was the worst since
1938. It withdrew from the government in the fall 1995, but the reason was not
the Kurdish issue or its minimal program of democratization but, simply, a ques-
tion of survival.
W H Y THE WELFARE PARTY SUCCEEDS W H I L E OTHERS FAIL
The Welfare Party (WP), which has existed as an organized movement since
1971, also faces these paradoxes. It faces Kurdish radicalism, and it is the only po-
litical formation that is clearly designated as an enemy by the army. It is then
obliged, more than other political parties, to manage the susceptibilities of the
armed forces. Moreover, this party did not have a linear trajectory in Kurdistan.
Its ancestor, the National Salvation Party (NSP), entered the Parliament in 1973.
However, it found "its real identity only when it increased its votes" in the Kurd-
ish towns in 1977.12 It obtained 7.8 percent of the vote during the municipal
elections of 1987. Its score was 20 percent in Kurdish towns such as Diyarbakir,
Bingol, Bitlis, Elazig, Siirt, Mus, Van, Adiyaman, Urfa, Agn. In the beginning of
the 1990s it faced a dramatic decline: its alliance of 1991 with the NAP of Turkes
ended its impact in Kurdistan. And, finally, during the 1994 municipal elections,
it earned an overwhelming victory by obtaining almost the totality of the Kurdish
towns.
How can we explain such a victory only three years after such a defeat? The
well known pragmatism of the WP has surely played a role in this success but is
not the sole reason. Moreover, despite a Kurdish nationalist discourse, locally the
WP did not become a "state-party" and even less an antipode of Kurdish radical-
ism, even if it profited from the banishment of the DEP. Quite the contrary, it did
succeed because it espoused some aspirations of the banished Kurdish formations.
Moreover, it succeeded in putting those aspirations in a wider, more universal
register, that of the Muslim brotherhood of the two peoples, a theme that Mus-
tafa Kemal developed in 1919 and 1920. In a similar way, it has used its organic
ties with the Kurdish nationalist movement. We need detailed studies to under-
stand exactly the nature of these ties, but we can, nevertheless, add that the Kurd-
ish revolts in the 1920s and 1930s were largely dominated by religious orders
(tarikats). Nowadays, despite many internal conflicts, those transethnic orders link
Kurdishness to larger political entities. Finally, one should add that locally the WP
is a Kurdified party. It is not implemented by Ankara but is composed of Kurdish
members and in many cases Kurdish nationalists.
A second feature can also explain the success of the WP: It is the only
formation that is perceived, concerning the Kurdish issue and many others, as au-
tonomous from the state. It is the only formation that does not present itself as
Kemalist, even if for legal reasons it cannot adopt a clearly anti-Kemalist position.
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The elaboration of such an image is facilitated by the fact that this party does not
assume any governmental responsibility—in other words, it has free and "clean"
hands. This enables it to develop a radical discourse on the Kurdish issue, as we
observe it in the report prepared by Tayyip Erdogan (current mayor of Istanbul)
in 1992. This report, the most brilliant document of political pragmatism ever
seen in Turkey, allowed the WP to change its position after its very pragmatic
but disastrous alliance of 1991 with Turkish extreme right. This report sug-
gested "to publicly question the official ideology which is based on negation and
assimilation, to defend the necessity to abrogate all the laws that obstruct the
recognition and development of Kurdish culture, to develop a more sensitive pro-
gram than the other political parties on the human rights issue, to send high-level
missions to the region to evaluate rapidly the evolution, to condemn state terror as
much as that of the PKK and to oppose, in an identical way, the Kurdish and
Turkish racism."13
One should add to this capacity of navigating between different poles, com-
bining locally both Turkish and Kurdish nationalism, one last advantage that the
WP possesses: It presents itself as an opposition group that nevertheless has suc-
ceeded in integrating into the system without violence. One can legitimately think
that for some Kurdish political actors, this constitutes a "legalist" alibi and offers
the possibility of policy-making without risk. All these elements explain that the
WP discourse—maybe because it has no real effect and it is not a discourse of po-
litical practice—can be welcomed in the Kurdish regions and at the same time can
be tolerated by the state as long as it remains an opposition party.
KURDISH RADICALISM AND INTEGRATION INTO THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
The WP, however, is in no way a substitution for the Kurdish nationalism
that expressed itself in the 1990s by the formation of the Peoples Labor Party
(HEP) and, later, of the Democracy Party (DEP). Locally, the WP is one of the
expressions of Kurdish radicalism or coexists with it. The current situation for-
bidding any Kurdish legal representation14 should not lead us to erroneous
interpretations: Kurdism was and is a given fact since the 1960s in the Turkish
political arena. Without necessarily representing themselves as radicals, Kurd-
ish nationalists participated, for long decades, in the political game. Their actions
were determined by a double character: on one hand, nationalism or at least some
degree of Kurdishness constituted their common ground and allowed them to
act collectively in some situations.15 On the other hand, they were differentiated
according to the political cleavages that concerned Turkey as a whole and acted as
Turkish political actors. Even when they passed from one party to another, they
acted in conformity with a common pattern of Turkish culture. This explained
their internal divisions and political affiliations. At least three political formations,
the NSP, the JP and the RPP, had their nationalist Kurdish politicians known as
such or even condemned by tribunals for separatism.
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The formation of the HEP and, subsequently, the ban of the DEP, signi-
fied that Kurdish nationalism, already obvious during the popular meetings of the
1960s and on a municipal level in the 1970s, strove to have an organized and legal
form. This also allowed urban radicalism to create a junction with Kurdish politi-
cal actors who were already well integrated into the system, for those actors were
affiliated by past relationships to other political formations. Kurdishness became
a sufficient and solid ground to envisage the creation of a separate organization.
That was also a necessary condition for their own survival. HEP persisted and,
supported by the urban mobilization of 1989-92 and reinforced by this junction,
easily became the major political force especially in the provinces of Mardin and
Diyarbakir and the old Batman province.
However, this radicalism emerged under peculiar conditions in which a
guerrilla movement, the PKK, and not a political opposition, was the reference of
the Kurdish movement. The HEP and later the DEP have suffered from at least
three handicaps. First, they failed in their attempt to invent an identity of their
own. Instead of targeting the position of credible interlocutors of the Kurdish
issue in the Parliament, they proposed only to become a mediator between Ankara
and the guerrillas. This has naturally degraded their image without offering them
the mobilizational capacity of the PKK and a recognition from one of the protag-
onists of the war. Until 1993, at least, the PKK was the most active element in
Kurdistan, both militarily and in the urban centers. This situation reduced the field
of action of the HEP and the DEP, forbidding them to develop independent poli-
cies. The legal structures of the HEP and the DEP coexisted with that of the PKK
and were hoped, at most, to be able to play a political role one day in the future.
These structures are not to be confused with those of the PKK, neither ideologi-
cally nor organically. They distinguished themselves from the PKK in many cases
by their attempts to condemn violence, but they could not prevent being presented
as a legal branch of the PKK. Secondly, the HEP and later the DEP regrouped
different generations and types of political actors. Some of them were already in-
tegrated in the system while some others were brought to the political arena by
urban radicalism. Those generations proposed different patterns of action.
Finally, and more important than everything else, as the HEP before it, the
DEP was the main target of the army, the establishment and the media that could
not tolerate an independent Kurdish representation. Dozens of its members and
one of its deputies have been killed. The DYP, in search of popularity16 just before
the municipal elections of 1994, did not hesitate to sacrifice it for political reasons.
At the same time, the DEP was finally finding international support and could
now more easily present itself as the interlocutor for the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
This process would inevitably lead to the politicization and internationalization of
the debate, which could not be tolerated by the state.
Kurdish radicalism is now largely reduced to a extraparliamentary presence.
But it can easily regroup if a political process to resolve the Kurdish issue were de-
cided. It has its social base, namely in the provinces of Diyarbakir and Mardin
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and, more generally, among the Kurdish intelligentsia. However, its unity seems
to be difficult to perpetuate because of its non-nationalist affiliations (adher-
ence to conservatism or social-democracy, Islamism and Alevism) will become
more important in the future. Moreover, in the perspective of the legalization
of the Kurdish formations, namely of the PKK and the PSK, its electorate or
even cadres will polarize according to those affiliations rather than maintain dis-
tinct partisan structures. The division of the nonarrested members of the DEP
between a few organized formations and initiatives is, from this point of view,
rather significant. If we adopt the hypothesis of a political process of resolution
of the Kurdish issue, we can foresee that those formations, affiliated with other
political parties or not, will seek to negotiate new alliances with Turkish politi-
cal parties.
PARTISAN PAWNS AND THE FUTURE OF THE KURDISH ISSUE IN TURKEY
Finally, it seems necessary to insist on the constraints imposed by the Kurdish issue
on the state and the political system in Turkey. The analysis of these constraints
necessitates two remarks. First, in the current situation, the Kurdish issue does not
threaten the survival of the Turkish state. This survival is assured by the existence
of the army and a suprapolitical establishment, commanding the bureaucracy and
almost entirely dominating urban Kurdistan. Moreover, by combining protection
and coercion as well as redistribution, the state disposes of a legitimacy that goes
far beyond partisan division and that covers a large part of the Turkish-Sunni
population, including the electorate of the WP. The management of the legislative
domain is then not so difficult. Only a victory of WP (and in the perspective that
this party challenges openly and concretely Kemalist symbolism) would seem to be
able to change the situation and provoke a direct intervention of the army.
Nevertheless, it is no longer possible to discuss the Kurdish issue in Turkey
only in the terms of the survival of the state. We have also to take into considera-
tion other factors: the legitimization mechanisms and constraints that assure the
durability of the state are not given once and for all. The legitimization depends
more than ever on the enlargement of redistribution whose failure provokes large
social protest. It also depends on the credibility of the so-called military solution.
If the Kurdish war enabled the army to have military experience, the absence of a
notable victory in one decade has created a problem of credibility, including the
military field stricto sensu, pushing some high-ranking officials to evoke the in-
efficacy of the military solution. Moreover, in Turkey as elsewhere, the state is
not a monolithic bloc. The army, which is probably the most homogenous corps
of the state is not sheltered from internal contradictions and the dynamics of cen-
trifugal groups. The last years of Turkish military history are marked by mysteri-
ous deaths, such as those of Es,ref Bitlis and Cem Ersever, and mini-coups that
provoked open polemics and insults between the armed forces in the press. The
war against the Kurds has aggravated these conflicts.
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One should also remember that the Kurdish dynamic is not the only one
that can bring violent protest. Political Islam and Alevism also proved that, when
excluded, they are able to act in a similar way and weaken the immunity of the
center.17 The current management of the Kurdish crisis and, in a more discrete
way, of the Alevi question, by the transfer of the "protection" from the state to the
local communities over large militarized regions has allowed the state to enlarge
its support but has provoked, in many places, dynamics that it cannot control.
Moreover, the repercussions of the Kurdish war enlarged the Kurdish "political
periphery" and implemented it in the big cities of the country. This can, accord-
ing to a very traditional pattern, also reduce the immunity of the center, give birth
to violent protest or, at least, weaken social democratic and conservative poles.
Without giving a dichotomic explanation to the state and the political
system, one should admit that they are not exactly the same thing. The long his-
tory of pluralism in Turkey shows that the political system can assure its own
durability against the state, with three conditions. First, it must be able to create
a favorable power balance with the army and the establishment. Second, in order
to do this, it must integrate the forces that are excluded from the system and trans-
form them into electorates. Third, the durability of the system depends on the
creation of a strong partisan structure, namely, Islamist, leftist and conservative.
The current fragmentation of the system in Turkey can then be interpreted as the
prelude of new recompositions. But these recompositions necessitate, once again,
an enlargement of the electoral bases, among them the Kurdish base.
Finally, the impossibility of facing a multiplicity of protest (Kurdish, Alevi
and Islamist) and the complex interplay that is the result of this multiplicity
engenders an imperative for the political system: to integrate all of them on the
basis of a new social and political contract. The above-mentioned elements (weak-
ening of the immunity of the center and the internal contradiction of the state) can
be particularly dangerous for the political system. In the end, it is not the army but
the civilians who pay for such a crisis. It is a peculiar logic that it is the armed forces
who during crisis evict civilians, who are the only ones able to proffer to opponents
the haven that is necessary to reimpose state authority via the armed forces.
Other constraints can be easily managed by the army, but not by the civil-
ians. Among those constraints one should first of all mention the economic
ones. Obviously, the state, in Turkey as elsewhere in the Middle East,18 is able to
manage a certain level of economic crisis. But this management might be difficult
if a country wants, at the same time, to maintain a pluralist political system. The
Kurdish war now costs on average some $10 billion dollars annually to Turkey; this
figure is almost equal to that of annual deficit of external commerce. The con-
tinuation of the war will only be possible at the price of the militarization of the
economy. Economic structures and redistribution networks of countries like Iraq
and Syria can allow such a militarization, but that is not the case of Turkey, which
has a strong private sector that the state does not control. For the private sector
such a militarization implies making a larger contribution to the war and partici-
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paring in the process of resource allocation. However, in Turkey as elsewhere, the
"patriotism" of the bourgeoisie has its limits. The continuation of the war has al-
ready provoked important reactions and explains the hostile declarations of the
TUSIAD, the leading businessmen's association of Turkey, as well as the report of
the Chamber of Commerce. Shortly after this report asking for a political solu-
tion, Sakip Sabanci, representing the second most prominent family in Turkish
economic life, presented his report containing the same conclusion.19 The most
prominent individual in economic circles, Rahmi K09, explained that he, too, sup-
ported the initiative of Sabanci. The pressure of the IMF has the same orientation
and demands that Turkey reduce its public expenses, namely military spending.
Finally, the difficult strikes of September and October 1995 have demonstrated
that civilians cannot avoid enlarging the redistribution without considering the risk
of the mobilization of the working class. It is obvious that a civilian government
does not have the capacity to easily ban the strikes and to impose the heavy bill of
economic restructuring as the military regimes of 1971 and 1980 were able to do.
One must also mention the importance of Western pressure, which can be
explained more by the impact of the Kurdish issue in Germany than by the sup-
posed pro-Kurdish attitude of Western countries. The growing American pressure
can of course not be explained by the presence of a Turkish diaspora but is based,
paradoxically, on a pro-Turkish policy (the necessity of having a stable Turkey).
These pressures could remain manageable for a military regime that is not ac-
countable before an electorate but not for civilian politicians. The reason for this
is quite simple: since 1946, Western support and the external credibility of the
country have always been an element of legitimization of civil governments inside
Turkey. It is true that Western pressures can give birth to nationalist and populist
campaigns in Turkey, but these campaigns support the big political parties and
only reinforce the impact of the extreme right, such as the NAP.
The above-mentioned paradoxes and constraints permit us to conclude that the
future of the Kurdish issue depends on the evolution of the political system. In a
similar way, we can postulate that the three processes of integration—those of the
Kurdish movement, political Islam and Alevism—go hand in hand. The triple in-
tegration is problematic, but the political system has, in principle, enough resources
to realize it and its survival depends on it. Beyond this conclusion, however, the
future of the Kurdish issue and that of Turkish political life remains unpredictable.
The above-mentioned constraints, the multiple attempts to start a political process
that we observed during the early 1990s, the limits of the military solution, which,
with the departure of the general staff Dogan Giires,, its architect and main de-
fender, become obvious, and the latest initiatives of the businessmen are the signals
of a change of course.
One should also notice that the Kurdish issue per se did not allow the armed
forces to contest the legitimacy of the pluralist political system. It is true that the
nonshared responsibility that they had in the management of the Kurdish issue
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would delegitimize a more heavy presence of the armed forces on the political
arena. However, one cannot exclude such a possibility in the future. The presence
of two other formations claiming integration, Alevism and political Islam, as well
as the reinforcement of the NAP, which enables us to foresee a period of violence
as in the 1970s, are important elements that we have to take into consideration.
These elements can naturally change the data of the Kurdish issue.
Turkey faces, once again in its history, a crossroads between two options.
The election of 1995 can determine the choice that it will make. Nevertheless, one
point can already be given as guaranteed: This choice will also determine the tra-
jectories of Turkey in the year 2000.
EPILOGUE
This chapter was written at the end of October 1995. Less than two months later,
on 24 December 1995, parliamentary elections were held in Turkey. Their results
confirmed the analysis put forth in this chapter, namely the continuing frag-
mentation of the conservative and social-democratic poles.20 The WP continued
its ascension but without being able to form a majority in the Turkish National
Assembly.
The elections demonstrated a continued momentum for political mobiliza-
tion in Kurdistan. Kurdish radicalism showed a remarkable capacity to overcome
the judicial restrictions imposed upon it by the state and a certain psychologi-
cal moroseness. The main Kurdish formations formed a bloc behind the PDP
(HADEP). This bloc, which was supported by the extraparliamentary Turkish
leftist organizations, obtained 4.1 percent of the total vote.21 In some provinces the
PDP obtained a very high vote: 46.7 percent in Diyarbaktr; 22 percent in Mardin;
26 percent in §irnak and Siirt; 27.7 percent in Van; 37.4 percent in Batman; and
54.3 percent in Hakkari.22
These results can be interpreted as proof of the continuing mobilizational
capacity of Kurdish nationalism; they also indicate its limits in the obtaining
conditions. In fact, the PDP (HADEP) succeeded well in some Kurmanji-Sunni
homogenous regions.23 Elsewhere its impact seems to be limited or even quite
poor. For example, it obtained 18 percent in Agn; 7 percent in Bingol; 10 percent
in Bitlis; 4 percent in Elazig; 1 percent Erzincan; 6 percent in Erzurum; 6.7 per-
cent in Kars: 2.8 percent in Malatya; 2.7 percent in Maras; 17 percent in Mus and
Tunceli; and 13.6 percent in Urfa. In most of these towns the WP also received
quite high number of votes: 30 percent in Agn; 51.6 percent in Bingol; 28.8 per-
cent in Bitlis; 42 percent in Elazig; 32 percent in Erzincan; 38 percent in Er-
zurum; 37 percent in Malatya; 27.8 percent in Siirt; and 26 percent in Urfa. The
other political parties had rather poor showings in the Kurdish provinces.
Finally, one should add that the PDP (HADEP) had little impact in the
Turkish towns where large Kurdish communities reside. It received only 6.7 per-
cent of the vote in Adana; less than 3 percent in Ankara; and less than 4 percent
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in Istanbul and Izmir. This poor showing seems to indicate that the metropolitan
cities continue to have an important integrative function that give birth to new po-
litical formations. This does not, however, mean the end of Kurdish radicalism in
the big cities of Turkey. It means, rather, that in spite of emotional, cultural and,
in some case, economic mobilization, the politics of these towns are shaped by
other socio-political determinants.
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8T H E N E W DEMOCRACY
MOVEMENT IN TURKEY:
A RESPONSE TO LIBERAL
CAPITALISM AND KURDISH
ETHNONATIONALISM
Robert Olson and Yiicel Bozdaglioglu
X he Turkish Republic, created in the aftermath of World War I when the
international economic order was dominated by Keynesian economics, established
the Turkish economy on a Keynesian foundation.1 Lacking sufficient capital ac-
cumulation for industrial investment, Keynesian economic policies encouraged the
emergence of a national bourgeoisie. Statist economic policies also affected po-
litical life. Established by Kemal Mustafa Atatiirk, the leader of the Turkish
nationalist forces in the War of Independence, the Republican People's Party
(RPP) dominated Turkish political life up to the late 1940s. The RPP allocated
the country's resources to create a national economy.2 In the 1940s, under Ismet
Inonii, Ataiirk's successor, who was the leader of the RPP and the president of
Turkey until 1950, Turkey experienced a civil revolution that witnessed the emer-
gence of party politics despite these seeming changes. In the 1950 election, the
Democrat Party (DP), led by Adnan Menderes, won a majority in parliament and
came to power. During the DP period, the bourgeoisie continued to be protected
by government regulations. After DP rule was ended in 1960 by a coup d'etat,
Turkey experienced two more military coups—in 1971 and 1980—which the
bourgeoisie applauded because the 1960 constitution, as far as they were con-
cerned, had granted too many rights to workers and unions. These rights were
thought to be the causes for the anarchy and terror that plagued Turkey in the
1970s, justifying the 1980 coup. The 1980 coup became the cornerstone of sub-
sequent Turkish economic and political life. In the 1983 elections, new actors
appeared on the Turkish political scene. Supported by the generals, Turgut Ozal,
leader of the Motherland Party (MP), came to power and dominated Turkish po-
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litical life for seven years. In many ways this was the most interesting period in
Turkish political and economic life since DP rule in the 1950s, when Turkey
experienced substantial transformation in its economy. Under Ozal, Turkey strove
to change from an import-substitution to a market-based economy. These ef-
forts to liberalize the economy created huge challenges. Since it did not have
enough capital accumulation and knowledge to build a market-based economy,
income distribution was so distorted as to create egregious imbalances. During
this period the bourgeoisie maintained a low profile, a role they had taken his-
torically in the political arena, preferring instead to let their representatives in-
fluence politicians.
In the 1970s changes emerged in both the domestic and global arenas caus-
ing transformations in Turkey similar to those in European countries such as Italy
and even in the United States. In these countries, the bourgeoisie began to par-
ticipate increasingly in politics from the 1980s onward. Ross Perot in the United
States, Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Cem Boyner in Turkey are examples of these
trends. First, they represent the bourgeoisie and, second, their economic policies
are similar. They defend the principles of neo-liberalism and globalism, whose
principles were extolled by Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret
Thatcher in England. Their movements appeared as these countries' economies
began to experience difficulties. Neo-liberalism flourished as it coincided with the
collapse of communism.
The generals who brought a halt to party politics in Turkey with their 12
September 1980 coup probably lacked a firm notion of the policies they wanted
to implement. When they put an end to the activities of the rightists and leftists,
whom they accused of terrorism prior to the coup, they also put an end to those
parties that represented deeply rooted leftist and rightist mainstreams in Turkish
political life. Two respected Turkish journalists have commented that the generals
"thought they were creating a new political arena in Turkey. And even though new
parties, which were continuations of the old ones, were established and even won
in elections and formed governments, Turkish political life would be very differ-
ent from what it had been prior to 12 September."3
However, the generals did not count on the rambunctiousness of Turkish
political life. In less that a decade a coterie of different political parties would take
charge of the government. Fourteen years after that interval and eleven years after
the return to democracy under terms that the new constitution specified, the
existing parties have been unable to determine their functions and roles. Political
parties in Turkey are desperately trying to find a  new role for themselves. The
major parties in the ruling coalition since 1991—the True Path Party (TPP) and
the Social Democrat People's Party (SDP) and the major opposition MP—-have
still not found their balance. However, after several elections, parties such as the
Motherland Party (MP), the True Path Party (TPP), the Social Democratic Party
(SDP), the Welfare Party (WP) and National Action Party (NAP) have emerged
as major players.4
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE NEW DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT
The NDM, which officially became a party in December 1994, is the twenty-third
political party to participate in current political life. Although it is a new party in
the political arena, it has attracted considerable media and public attention. Its
radical program stressed the importance of privatization and a smaller state and
the necessity of closing of the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs). The MP at-
tempted to include as many compatible political tendencies as possible into a
single party. In this process, Turgut Ozal also attempted to tackle major economic
challenges and, as a corollary, to demolish the differences among ideologies. This
platform appealed to many voters and the party won a majority in the 1983 elec-
tions. But its popularity depended on other factors as well. After the 1980 coup
d'etat, all political parties were banned and several others were created artificially.
This gave the MP a great advantage vis-a-vis the other parties. It succeeded in its
aim to include diverse tendencies in a single party since there was no other party
or parties for politicians to join. However, this attempt to bridge differences
created tensions within the MP when radical Islamists joined the party. This
was to be the main handicap of the MP. By 1994, two other parties, similar to
the NDM, began to appeal to these same groups. Like the MP of Turgut Ozal,
the NDM advocates privatization, closing and selling of SEEs and a smaller cen-
tral government.
In the political arena, as distinct from the economic arena, the NDM's focus
on the Kurdish problem accounts for both its current popularity and the strong
opposition it has generated. Its accusations that the state is responsible for the
Kurdish problem has brought strong opposition from right wing nationalist par-
ties, parties with which Boyner once sympathized. On occasion Boyner has been
interrogated by the State Security Court, the watchdog on any alleged seditious
activities against the state, especially any activities.that seem to support the Kurd-
ish nationalist movement.5
The difference between the NDM and the MP is most notable in the struc-
ture of its party membership. In spite of its aim to include all political persuasions,
the NDM has been unable to attract the Islamists, but it does include Kurds,
which the MP did not, at least, up to late 1995. According to Ismet Giritli, "As
was the case in the establishment of the MP, it is evident that the NDM's goal is
to put the rightists, leftists, nationalists, traditionalists and, in addition to all of
these, the Kurdish nationalists in the same pot."6 Furthermore, there are some
people called "Second Republicans" in the movement who are known for their
strong opposition to the current structure of the state, arguing that it is not based
on a "civilian" constitution. They maintain that because the current republic was
founded by commanders of the War of Independence, it does not represent the
real will of the Turkish people; furthermore the state was formed according to the
principles of state ideology defined as Kemalism. Because of this, Kemalism must
be demolished and replaced with a new ideology in a second republic. Boyner
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stressed that, "We are neither communists, fascists nor Kemalists."7 The Second
Republic's leaders and theoreticians advocate the necessity of a new constitution
and a new state based on principles determined by the Turkish people not Kemal-
ist ideology.
There are many interesting names in the party, some of them worth noting.
Cem Boyner is a businessman and a former president of TUSIAD, the leading
organization of Turkish businessmen; Asaf Savas Akat, an economics professor
known as an advocate of the Second Republic; Cengiz Candar, a journalist and
former sympathizer of the leftist Turkish Workers' Party (TWP); Memduh
Hacioglu, a businessman and former president of the Istanbul Chamber of In-
dustry (ISO); S, erif Mardin, a political scientist and currently chair of the religious
studies department at American University in Washington, D.C.; Ziilfu Dicleli, a
theoretician of the NDM and a former member of the Turkish communist party
(TCP); Etyen Mahcupyan, a former member of the TWP and a Turkish citizen
of Armenian origin; Canan Balkir, an economics professor; Umit Firat, a Kurdish
intellectual and publisher; Sedat Uhan, a retired brigadier general who is known
for his opposition to former President Kenan Evren (1983-91); Mehmet Emin
Sever, a member of parliament from the province of Mus and a former member of
the Democracy Party (DP), a Kurdish party; Hiilagu Balcilar, a former president
of an office of the NMP in Adana; Mustafa Pacal, a unionist and the president
of Hak-Is Union; and Mehmet Altan, a well known journalist and an advocate of
the Second Republic. Altan recently left the NDM, accusing it of being a leader-
dominated party.8
It is evident from the list of the founders that the NDM is an elite move-
ment, even though it professes equality among all supporters including those with
questionable legal status. There are no delegates and no veto mechanism. Al-
though it advocates a democratic resolution to the Kurdish problem, only 7 percent
of its votes are from the Southeast; 5 percent from the Black Sea region; 9 percent
from the Aegean Sea region; 6 percent from the Mediterranean Sea region: and
11 percent from Central Anatolia.9
The NDM has been successful in attracting people from different ideolo-
gies except for the Islamists, Kemalists and, some argue, workers or represen-
tatives of workers. There are several reasons why few Islamists join the NDM,
the most important being the manner in which Cem Boyner characterized the
prophet Muhammad. He reportedly said, "We must exceed both Muhammad and
Ataturk."10 After this rankling remark, Cengiz Candar, a journalist and a former
member of the Turkish Workers' Party (TWP), was delegated to smooth relations
with the Islamists. Candar visited some religious figures and stressed that Boyner
was very willing to speak with them.
Islamist politicians hesitate to join the NDM, whose future is uncertain,
when the WP is increasing in popularity. In addition, there is a belief among the
Islamists that the NDM has been formed to prevent the growth of the WP. Fur-
thermore, there are not many Islamist politicians who believe in the economic
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liberalism that is the backbone of the NDM's program. The belief that the NDM
is supported by the media, whom the Islamists do not trust, diminishes the sup-
port from this group. Other Islamist groups known as "liberal-Islamists" also want
little to do with the NDM and prefer to join other parties such as the Democrat
Party (DP) of Aydin Menderes, the New Party (NP), and the Reborn Party (RP).
In fact, these groups were actually sympathetic to the NDM as they viewed it as a
second MR But Boyner's derogatory words about the prophet Muhammad were
exploited by a wide range of Islamists and they distanced themselves from the
movement. Another reason the Islamists look warily at the NDM is its liberal eco-
nomic agenda.
The NDM's program regarding religion is not entirely opposed to the ideas
advocated by the Islamists. The NDM emphasizes separation of religion and state.
Cem Boyner proposes that any member of parliament who wants to take an oath
on the Quran should be allowed to do so and advocates that state control over re-
ligion should be lifted and left to the religious societies {cemaats). While he asserts
that secularism is a fundamental principle of modern and democratic Turkey, he
qualifies this by saying that "under the present conditions, secularism should be re-
defined: all religious education should be in the hands of the public."11 Cem
Boyner does not appear to perceive the religious-based WP as a danger to Turkish
democracy. He thinks religious movements are increasing in the world because
people are seeking spiritual sustenance in the wake of the collapse of the bi-polar
world system. He stresses that in Turkey religious movements are largely reactions
to the collapse and corruption of the current political system, and he views the
popularity of the WP as an answer to this corruption. Such ideas frighten secular-
ists, who sympathized with Boyner in the beginning, but now fear his ideas and his
attempts to gather Muslims under the NDM umbrella.
Businessmen seem to be divided into two groups concerning the NDM.
While the Sabanci family, which is one of the leading business families, supports
the NDM, other businessmen are disturbed by its economic agenda. In a widely
circulated interview, Sakip Sabanci said, "We support Cem Boyner."12 Another
indicator of the Sabancis' support is the membership in the NDM of Aziz Koy-
luoglii, who is the president of one of the Sabancis' companies and very close to
the family. Giiler Sabanci, the daughter of Sakip, has also expressed enthusiasm
for the NDM. The K09 family's position, however, is different. One newspaper
account attributes the silence of the K09 family to the fact that they do not like the
NDM's antiprotectionist policies; many of the K05 family enterprises benefit from
those policies. It must be noted, however, that the Sabanci and K09 empires
do cooperate in certain undertakings. But Boyner has declared, "I am part of this
order and I gained a lot from this order, but now I oppose it. This order must
be changed and we are ready to change it. Businessmen who are opposed to the
Customs Union with Europe and against liberalism are those who are fed by the
current order."13 Such remarks are sure to send shivers through businessmen and
industrialists still prospering from protectionist tariffs and taxes. It seems that
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many businessmen who support the NDM are also against wasting resources to
solve the Kurdish problem, especially Ankara's war against the PKK, by military
means. They want the resources spent on the war, estimated to amount to some 6
to 7 billion dollars a year since the end of the Gulf war, to be devoted to economic
development.14
From the view point of the Kemalists, the NDM is not an attractive move-
ment to join. They do not like Boyner's criticism of the deficiencies of the
Kemalist legacy; indeed, Kemal is so revered that insulting him is a crime under
current Turkish law. Boyner, however, aims to substitute Kemalism and its em-
phasis on statism with the ideology of Western liberalism: "If you look at the six
principles of Kemalism, you notice one word is missing—democracy."15 Asaf
Savas Akat, an economist and strong advocate of the Second Republic and who
is on the NDM's board of advisors, adds that the lack of the democracy prin-
ciple is at the heart of Turkey's dilemma.16 Celal Boratav supports Akat's analysis,
adding that "the NDM says that it is the continuation of all movements in the
past that provided Turkey with important services. While they are content with
everybody else, their main enemies are the Kemalists and the socialists who rec-
ognize the Turkish Revolution."17
In the foreign press and in diplomatic circles, the NDM attracts wide at-
tention. It is evident that European and American media and those close to
government circles and members of governments themselves are interested in and
support the new movement. Time magazine mentioned Cem Boyner as one of the
world's one hundred youngest leaders. Comparing Boyner with Silvio Berlusconi
of Italy, it declared that "Cem Boyner changed has changed the political agenda
in Turkey."18 The Los Angeles Times suggested that Cem Boyer might fill the gap in
Turkish politics after the death of Ozal in 1993 and that Boyner was trying to
wake up the Turkish people before the ethnic and religious conflicts in regions near
Turkey inundate the country.19 Boyner has spoken to the European Parliament as
well as the foreign minister of Germany and other leaders of European gov-
ernments. These meetings increased dramatically in the three months prior to
24 December 1995 general elections in Turkey.
What are the reasons that Europeans are so interested in the NDM? It
seems European leaders perceive the NDM as a new element in a changing Turk-
ish political structure. According to Hadi Uluengin, a journalist for the daily
Hurriyet, the NDM leader speaks the same language as Europe, frequently punc-
tuating his speeches with the words freedom, democracy and liberal economy.20
Second, Europe did not want to make things too difficult for Turkey on the eve of
its admission to the European Customs Union (ECU): a policy that paid off when
Turkey was admitted to the ECU by an overwhelming vote on 13 December
1995.21 Turkey even received support from former radicals such an Daniel Cohn-
Bendit, who noted, "Secularization of Europe took 200 hundred to 250 years. By
the time stability had come, Europe had paid a heavy price. Now Europe does not
want to experience the same problems because of Islam. This frightens Europe.
160 / THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
For all of these reasons, Europe sees the NDM as a new formation that will allow
smoother relations with Europe." According to a senior official with the U.S. ad-
ministration, Boyner "appears to have the charisma and willpower, but he still
needs time. Officials in Washington who follow Turkey closely believe that some-
one like Boyner, under current conditions in Turkey, could think of success only
after some five to seven years of organizing and campaigning."22
It is clear, despite the diverse reactions, the NDM has attracted attention.
What are the reasons for its appeal vis-a-vis other political parties? Some claim the
NDM is protected by the government to prevent the further rise of the WP.
Others claim that it is supported by certain government circles to enable safe dis-
cussion of the Kurdish problem in the public arena.
There are two major academic theories regarding the emergence of the
NDM as a political force in Turkey, one that is domestic and one that is inter-
national. In order to discuss these two theories it is necessary to examine the
NDM program.
THE N D M ' S PROGRAM
The NDM's chief objective in the newly emerging world order is to align Turkey
with the league of Western industrial and capitalist democracies. The NDP ad-
vocates ending human rights abuses, especially against the Kurds, allowing more
cultural freedom to the Kurds and lifting state control over religion and the econ-
omy. These radical ideas made the NDM more attractive to the intelligentsia in
spite of strong opposition from nationalist right wing circles, and some armed
forces commanders and the former Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The NDM thinks Turkey can develop faster if its political structure is based
on three fundamental freedoms: speech, religion and enterprise.23 What the NDM
means by the freedom of enterprise is a reduced role for the state in the economy.
The NDM's economic program reflects a pure liberalism. It emphasizes the
necessity of a reduced state. According to its theoreticians, the state must not
engage in any economic enterprises. Its fundamental job must be to organize eco-
nomic activities and economic life in general. It must transfer this responsibility to
the private sector. In order to do this, the SEEs must be closed or sold; privati-
zation is the most urgent task. The NDM thinks the market economy is the
only way to increase productivity. Boyner says, "We must remove political sub-
ventions, customs, immunities and protectionist regulations. We have to privatize
immediately and the state's role in the economy must be reduced. It must leave all
economic activities to citizens and private enterprises. On the other hand, the state
must be a big state in terms of justice, education and social security."24
According to the NDM's program, when the world stepped into a new
epoch in the 1980s, Turkey had serious problems. Democratic institutions could
not produce solutions. On the contrary, all institutions were corrupt: "Under these
conditions, our country went into an extraordinary era. In this era, some radical
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decisions were taken. Even though it had no democratic base, it has been success-
ful. It has been noted that Turkey could compete with European countries in a free
market economy, but that the democratic institutions to encourage these develop-
ments were unable to be formed."25 These positions make it clear that the NDM
does not think of itself as simply a movement for a refurbished democracy; rather,
it is a new movement for a new democracy. It is the first mainstream political
movement in Turkish politics to advocate the dismantling of Kemalism. Unlike
other political parties, at least in 1994, the NDM also stresses the connection be-
tween the political economy and the Kurdish problem, a problem to which the
NDM proffers a solution.
The NDM's approach to the Kurdish problem is the most significant reason
that the NDM has attracted attention from all groups in Turkey. As two respected
journalists have noted, "Neither Boyner nor any of his closest circle are of Kurd-
ish origin, but the argument is that once this problem is solved other solutions
will follow. No one should preach to another on motherland, nation, flag or reli-
gion. . . . A solution to the Kurdish problem can only be found in Parliament."26
The NDM views the Kurdish problem as Turkey's most serious challenge,
and Boyner has promised to solve it peacefully. The NDM states emphatically that
the Kurdish problem is largely a matter of identity.27 In the view of its theoreti-
cians, the ongoing Kurdish problem and, especially, the war against the PKK is not
just a Kurdish problem but a Turkish problem: "Today, Turks cannot solve the
Kurdish problem, nor can Kurds. This problem can only be solved by both Turks
and Kurds together. Indeed, there is not a Kurdish problem in Turkey. The Kurds
only want to speak and write in their own language, that is, they want what they
have now."28 The NDM proposes several ways to deal with the Kurdish problem.
First, the Kurdish-Turkish and the Sunni-Alevi splits must be bridged; second,
Turks must accept the Kurdish reality and Kurdish culture; third, all players must
engage in dialogue; and, four, the "terrorist" PKK must be separated from the
Kurdish problem. The NDM is not opposed to the establishment of a Kurdish po-
litical party. Boyner "believes that the Kurdish reality should be accepted, but that
Kurds must recognize that Turkey is a country shared by everyone and that it is
indivisible." If that is acknowledged, then the Kurdish language, culture and edu-
cation should be developed. Boyner accepts the Democracy Party (DP) as playing
a crucial role in fulfilling a historical role in creating a dialogue between Turks and
Kurds: "I cannot think of Parliament without the DP. It is not because I agree with
them. Even though they say the exact opposite of what I say, I do fight for their
right of free speech."29 According to Boyner, there is no problem in giving rights
to the Kurds individually, but there is a problem in recognizing them as a national
identity. In his view, Turkey can solve this problem by granting all democratic
rights to the Kurds and by recognizing the Kurdish reality.
Boyner emphasizes that Turkey has reached a point of no return with regard
to the Kurdish problem. He compares the Palestine-Israel, South African and
Britain-Ireland problems with the Kurdish problem. He sees the autonomy agree-
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ment signed by the PLO and Israel and Mandela's success in South Africa as ref-
erences for Turkey. He emphasizes that these developments demonstrate that even
the most difficult problems can be resolved with good will and dialogue.30 In one
of his interviews, the NDM spokesman stated that he would meet anyone,
including Abdullah Ocalan, leader of the PKK, if the PKK would stop its "ter-
rorism." "When I give the example of the PLO and Israel," said Boyner, "I mean
the circumstances in the world can change. The PLO was established in 1964 and
recognized by the United Nations in 1974. Now the PLO is not what it was in the
past; neither is Israel. They changed and they decided to solve their problems
peacefully, i.e. condition change. Today the PKK is a terrorist organization, but I
don't know what is going to happen in the future.31
This implies that the NDM is ready to make an agreement with the PKK
as long as it does not resort to force. The NDM currently describes the PKK as a
terrorist and fascist organization: "The PKK is a fascist movement, and you cannot
evaluate this organization in the context of the right of speech or any other right.
Any organization which uses terrorism to reach its goal is dirty."32 The NDM's
ideas regarding the Kurdish problem brought strong reactions. Its radical thoughts
about the Kurdish problem (which as time passes seem increasingly less radical in
Turkey, as even mainstream political parties advocate the necessity of solving and
recognizing the challenge of Kurdish nationalism) brought harsh criticism from
the nationalist right wing parties and some military commanders, who accused
the NDM of being a Kurdish party. The NDM rejects all such charges. It denies
being a Kurdish party, describing itself as a party that believes in free and public
expression.33 On the other hand, the PKK and Kurdish nationalists characterize
the NDM as an instrument of the bourgeoisie class. Abdullah Ocalan has stated
that "The Turkish business class created a new party to solve the Kurdish prob-
lem. It is interesting that the Turkish people cannot find any solutions, but that
Turkish businessman can. They see a solution in which we can be in association
with Turkey and that is proper for us. Because they are the class in production and
know very well what they are doing."34
The NDM theoreticians think there are many reasons for the party to prof-
fer solutions to the Kurdish problem. The question is: Why is the NDM so radical
about the Kurdish problem when its position may cause it to lose support? As
mentioned above, the NDM sees the Kurdish problem as a matter of identity. But
why does it concentrate on the identity problem and ignore the socioeconomic dis-
equilibrium that fosters the growth of Kurdish nationalism? The NDM program
asserts that the new Turkish republic was founded on the ashes of the Ottoman
Empire, which was multicultural and multi-ethnic. Due to the fear that the new-
bom republic could not be protected if the new government were to recognize all
languages and cultures, a new official ideology was developed. Except for the mi-
norities recognized by the Lausanne Treaty, signed in 1923, the ruling class aimed
to melt all cultures in the majority Turkish culture. However, this effort, the NDM
stresses, has not been successful. Today the Kurdish problem endangers the de-
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mocratic life in Turkey. The NDM manifesto states that the Kurdish problem can
only be solved by Turks and Kurds themselves. It also declares that the Turkish
government must grant rights to Kurds and allow them to establish a Kurdish
party to improve their cultural and societal conditions.35
The NDM stresses three approaches to the Kurdish problem: a solution
must be reached democratically, prejudices must be eradicated and both Turkish
and Kurdish extremist nationalism must be curtailed. It is important to prevent
increased Kurdish support for the PKK. The problem of identity plays an impor-
tant role in the NDM's program. Etyen Mahcupyan, one of the theoreticians of
the NDM and, interestingly, a Turkish citizen of Armenian ethnicity, points out
that the NDM brought the question of culture to the fore when it was established.
According to Mahcupyan, the Kurdish problem rose from the concept of citizen-
ship specified in the constitution: "We must find a new citizenship concept. We
have to define it again to include all identities in Turkey. These problems, in fact,
are not only that region's [here he refers to the southeastern region of Turkey,
which is predominately Kurdish and where war between the government and
the PKK has raged for the past decade] problem, but all of Turkey's. These prob-
lems are the consequences of certain conditions. When these consequences meet,
conflict of identity results. Problems going on in the East and Northeast have also
emerged."36
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Since its establishment the NDM has appealed to different political groups. In
order to understand the emergence of the NDM, one must also look at the do-
mestic and international variables that impelled the NDM to emerge on the
Turkish political scene. Internally, the NDM should be evaluated in terms of the
structures and roles of the current parties. But it should also be studied in terms
of the changing structure of the Turkish economy and the increase in the rise of
Kurdish nationalism since the Gulf war in 1991.37 The emergence of the NDM
must also be evaluated in terms of international economic and political theories
that influence the NDM's program.
After the coup d'etat in 1980, Turkey witnessed fundamental transfor-
mations in its economy and political life that created problems at the macro
level. Efforts to transform Turkey from an import-substitution to a market-based
economy created many problems in social and political life. Distorted income dis-
tribution and corrupt political life increased support for Islamist movements and
parties, especially the WP. Heightened Kurdish nationalism gave rise to height-
ened Turkish nationalism and chauvinism. As a result, Islamist movements in
general have gained momentum during the last decade. The fear that current po-
litical parties lack balance and were increasingly unable to keep pace with the
changing world order brought businessmen into political life. According to
Boyner, "Political parties in Turkey do not reflect social opposition. This is obvi-
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ous from the votes they obtain in the elections. The party that got most of the
votes still only received 20 percent of the total vote. This means that 80 percent
of the people do not support that party. Since people are not satisfied with current
parties, they indicate their unhappiness by giving support to the Islamist parties
like the WP. The NDM has been representing the social opposition since its
establishment. This is the main strength of the NDM."38
There is nothing new in the fact that businessmen influence political life in
Turkey and the Parliament; this is increasingly evident since 1950. While the
owners of small and middle-scale firms and provincial businessmen have always
been represented in Parliament, now in the 1990s industrialist and businessmen
seek election to Parliament. Unlike in the past, when they influenced the decisions
of Parliament via their representatives, nowadays they want to influence the deci-
sions of Parliament directly. The daughter of Vehbi Koc, who is perhaps the most
well known businessman in Turkey, became a member of the MR Another busi-
nessman, Besim Tibuk, established the Liberal Party (LP).39 The former president
of TUSIAD, Erdal Kabatepe, is trying to organize a new movement called the
Liberal Movement (LM). Why do all of these wealthy men want to participate in
political life as members of Parliament? The answer seems to be that "they do
not trust their representatives anymore. They realize that politicians are very slow
in making decisions, especially when circumstances demand that they move fast.
They now want to take control of political life and determine the direction of
politics."40
As noted above, the theoreticians of the NDM and some other observers
opine that the NDM phenomenon occurred in Turkish politics as a result of the
changing structure of Turkey and of the world; the changes heightened doubts
among wealthy businessmen that existing parties and politicians were capable of
managing these changes. We argue that the NDM's ideas and program reflect the
consequences of these changes. When writing about the NDM, one must take
three determinants into account: the Turkish economy, the structure of the state
and the Kurdish problem. It is obvious that these variables should be evaluated in
terms of international political economic theory.
As an economic variable, the first determinant is the rules of the new world
order that caused the NDM to emerge in Turkish political life. In the 1920s, there
was only one economic rightist ideology representing the business class, namely,
liberalism, the classic economic theory that advocates no state intervention in
the economy, or at least as little as possible. However, the appearance in the 1920s
and 1930s of nazism in Germany and fascism in Italy, both of which advocated
state intervention in the economy, resulted in new challenges to liberalism. World
War II, in a sense, was the conflict between nazism-fascism and liberalism.
But, paradoxically, it was Keynesianism, the antithesis of liberalism, that
emerged as the dominant economic theory and practice, after the war. Keynes-
ianism advocated that the state play a role in the economy, especially in providing
the means for embarking on new economic "take-off." Keynesianism stood for
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more equal distribution of wealth. Keynesianism was not, however, anticapital.
The period after 1945 was a golden one for Keynesian economics. But beginning
with the 1970s, capitalism underwent a serious crisis. As long as the Keynesian
policies were continued, the economic crisis became worse. Conditions were ripe
for the emergence of a new liberalism with a new theoretical base. By the end of
the 1970s, a world economic system emerged according to this new liberal-right
ideology. This new neo-classical economic theory stresses that the state should
play little or no role in the economy. Unlike Keynesian economics, neo-liberalism
stresses the capacity of enterprising individuals to affect economic change. Neo-
liberalism began to dominate first in the Northern Hemisphere and subsequently
in the Southern Hemisphere and the non-Western world via the IMF and the
World Bank.
Turkey encountered economic neo-liberalism and the accompanying new
right political ideas in the early 1980s during Turgut Ozal's stint as prime minis-
ter. In the 1990s, the NDM and other political formations with more radical liberal
ideas than those of Ozal and his MP party are emerging into the political area.
The NDM synthesizes two tendencies strengthened in the 1980s. One is the
"New Right," whose principles were carried out by the Reagan and Thatcher
governments in the United States and Great Britain and that of the military dic-
tatorships of Latin America, which was brought to Turkey by Ozal and the MR
The other tendency is a post-Marxism, postmodernism, which was adapted by
radical intellectuals affected by the failure of the social movements in Europe in
1968-73 and assimilated by academic environments and the media. In the view of
Ergin Yildizoglu, "These two trends believe that all ideologies are death and that
they themselves are the expression of the era in which there is no other ideology.
What they have in common are ideological hypotheses which are as old as the
capitalist production system itself; society is not the organic sum of individuals,
but the mathematical sum of individuals. Due to this belief, the starting point is
the individual, not society; the free market is the source of democracy and indi-
vidual freedoms. People can only overcome the conflicts among themselves based
on humanitarian values and historical common ethics."41
In Yildizoglu's view, two groups are playing important roles in the ideo-
logical thrust of the NDM. The liberal "new-rightist" wing and the "democratic
liberal-leftist" wing. Boyner and his businessmen supporters are the advocates of
the liberal new-rightist wing. It is clear that the ideas of this wing center on eco-
nomic issues. As mentioned above, this group wants to implement the economic
ideas of neo-liberalism in the Turkish economy. According to them, Turkey is
experiencing a very serious economic crisis. It does no good to approach this
crisis with traditional projects and resolutions; instead they want to transform
Turkey so as to prevent future crises. In order to do this, they want to remove
all barriers that prevent the market from operating freely. Again according to
Yildizoglu, "Gem Boyner sees state intervention as the reason for economic crisis.
In order to overcome or manage the crisis, the state should have no influence in
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the economy."42 This new right wing hypothesizes that the world is made up
of individuals independent from each other and who seek only their own ad-
vantages.
Another group affecting the NDM's program is the "liberal leftists." This
group consists of some scientists and journalists. While the new right wing focuses
mostly on economic issues, the liberal leftist or post-Marxist wing concentrates
heavily on the structure of the state, society and Kurdish issues. They think that
politics should not simply be a struggle for power. Ziilfu Dicleli characterizes the
ideas of the liberal leftists in the following manner: "In the past, as was the case in
other countries, people could be divided into two camps in Turkey and politics was
a struggle for power. However, we have come to the end of this kind of politics.
It is impossible for societies to be divided into two camps: socio-economic, cul-
tural, geographical, ethnic and religious differences are increasing. Furthermore,
there is a propensity for people to act and think individually and relations with the
outside world are being diversified. This brings a process to the fore in which
societies become atomized. Every identity and interest, in order for them to be
accepted by someone else, exaggerated their own interests and identities which
causes tribalism and micro-nationalism."43
Many scholars introduce differences of civilizations, religions, cultures and
identities to describe the current and future evolution of civil society and interna-
tional relations. This post-Marxist, postmodernist wing seems to agree with the
ideas of the inevitable "clash of civilizations" as first expressed by Samuel Hunt-
ington in the United States, who wrote that "the fundamental source of conflict
in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The
great divisions among humankind and the dominating sources of conflict will be
cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but
the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of
different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics."44
The theoreticians of the NDM seem to be heavily affected by the clash of
civilizations theory. Their ideas regarding the Kurdish problem and the religious
issues confirm this. They believe that "to obtain power through the support of one
or several entities in the country increases conflicts and wastes the energy of other
groups which are not in power. Under these circumstances, to insist on the tradi-
tional operation of politics invites threats that may result in the division of the
country. This is what makes the NDM approach new and different. It does not
oppose the multiplicity of the nation. What it wants to prevent is multiplicity
turning into polarization and the mushrooming of conflict. It aims to create a syn-
thesis of different groups within the nation. The NDM's main goal is to establish
a new movement that will gather the representatives of these different groups
under a single roof."45 The democratic liberal leftist wing also recommends that
religion be entirely separate from the state. In one of his interviews Cem Boyner
stated that "people can establish ethnic or religious parties."46
Robert Olson and Yucel Bozdaghoglu \ 167
The NDM stresses that Turkey, whose population is 99 percent Muslim, is
experiencing a religious conflict. The developments that occurred in the province
of Sivas in July 1993 in which some thirty-eight people, most of them Alevi writ-
ers, authors and intellectuals died as a result of Sunni arson of a hotel, must be
prevented. The conditions that gave rise to riots by Alevis and Kurds as a result of
Sunni provocations in the Gaziosmanpasa suburb of Istanbul in March 1995 must
be addressed. The NDM argues that these events occurred because religion, under
the control of the state, is interpreted solely as Sunnism. In so doing, the state ig-
nores peoples who adhere to other sects of Islam, such as the Alevis. The Alevis,
called Alawiyya in Arabic or Nusayriah, are Muslims who comprise approximately
15 to 20 percent of the total population of Turkey of about 63 million. Further,
around 15 to 20 percent of the Kurdish population of 10 to 12 million is Alevi.
Alevis or Alawiyya/Alawites also comprise about 10 to 11 percent of the popula-
tion of Syria. The Alawites are a powerful group in Syria who have controled the
highest echelons of power in Syria since 1970. Hafiz al-Asad, the president of
Syria, is an Alawite/Alevi.47
It is not coincidental that the liberal leftist group believes in the demise of
ideologies and advocates neo-liberalism. This is clear from their ideas regarding
the structure of the state and economy. Boyner explains, "When saying ideology,
if one means liberalism, capitalism, fascism and socialism that have been domi-
nant since the 1800s, we think these ideas have lost their validity. Today the world
is going into a new epoch. Knowledge and communications are shaking up the
world as much as the invention of the machine. We have to form a new viewpoint
that can embrace this new world in a wholeness.,We have this kind of ideology.
In this ideology, there is democracy, freedom, a competitive and productive market
economy and the idea of social equality and justice."48 The main goal of this wing
of the NDM is democracy, even radical democracy. Given that socialism collapsed
and all ideologies are death, there is only one thing left to fight for: democracy.
The liberal leftists seem to be influenced by the ideas of Francis Fukuyama, espe-
cially on the issue of ideologies. In "The End of History?" Fukuyama asserts that
"the passing of Marxism-Leninism first from China and then from the Soviet
Union will mean its death as a living ideology of world historical significance . . .
And the death of this ideology means the growing 'Common Marketization' of
international relations, and the diminution of the likelihood of large-scale con-
flicts between states."49
Ergin Yildizoglu, however, is not altogether convinced by Fukuyama's
theory. Marxism, he points out, expresses a relation between the idea of democ-
racy and equality and the struggle for democracy is ensconced in the "grand
narrative" of socialism. Given that socialism has collapsed, the struggle for democ-
racy cannot be sustained on the hypotheses of Marxism.50 A second theoretical
position of the NDM is the "Post Modernist Situation." This idea was articulated
by the "nouveaux philosophes" in the 1960s based on the rejection of the ideas of
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the Enlightenment. The starting point of this new philosophy was the assertion
that the world is understandable and changeable and that mind and reality are
indeed illusions, a view contrary to the 18th century's Enlightenment tradition.
Jacques Derrida has opined that there is no place for concrete reality.
Language is always a barrier between humans, preventing an empirically based un-
derstanding of reality. Post-Marxism and postmodernism complete the economic
perspective: the post-industrial society envisaged by Daniel Bell, who was one of
the philosophers of the "New Right" during the 1970s. According to this hypothe-
sis, "In the new era, the production of knowledge gains in importance compared
to materialism. These two philosophical and economic perspectives constitute the
Post Modernist Situation of Francois Lyotard, who supports the end-of-history
thesis. The postmodernist thesis spawned the political trend of post-Marxism."51
Post-Marxism developed as a result of the political and moral failure of the
1968 social movements in Europe. Post-Marxism advocates the basic tenets that
postmodernism rejects, i.e. that the basic determinants of societal and political
identities are objective class structures that can be described historically; that pro-
duction relations and economic bases have primary explanatory functions while
politics and ideology are secondary; that the proletariat has objective interests
other than socialism; that only objective interests of classes can be entertained;
and, finally, that capitalism can be transformed into socialism. In this process the
proletariat has a different and more privileged position than others.
The NDM's post-Marxist wing seems to be affected by these postmodernist
and post-Marxist ideas, which seem to affect their ideas concerning the challenge
of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, what they refer to as the Kurdish problem, and
their ideas about the role of ideologies in society.
The NDM is a synthesis of two ideologies: neo-liberalism and post-Marxism.
While neo-liberal principles are dominant factors in economic issues, liberal left-
ist or post-Marxist ideas are evident in their views of the structure of the state and
the Kurdish problem. The NDM aims to include both rightist and leftist princi-
ples. If this is the case, where do we place the NDM in the Turkish political
spectrum? Is it on the left or the right of center? Or is it in the center? In order to
answer these questions, we must look at the current Turkish political line-up.
The TPP-RPP government (prior to the 24 December 1995 election) was a
coalition of center-right and center-left, which grew weaker throughout 1994 and
1995. This became clear in the elections of 21 March 1994, when neither the
center-right nor center-left but rather the more extremist right parties, such as the
nationalist NAP and the Islamist WP, strengthened their power. While the TPP
and the MP received around 40 percent of the vote, the RPP-DLP (Democratic
Left Party) alignment received 27 percent of the vote. Extremist nationalist and
religious parties such as the NAP and the WP got nearly 30 percent. As a result,
the unification of the TPP and the MP came to the fore in the center-right
agenda. The big bourgeoisie especially want an end to this division. Powerful busi-
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nessmen would also like to pull the right-wing NAP more to the center. On the
left side, the DLP, led by Biilent Ecevit, seems to have an advantage and is seen by
many observers as the only party that can stop the rise of the WP. It is not sur-
prising that in late November 1995 former members of the RPP, which at that
time was led by Deniz Baykal, abandoned the party and migrated to Ecevit's DLP.
One of the migrating members was Mumtaz Soysal, an ardent nationalist and re-
spected constitutional specialist who served as foreign minister of the TPP-RPP
government in 1994. On the left side, the DLP is seen by many observers as the
only party that can stop the rise of the WP.
In this context the NDM finds its place in the center-right wing. But the
leaders of the NDM do not want to be classified as rightist or leftist. They stress
that politics must be removed from the quagmire of artificial definitions.52 The
NDM's targeted groups are those that experienced disappointments and failures
with the center right and left parties, namely the Alevis and Kurds.
The NDM is a movement of the center-right that is trying to gather sup-
port from diverse groups. Its primary aim is to harmonize the ideas of neo-
liberalism and of the democratic liberal left in its structure. While neo-liberalism
principles are dominant factors in its economic program, post-Marxism thought
is dominant in its social and cultural agenda, especially with regard to the Kurdish
problem. What worries the theoreticians of the NDM concerning Turkish po-
litical life is the fear that the world is entering a new epoch and that the current
crop of politicians is incapable of meeting the challenges of the new world order.
It is obvious that the NDM movement is a continuation of the Ozal era. Al-
though it has new and radical ideas about the state, economy and the Kurdish
problem, the NDM also has some handicaps.
The main factor that makes the NDM a new and radical political party is
its approach to the Kurdish problem. Its advocacy of a peaceful and political so-
lution to the Kurdish problem was/is appreciated by many observers. But the
NDM sees the problem as a struggle of establishing identity, i.e. as a clash of
identities (rather than of civilizations) between Turks and Kurds. It seems unlikely,
however, that the struggle between Turkish and Kurdish nationalism will abate
without a reallocation of economic resources.
The NDM's analysis of the state also does not fit the facts of Turkey.
Second Republicans in the movement assert that the current state was established
by the generals of the War of Independence and that the Kemalist ideology it
spawned no longer reflects the will of the Turkish people. The NDM's assertion
that the state is under the complete control of the civil-military bureaucracy has
not been true since at least the 1950s. During the establishment of the Turkish
Republic, the civil-military bureaucracy took its place in power along with the big
bourgeoisie and landlords. This was the situation up to 1946, which marks the
beginning of multiparty politics. After 1946, those who directed the state were
big bourgeoisie-industrialists and the large land owners. The balance of power
among these factions changed in the 1970s, and the big bourgeoisie represented
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in TUSIAD gained control of the state.53 The NDM sees the coup d'etats of
1960, 1971 and 1980 as efforts by the civil-military bureaucracy to strengthen its
control of the state, but the NDM theoreticians cannot explain why the bour-
geoisie applauded and even invited all of these coups.
It is clear that the NDM leadership's perception of democracy is based on
individualism. As Korkut Boratav points out, "The perception of democracy based
on individuals and leaving them alone with their rights and responsibilities is
primitive. The main mechanism of democracy is organized society, i. e. the organi-
zation of productive people, unions, cooperatives and voluntary associations."54
Korkut Boratav is of the opinion that the NDM wants to accomplish what Ozal
tried to do with the aim of obtaining 45 percent of the vote in a general election.
But, he states, the NDM does not understand the glaring contradiction: While
Ozal was engaged in these politics he not only allowed the poor villagers migrating
from the countryside and villages to build gecekondus or shanty houses on the out-
skirts of the big cities, he granted them subventions to do so. In a biting critique
of the NDM's economic program, Boratav says, "People supported Ozal in order
to receive these benefits; if you take them away, why do people want democracy?"55
This is the dilemma facing the neo-liberal, post-Marxist, post-modernist
approach (one dare not call it an ideology) of the NDM as it has emerged on the
Turkish political scene. If the people do not want democracy on the terms prof-
fered by the NDM it seems unlikely that the NDM will be able to implement an
economic strategy that will satisfy the economic needs or hopes of ordinary Turks
and the bulk of Kurds. The NDM program to foster economic development of
Turkey and its strategy to contain Kurdish ethnonationalism seem fundamentally
contradictory.
These contradictions were borne out by the parliamentary elections of
24 December 1995, in which the NDM received a total of 135,250 votes; less
than 1 percent of the total. In the heavily populated Kurdish provinces in the east
and southeast, the NDM received 4.41 percent of the vote in §irnak and 2.67 in
Van. It obtained more than 1 percent of the vote only in Bitlis, 1.83; Bingol, 1.06;
Agn. 1.05; Diyarbakir, 1.59; Mus, 1.12; and in Siirt, 1.30 percent. Such a poor
showing may well place the future of the NDM itself in jeopardy as well and the
neo-liberal economic program it put forward to coopt the challenge of Kurdish
nationalism.
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NATIONALISM AND THE RULE
OF LAW IN TURKEY: T H E
ELIMINATION OF KURDISH
REPRESENTATION DURING
THE 1990s
MarkMuller
A he aim of this chapter is to focus on Turkey's domestic policy1 toward its
Kurdish intelligentsia since the Gulf war and consider the long-term implications
of that policy for the rule of law within Turkey. I provide a brief historical account
of the establishment of the rule of law and how it has been undermined by an of-
ficial state policy of repression toward minorities and examine how the ideological
imperatives that underpin such a policy have fundamentally affected the Turk-
ish legal and political structure. I document how this policy has led to the virtual
elimination of Kurdish representation within the press, Parliament and the courts
throughout the 1990s and conclude with an assessment of the long-term impact
of this policy for the rule of law, Turkey's body politic, and its future relationship
with Europe.
T H E ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW
There can be little doubt that the Turkish political revolution of the 1920s had a
profound effect on the rule of law within the central territories of the Ottoman
Empire. The creation of a modern republican constitution in 19242 symbolized
Turkey's desire to transform itself into a progressive, Western-orientated, secular
nation state. The constitution also provided a useful legal mechanism to entrench
political and cultural reform. Thus, although forged in war, the secular character
of the republic was secured by the prudent deployment of Western legal reforms.
Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, the architect of the new state, understood the fun-
damental role that legal reform could play in affecting such political and social
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transformation within society. In a speech in 1924 he commented, "Changing the
rules of life in accordance with the times is an absolute necessity. . . . Nations
cannot maintain their existence by age-old mentalities.... Superstitions and non-
sense have to be thrown out of our heads."3
By 1925, legislative measures had secured the abolition of the Caliphate and
religious courts4 and brought public education and religious institutions under the
control of the executive.5 Legal reform was also used in the dissolution of religious
sects, the banning of the fez, the introduction of the Gregorian Calendar and the
adoption of the Latin script. The principle of secularism was enshrined in the
Turkish constitution by amendment in 1937.
The enactment of the civil law code of 1926 deepened the secularization of
Turkish civil society and further entrenched the Western concept of the rule of
law. It created a unified system of law in which all citizens became equal before
the law, irrespective of their religious or ethnic disposition. The special status re-
served for Muslims and principal non-Muslim communities—Greek, Armenian
and Jewish—were abolished. It established familiar Western secular principles of
equality, freedom of contract, private property and enforceable individual rights
and drew heavily on the Swiss and German civil codes and the Italian penal code.6
The 1926 code represented Turkey's final break with its Ottoman and
Islamic past and crystallized the Kemalist commitment to the rule of law. Its
preamble began: "There is no fundamental difference in the needs of nations
belonging to the modern family of civilizations. Perpetual social and economic
contacts have . . . been transforming a large civilized body of mankind into a
family. . . . We must never forget that the Turkish nation has decided to accept
modern civilization and its living principles without any condition or reserva-
tion. . . . The aim of law is not to maintain religious regulations, nor to maintain
any other habitual customs, but to ensure political, social, economic and national
activity at all costs."7
The widespread use of such legal measures not only entrenched political
revolution, it established the notion of equality before the law and created an ap-
preciation of the civilizing qualities of law. In this respect, the Kemalist principles
of republicanism, secularism and modernism contributed significantly to the es-
tablishment of the rule of law within Turkey.
However, in other important respects, the development of Kemalist ideol-
ogy had a fundamentally negative effect on the establishment of the rule of law. In
particular, its consistent obsession with national unity undermined much of the
progress achieved through legal reform. This obsession was borne out of the ex-
periences of the War of Independence, which followed in the wake of World War
I and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. By 1917 the Great Powers of
Europe had already secretly agreed to the division of the Middle East and were not
in any way predisposed to the creation of an independent state for Turks.8 Mustafa
Kemal used the energizing power of nationalism to win the War of Independence.
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He therefore based the legitimacy of the fledgling republic upon the principle of a
national homeland for Turks.
Throughout the next two decades, Kemal reinforced the policy of ethnic na-
tionalism in an attempt to foster within the Turkish people a deeper allegiance to
the new republic. In a speech at the opening of a faculty of law in Ankara in 1925
he remarked: "The Turkish Revolution . . .  means replacing an age-old politi-
cal unity based on religion with one based on another tie, that of nationality."9
According to Mustafa Kemal, the central weakness of the Ottoman Empire em-
anated from its acceptance of its own multicultural nature. This had led to the
search for independence and autonomy by minority groups, such as the Armeni-
ans and the Kurds, which had resulted in self-mutilation. This experience helps
explain the regime's deep-seated fear of minorities and its consistent oppression
of them.
Thus, the 1930s saw a series of cultural measures designed to emphasize the
cultural homogeneity of the Turkish people. History books were rewritten to exalt
the achievements of Turkish culture as distinct from Ottoman or Islamic culture.
Institutions, such as the Turkish Historical Society in 1931 and the Turkish Lan-
guage Association in 1932, were established to assert the superiority of Turkish
culture over other indigenous cultures.
The tendency to herald the achievements of Turkish culture to the exclusion
of all other minority cultures led to the glorification and idolization of the great-
est living exponent of that culture. Over the next thirty years Mustafa Kemal's
nationalistic teachings enveloped all state institutions and created a rigid state ide-
ology. By adopting the title Ataturk, Mustafa Kemal made "Turkishness" syn-
onymous with the state that he had founded. As a result, ethnic-nationalism came
to underpin the whole raison d' etre of the Turkish State.
The principle of ethnic-nationalism received international credence in the
Treaty of Lausanne in 1924,10 which overturned previous international recogni-
tion of the right to autonomy for other minorities in the region such as the
Kurds.11 The Treaty of Lausanne failed to recognize ethnically based minorities.
As Lord Curzon noted: "The Turkish delegation insisted that these minorities
[Kurds, Circassians and Arabs] required no protection and were quite satisfied
with their lot under Turkish rule."12 In one stroke the Kurdish people lost their
right to exist as a recognizable and distinct people and became incorporated into
the Turkish nation by virtue of their Muslim heritage.
Since then, this treaty has been used by the Turkish authorities to justify the
absence of special status or provisions for the Kurds of Turkey. In a BBC interview
on 24 March 1992, minister of the interior Ismet Sezgin invoked the treaty to
assert that the Kurds were not a minority but actually "first-class citizens of the
Turkish state." The historical reality could not have been more different. The fail-
ure to recognize Kurdish interests led to a rebellion in February 1925 by Kurdish
nationalist and religious leader Sheikh Said of Piran. Two further revolts occurred
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in 1930 and between 1936-38. For the Turkish authorities these rebellions estab-
lished the Kurds as the preeminent separatist threat. Since then, Ankara has
pursued an iron-fist policy toward Kurdish dissent.
The international legitimization of Turkish nationalism had a profoundly
corrosive effect on the Kemalist commitment to the rule of law and recognition of
minority rights. The abolition of special status for non-Muslim communities had
been accepted on the basis that henceforth all citizens could invoke constitutional
rights that guarantied cultural freedom. The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) funda-
mentally undermined that enterprise and effectively disenfranchised Muslim and
non-Muslim minorities.
Yet it was the not nationalism per se but the adoption of ethnic-nationalism
that resulted in the denial of minority rights. More particularly, it was the attempt
to create allegiance to the new republican state through membership or adherence
to an ethnic culture rather than through the idea of national citizenship. As a
result, the nature, character and boundaries of the Turkish state became inextri-
cably linked to the idea of ethnic-nationalism.
This authoritarian drive for ethnic national unity led to the destruction of
the fundamental principle of equality before the law. Turkish citizens of Kurdish
origin are no longer able to invoke fundamental rights in the constitution pertain-
ing to freedom of association, movement and expression unless they accept and
act upon the precept "Happy is he who is a Turk." Any expression of their own
cultural identity precludes them from invoking such rights.
Since 1924 all other principles and constitutional rights guaranteed under
the Turkish constitution have been made subject to the "Supreme Principle of
Ethnic-Nationalism." In order to assert and/or enforce any right a citizen must
ensure that he or she does not contravene this supreme principle. Any expression
of minority identity is interpreted as an attack on the character and indivisibility
of the Turkish state, since indivisibility is defined by the official ideology of "Turk-
ishness." This leads to the effective disenfranchisement of minorities within Tur-
key. An example of this can be found in the basic principles of the constitution of
1982 which are laid down in Article 2: "The Republic of Turkey is a democratic,
secular and social state ruled by law, respecting human rights in the spirit of social
peace, of national solidarity and of justice, bound to the nationalism of Ataturk
and founded on the principles pronounced by the preamble."
Nationalism is also entrenched in Article 26, paragraph 3, and Article 28,
paragraph 2, of the 1982 constitution, which give the legislature the powers to
adopt laws that prohibit the use of certain languages.13 These provisions find fur-
ther concrete expression in the several provisions concerning the National Security
Council and its powers, in the provisions on limitations of human rights and in
the spirit of the provisions of the emergency law.14
Yet the denial of minority existence has created an inherent and dynamic
tension within the Turkish body politic resulting in constant political conflict be-
tween the state and those elements in society opposed to its official ideology. Any
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expression of cultural and/or ethnic dissent is, by ideological necessity, classified
as a threat to national security, regardless of whether such activity is violent or
nonviolent in nature. This continual source of conflict can only be resolved by fun-
damental reform to Kemalist ideology or by the adoption of an iron-fist policy
toward dissent. To date Turkey has chosen the latter alternative. This has led to
the militarization of the entire legal and political structure which has not only un-
dermined the exercise of individual rights but also compromised any effective
separation of powers and threatened the independence of the entire judiciary.
T H E EFFECT OF ETHNIC NATIONALISM ON THE
LEGAL STRUCTURE OF TURKEY
Throughout its seventy-three-year history, the Turkish military has consistently
intervened in politics to preserve the Kemalist character of the Turkish state. One
such example was in 1960, when General Cemal Giirsel removed the civilian gov-
ernment and declared himself president. There can be little doubt about his
attitude toward the rights of a quarter of the republic's citizenry when he stood on
an American tank in the southeast city of Diyarbakir and declared, "There are no
Kurds in this country. Whoever says he is a Kurd, I will spit in his face."15 In June
1960, 485 Kurdish notables were arrested and detained and some 55 were exiled.16
The military interventions of 1961, 1971 and 1981 established the mili-
tary's profound influence over all state institutions as "supreme protector of the
nation." The Kurdish issue, together with the growth of radical politics, was suf-
ficiently serious to require a coup d'etat in 1980, which resulted in further op-
pressive measures against the Kurds during the next three years of military rule.
The military-inspired approach continued under the civilian administration of
Turgut Ozal, who in 1985 introduced a system of civilian militia known as the vil-
lage guard system to supplement gendarme operations.17
Since 1980, political stability has largely been achieved by integration of the
military within the Turkish executive. This has led to the creation of the National
Security Council but also to the development of a separate court structure in rela-
tion to matters purportedly concerning national security. As a result, Turkey has a
complex interrelated court structure of inferior and superior courts. Broadly speak-
ing, the system is made up of judicial, military, administrative and security courts.
These courts are of first instance and are subject to appeal to a plethora of inter-
related superior courts. The superior courts consist of the Constitutional Court,
the Court of Appeals, the Council of State, the Military Tribunal of Appeals, the
Supreme Military Administrative Court, the Court of Jurisdictional Dispute, the
Court of Accounts, and the Supreme Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors.
The distinctive feature of this court structure is the role played by military and se-
curity tribunals. Theoretically, the jurisdiction of these tribunals concerns national
security. However, since national security is equated with national unity, and na-
tional unity with Kemalist ideology, all political opposition to this ideology, in
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practice, falls within the ambit of this jurisdiction. As a result, these military and
security courts have become the arbiters of what constitutes legitimate political
dissent.
Thus, while the Kemalist commitment to republicanism and secularism has
strengthened the Turkish legal system, its adherence to the supreme principle of
ethnic-nationalism has led to the development of a number of military and secu-
rity courts, which have fundamentally hampered any effective separation of powers
and threatened both the independence of the judiciary and the rule of law.
The State Security Tribunal is a nonjudicial court that exclusively deals with
all political and terrorist offenses. Its practical jurisdiction is now so pervasive that
it has the power to determine the parameters of all political and civil rights, such
as the right to freedom of expression, movement and association. To a very great
extent it has usurped the traditional functions of the judicial courts and is a signifi-
cant threat to the concept of judicial justice.
The Tribunal's composition consists of one military judge appointed by
the minister of justice or the minister of national defense and two civilian judges
appointed by other government ministries. However, the exact status of this ar-
rangement remains uncertain. Article 143 of the 1982 constitution states: "Courts
of the Security of the State shall be established to deal with offenses against the
indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, the free democratic
order, or against the public whose characteristics are defined in the constitution,
and offenses directly involving the internal and external security of the State."
Thus, although the Turkish constitution provides for the establishment of
such tribunals to hear such cases, the composition and competence of these tri-
bunals may well be contrary to other provisions of the constitution. Clearly, tribun-
als that do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process should not
be created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary judicial courts.
What is certain is that the composition of the State Security Tribunal
breaches the principle concerning judicial independence. A court should be inde-
pendent from the executive branch; the executive should not interfere in a court's
proceedings and a court should not act as an agent for the executive against an in-
dividual citizen. The composition of the Tribunal breaches Article 6 of the Euro-
pean Convention, which guarantees the right to a fair trial and states "everyone
is entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law."
Just as the Turkish constitution loosely provides for the establishment of se-
curity tribunals to deal with political offenses concerning national security, it also
provides for the enactment of legislation that defines which type of activities shall
be come within the jurisdiction of such tribunals. Thus, although the 1982 Turk-
ish constitution states that everyone possesses inalienable fundamental rights and
freedoms18 and that "the press is free,"19 such rights and freedoms may be restricted
by law to safeguard the integrity of the state.20
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The constitution further provides under Article 14 that those who abuse
these freedoms "with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with
its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish State and Re-
public" and "who incite and provoke others to do the same shall be subject to
punishments determined by law." The law is contained in the various provisions
of the Turkish penal code and the 1991 Anti-Terror Law.
The Anti-Terror Law was introduced in 1991 to replace the much dis-
credited articles of the Turkish penal code, namely 140,141,142 and 163, which
legitimated prosecutions against writers and journalists accused of advocating
"separatism." However, as Article 19 has noted, instead of introducing greater
rights of freedom of expression it "defines terrorism so broadly and vaguely that
almost anyone can be convicted of it: no violent act is required."21 As such, it is the
decision to prosecute that effectively determines guilt.
Article 1 of the Anti-Terror Law states that "terrorism is any kind of action
conducted by one or several persons belonging to an organization with the aim of
changing the characteristics of the republic as defined by the constitution, its po-
litical, legal, social, secular and economic system, damaging the indivisible unity
of the State with its territory and nation, endangering the existence of the Turk-
ish State and Republic, weakening or destroying or seizing the authority of the
State, eliminating fundamental rights and freedoms, or damaging the internal or
external security of the state, public order or general health by any one method of
pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation, oppression or threat."
Under Article 6, methods of "pressure" are defined to include writing and
reporting ideas. It states that "those who print or publish leaflets and declarations
of terrorist organizations" are to be punished by heavy fines between 50 and 100
million TL. While Article 7 renders liable "those who assist members of organi-
zations constituted in the manner described above or make propaganda in con-
nection with the organization . . . to sentence by imprisonment of between
one and five years and a fine of between 50 and 100 million TL even if their of-
fense constitutes another crime." As a result, many actions that had been banned
by the repealed provisions of the Turkish penal code are now banned by the new
Anti-Terror Law. It is Article 8 that is most commonly deployed for this purpose.
It states that "written and oral propaganda and assemblies, meetings and demon-
strations aimed at damaging the indivisible unity of the State of the Turkish
Republic with its territory and nation are forbidden, regardless of method, inten-
tion, and ideas behind them. Those conducting such activity are to be punished by
a sentence of between two and five years' imprisonment and a fine of between 50
and 100 million TL." This provision has been used against journalists, members of
Parliament and lawyers alike.
These security measures are strengthened by Articles 119 through 122 of
the 1982 constitution, which provide for a state of emergency in four specific
situations. Emergency civil administration is advocated in the event of natural dis-
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aster, dangerous epidemic or an economic crisis, emergency civil administration,
or upon serious indications of widespread acts of violence aimed at the destruc-
tion of the free democratic order or a serious deterioration of the public order. A
dual system of civil and military administration is proscribed in the event of very
serious political disorder threatening the security of the nation or in the event that
the country enters a state of war.
The civil state of emergency is regulated by the State Emergency Act of
1983 and provides special powers for local governors.22 The military state of emer-
gency is regulated by the Military State of Emergency Act of 1971 as a amended
between 1980 and 1983.23 The state of war is regulated by the State of War Act
of 1983.24 A declaration of a state of emergency needs parliamentary approval and
cannot be issued for more than six months, after which it can be extended for
consecutive periods of four months. In normal circumstances Article 91 of the
constitution provides that statutory orders can only have force of law if they issue
from a statute passed by Parliament and are capable of review by both Parliament
and the Constitutional Court. These requirements are not in effect when Articles
119 to 122 are invoked.
These articles were invoked in 1987, when, under Turgut Ozal's premier-
ship, the government introduced a state of emergency in ten provinces in the
southeast of the country.25 However, it is the civil state of emergency that has
been in force in the ten provinces of the southeast region since 1987. Extraordi-
nary powers were vested in the regional governors. These powers were radically
extended by a statutory order with force of law, which concentrated the whole of
civil power in their hands26 and in April 1990, through the adoption of Kararname
(decree) 413, subsequently revised as Kararname 424.27
As Philip Robins has noted, the main thrust of this package of measures
was to increase the punitive effect of measures that could be applied to the region
and to restrict the flow of information by imposing increased restrictions on the
media.28 Likewise, the constitutionality of measures deployed by the Motherland
Party (ANAP) governments have also created great concern, including the exten-
sive use of state of emergency powers without respect for fundamental rights or
the right to judicial review of any act issued by state authorities. As Christian
Rumpf has remarked: "Under this legislation, enjoyment of individual rights has
been reduced to a very low level; in violation of the constitution, judicial review of
any act of the administration or responsibility of public servants in the field of
emergency issues have been excluded."29
The conduct of the Turkish authorities is, however, subject to international
legal scrutiny. Although the Turkish State has not ratified the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and is therefore not bound by its specific
provisions, it has pledged to meet human rights standards set by the Paris Charter
of the CSCE. More important, it is a party to the European Convention of
Human Rights. Indeed, the 1954 Act not only ratified the convention but incor-
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porated it and its jurisprudence into Turkish domestic law so as to become en-
forceable within Turkish courts as a species of national law.
Thus, in 1963 the then-Constitutional Court declared that the fundamen-
tal rights set forth in the 1961 constitution corresponded to the rights contained
in the European Convention and thereafter began to interpret fundamental rights
in the light of the Convention.30 However, the presently constituted Constitu-
tional Court has so far declined to invoke the Convention in interpreting the
constitution. Nevertheless, it is clear that Turkey remains bound by its provisions.
In fact, the Turkish government further strengthened its Convention obligations
in 1987, when it recognized the right of individual petition to the European Com-
mission with limiting reservations. Those reservations were subsequently declared
ineffective by the Commission.31
Moreover, by a derogation notice of 1992, communicated by the permanent
representative of Turkey to the Council of Europe, Turkey withdrew its original
notice of derogations from articles 5, 6, 8, 10, 11 and 13, as permitted under Ar-
ticle 15, and accepted the binding nature of all of the above substantive articles,
save Article 5.32 As a result of this derogation withdrawal notice, Turkey is subject
to the substantive Convention articles establishing the rights to freedom of ex-
pression, freedom from racial or ethnic discrimination, and the right to a fair trial.
The conduct of its institutions can therefore be subjected to review.
T H E ELIMINATION OF KURDISH REPRESENTATION
Since the Gulf war, little attention has been paid to Turkey's adherence to inter-
national obligations. Despite periodic promises of democratic and legal reform,
the Turkish government has systematically and methodically destroyed all legiti-
mate forms of expression of dissent by Kurds. It has deployed the security mea-
sures outlined above to crush all forms of nonviolent political opposition and has
allowed its security forces to operate with impunity throughout the emergency
regions and beyond.
On 20 October 1991 the new coalition government of President Siileyman
Demirel published its Principles of Democratization, in which it conceded that
Turkey had failed to meet its human rights obligations under the CSCE process
and the Paris Charter. It promised root and branch reform and, in particular,
reform of the constitution and the legal system in accordance with contemporary
democratic values; adoption of legislation to ensure media freedom; and recogni-
tion of the right of every individual to speak in his or her mother tongue and to
develop his or her culture.
Unhappily, none of these promises have been met.33 The 1991 Anti-Terror
Law, which was designed to deal with violent opposition, has been used to silence
nonviolent dissent. None of the cultural freedoms for Kurds has been granted.
Even the two widely publicized initiatives, the Parliamentary Human Rights
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Commission and new minister for human rights, have been disappointing in their
impact. As Article 19 noted in its 1992 report on Turkey: "the majority of reforms
affecting freedom of expression have not been introduced and it appears that the
Government lacks the political will to implement these much needed changes."
Instead, since 1991, the Turkish state has consistently restricted Kurdish
rights to freedom of expression, association and movement. The hopes of a return
to liberal democracy all but faded as the intensification of the conflict continued
between the state and the PKK. In 1991, the Motherland Party (ANAP) govern-
ment for the first time in decades allowed the celebration of Nevroz, the Kurdish
New Year festival. By 1992 the spirit of reconciliation had disappeared. Kurdish
colors, songs and slogans were banned. That year's Nevroz festivities left at least
ninety-one people dead in just three towns of the southeast, Cizre, § lrnak and
Nusaybin.34
The polarization of the Kurdish situation led to the militarization of the
entire southeast region by the security forces. By late 1992 the war against the
PKK had virtually destroyed the entire civic and judicial structure of the south-
east region. Allegations abounded of systematic torture, extrajudicial killings and
wholesale destruction of Kurdish villages. Amnesty International reported that se-
curity forces appeared to be operating with impunity and with little regard for the
constitution.35
Over two thousand villages were alleged to have been destroyed and over
two million Kurds exiled to western Turkey during this period.36 These reports
were later confirmed by regional governor Unal Erkan, who, on 13 July 1995,
stated that 2,667 villages had been depopulated and over 311,000 people displaced
since 1994. The terrorization of the populace intensified with the emergence
of Hizbollah, a shadowy contraguerrilla organization reputedly controlled by the
security forces, who carried out indiscriminate executions, arson attacks and
assaults.37
Having traumatized the local populace into submission, the Turkish au-
thorities now turned their attention toward the Kurdish and liberal press in an
attempt to silence dissent over the government's iron-fist policy toward the Kurd-
ish issue. The onslaught on the liberal media was comprehensive and systematic.
Restrictions were placed on the press, foreign journalists,38 political speeches,39
assemblies,40 demonstrations, academic publications,41 television and radio42 and
the arts.43
The authorities used a multitude of legal provisions in order to affect
comprehensive censorship. Apart from the all-encompassing provisions of the
Anti-terror Law much use was made of several articles of the Turkish penal code.
Article 158 makes illegal any "insult" or "aggressive language" expressly or by im-
plication, including "by allusion or hint" of or toward the president of Turkey;
Article 159 applies the same criteria to any insult directed toward "the Turkish
nation, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly, or the moral responsibility of
the Government or the military or security forces of the State or the moral re-
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sponsibility of the judicial authorities." Articles 311 and 312 prohibit "others to
commit crime" and "praising crime," respectively. These general articles are sup-
ported by more specific laws directed toward particular forms of expression, such
as Law 5680, the Press Law; Law 1117, the Law to Protect Minors from Harm-
ful Publications; Law 3257, the Act on the Works of Cinema, Video and Music;
Law 5816, the Law on Crimes Against Ataturk; Law 2911, the Demonstration
Act;44 and Law 2908, the Association Act.45
These provisions have been enacted and deployed to devastating effect solely
to preserve the ideological imperatives created by Atatiirk's conception of ethnic-
nationalism. They continue the tradition of using legal measures to affect social
and political transformation, albeit of a profoundly oppressive character. The
success of this policy depends upon the complete obliteration of any form of cul-
tural dissent. Since this is not possible without the wholesale physical elimination
of the Kurdish and liberal intelligentsia, a war of attrition has began with no end
in sight.
The greatest example of this war of attrition was, throughout 1993 and
beyond, the systematic persecution of Kurdish-owned national newspapers,
such as Ozgiir Gundem (Free Agenda), the most consistent and outspoken critic of
the Turkish regime.46 The persecution meted out was twofold in nature—first, the
use of oppressive legal measures including confiscations, raids and the institution
of legal proceedings, and, second, the use of extra legal measures from psycho-
logical harassment to arson and murder.
The combined effect of the legal measures led to the closure of the paper on
15 January 1993, with an attendant loss of over 300 million TL. The financial
problems occurred when the paper's distribution company, Ergam, was induced to
break its contract. The paper's subsequent attempt to organize distribution by vol-
unteers largely failed due to intimidation. A total of at least fourteen distributors,
newsvendors and paper boys/girls were murdered.47
The paper started publication again on 26 April 1993, when it merged with
another radical Kurdish newspaper, Yeni Ulke (New Nation). In the following
sixty-eight days, forty-one issues of Ozgiir Gundem were confiscated. Between the
date of relaunch and 11 November 1993 a further 134 out of 198 issues were con-
fiscated. A press release by the editorial board announced on 3 July 1993 that the
publishers and editors of the newspaper had been charged with total fines of 8.6
billion TL ($736,5000) and sentenced to prison terms totaling from 155 years and
9 months to 493 years and 4 months.48
These terms were variously imposed for offenses under the Anti-Terror pro-
visions relating to separatist propaganda and membership in a proscribed
organization. Many of the indictments were based upon the simple reference by
the newspaper to the words Kurds and Kurdistan. The institution of a further 170
legal proceedings against the newspaper occurred in 1993. By the end of the year,
Yas,ar Kaya, the newspaper's proprietor, faced a total of 16 trillion lira in fines and
between three hundred and nine hundred ninety years imprisonment.49
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The newspaper was also subjected to widespread intimidation and physical
attack. Six of the newspaper's journalists were killed in 1993, adding to the ten
other journalists killed since January 1992.50 Other journalists were routinely ar-
rested, detained and subjected to various degrees of ill treatment and torture.
Newsvendors continued to be subjected to harassment and assault through-
out 1993. Staff bureaus became the target of arson attacks. The year culminated
in a series of simultaneous raids on the newspaper's premises across the country
on 10 December 1993, International Human Rights Day, in which equipment
was seized and over one hundred employees were arrested, detained and variously
prosecuted51
The paper was eventually closed by the Supreme Court on 14 April 1994.
Its successor, Ozgiir Ulke (Free Nation), fared no better, being subjected to the
same forms of legal and extralegal measures. On 3 December 1994 its offices in Is-
tanbul and Ankara were bombed, leaving one dead and twenty injured. The paper
was subsequently closed on 3 February 1995, when it was held that it was subject
to the same ban as Ozgiir Giindem.52 There can be little doubt, however, that the
events of 1993 substantially reduced the ability of Kurdish intelligentsia to express
and communicate its concerns over the Kurdish issue and its possible resolution.
What is clear, however, is that the law in relation to censorship reflects the
state of freedom of expression in Turkey today. By embedding ideological re-
quirements into law, the Turkish authorities have allowed civil rights activists the
opportunity to highlight breaches of its international obligations concerning the
right to freedom of expression without reference to the circumstances of particu-
lar cases. This has led to numerous challenges to these provisions in both the do-
mestic and international courts.
Article 6 of the Convention sets out in clear terms internationally recognized
legal norms governing the establishment of a fair trial. Article 14 sets out the right
of nondiscrimination on grounds of race, ethnic identity and culture. Article 10 es-
tablishes the right to freedom of expression and states that "Everyone has the right
to freedom of expression. This right shall include the freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without reference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers."53 But this right is not absolute. Paragraph 2 of the
Convention goes on to limit the extent of the right in that the exercise of these
freedoms "may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties
as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society" and goes on to
list the various permissible restrictions, including "in the interests of national se-
curity, territorial integrity of public health or morals, for the protection of disorder
or a crime, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing
the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the au-
thority and impartiality of the judiciary." However, in order to invoke the use of
paragraph 2, contracting states must abide by the judgments of the European
Court of Human Rights and the decisions and recommendations of the Commit-
tee of Ministers, which have established that the respondent state is obliged to
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show that any restriction is "prescribed by law"; "has a legitimate aim" (i.e. para-
graph. 2); and is [3] "necessary in a democratic society" to promote that aim.54
In devising this tripartite test, the court has emphasized that, in evaluating
a particular restriction, it is faced "not with a choice between two conflicting prin-
ciples but with a principle of freedom of expression that is subject to a number of
exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted." Thus, the court has ruled that to
be "prescribed by law" a restriction must be "adequately accessible" and foreseeable,
that is, "formulated with sufficient precision to enable a citizen to regulate his con-
duct." The restriction, however, does not have to be codified; it is sufficient if it is
"reasonably foreseeable" from the case law." A restriction must also be in further-
ance of, and genuinely aimed at, protecting one of the permissible grounds listed
in Article 10(2) in order for it to be classified as having a legitimate aim. The court
further ruled that the list contained in Article 10(2) is exhaustive. "Necessary"
should not be equated with "indispensable," though any restriction must be more
than merely "reasonable" or "desirable." A "pressing social need" must be demon-
strated, the restriction must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, and
the reasons given to justify the restriction must be relevant and sufficient.56
In considering whether any particular interference is justified, that is, "suf-
ficient," the court will have regard to any public aspect of the case, the breadth of
the particular restriction and the appropriate margin that contracting states may
legitimately have in determining the necessity of the restriction.57 As regards the
breadth of a restriction, the court has made it quite clear that an absolute restric-
tion is unacceptable. Instead, the court will treat each case on its particular merits
but, in doing so, will have regard to the practice of other contracting states in as-
sessing a restriction's necessity.
Turkey is in clear breach of its international obligations under the treaty.
First, the all-embracing nature of the Anti-Terror Law is in conflict with the gen-
eral spirit of the rights establishing freedom of expression. Second, its subsequent
application by the authorities is at odds with its original purpose. The law was not
designed to restrict nonviolent dissent. Third, even if it were designed for such a
purpose, it could not be said that its subsequent application was "necessary," "suf-
ficient" or "proportionate to its legitimate aim," as required by the tripartite test.
As Article 19 has noted, it does not conform to analogous provisions legitimately
restricting the freedom of the press in other member states.
As regards the case of Ozgiir Gundem,w it should be noted that the Euro-
pean Court has repeatedly declared that "freedom of political debate is at the very
core of the concept of a democratic society."59 In particular, it has ruled in favor of
special protection of political expression in relation to a government's failure to in-
vestigate and prosecute murders of people involved in a separatist movement.60
The use of Article 13 of the 1982 constitution and the Anti-Terror Law to restrict
such debate is clearly contrary to international law. On a broader level, the Turk-
ish government has failed to protect what the European Court has described as
the "pre-eminent role of the press in a state governed by the rule of law."61 In a
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number of recent judgments the court has consistently stated that penalties against
the press for publishing information and opinions concerning matters of public
interest are intolerable.62
Turkey is legally obliged to honor its obligations under the European Con-
vention. It has a duty to ensure that its domestic legislation and jurisprudence
thereunder does not conflict with or inhibit any of the rights set out and guaran-
teed by the Convention. It is also under a positive duty to abide by the Convention
provisions and case law in relation to freedom of expression.
In fact, defense lawyers who operate in the state security tribunals have in-
creasingly used the 1982 constitution and the European Convention on Human
Rights to challenge the legitimacy and authority of such laws as the 1991 Anti-
Terror Law. The deployment of such submissions, together with the tactical use
of the procedures of the tribunals, has led to a number of adjournments, additional
hearings and appeals to the higher courts. This has delayed and frustrated the
ability of the authorities to clamp down swiftly on nonviolent dissent.63
As a result, 1994 saw a change of emphasis on the part of the Turkish au-
thorities. Instead of harassing journalists and broadcasters, the focus shifted
to those that supported and represented them in the domestic courts. In effect, the
war of attrition moved from the media and into the courts. Thus, 1994 witnessed
increasing allegations of institutional and anonymous harassment of Turkish
lawyers involved in sensitive political cases before state security tribunals. This
policy of harassment culminated in the "unknown perpetrator" killing Medet
Serhat, a prominent liberal Istanbul lawyer. For many it represented the full-scale
start of the "terrorization" of the Kurdish legal intelligentsia in Istanbul.64
In fact, the process had began earlier in the year in the state security tribunals
in Diyarbakir, southeast Turkey, when sixteen Diyarbakir defense lawyers were ar-
rested and detained in November and December 1993.65 On 17 February 1994
they, together with six other lawyers, appeared before the Diyarbakir state security
tribunal, charged with a multitude of political offenses under articles 168/2, 31,
33, and 40 of the Turkish penal code and Article 5 of the Anti-Terror Law. The
particulars of the indictment alleged participation in terrorist activity, including
the passing of material to PKK prisoners; membership in a proscribed terrorist or-
ganization, namely the PKK; and the sending of communications to European
human rights organizations. This was later clarified to mean "the making of false
and unwarranted applications to the European Convention."66
The evidence called in support of these charges rested largely upon the oral
testimony of one prosecution witness, Mr. Abdulhakim Giiven, himself a con-
victed murderer, and upon confessions obtained during pretrial detention. The
lawyers claimed that they had been subjected to harassment, ill treatment and in
some cases torture.67 They rejected the allegations in their entirety and claimed the
confessions had been obtained through force. They further prayed in aid of Tur-
key's acceptance of the right of individual petition to the European Commission.
Despite a series of hearings on 28 April, 23 June, 15 September, and 22 Novem-
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ber 1994, no such prosecution witness came forward. The case remains pending
to this day.
The importance of the lawyers' case is twofold. First, it casts light on the
current plight of Turkey's system of justice. It highlights the authorities' failure to
investigate, detain and initiate prosecutions in accordance with the law; to inves-
tigate allegations of torture and mistreatment during pretrial detention; to provide
access to legal advice and representation when available; and to provide an effec-
tive mechanism whereby these failures can be reviewed and their consequences
assessed in relation to the fairness of proceedings.
Second, and more important, the lawyers' case amounts to a sustained attack
on those lawyers within the Diyarbakir bar still willing to undertake defense work
in political cases. At present the Diyarbakir bar, which is the main bar association
in the southeast region, consists of 211 practicing advocates, of whom under 40
practice in the state security tribunals.68 In essence, the prosecutions form part of
a wider attack on the right to legal representation hitherto protected and guaran-
teed by the constitution to all citizens.
During the course of 1994 the Turkish authorities broadened this attack to
include rights to Kurdish representation within Parliament. This process had been
set in motion on 14 July 1993, when the Constitutional Court banned the pro-
Kurdish Peoples' Labor Party (HEP) on the grounds that the party had violated
the constitution69 and the Law on Political Parties, which states that "political par-
ties are prohibited from stating that on the territory of the Republic of Turkey
there exist minorities of differing nationality, religion, culture or confession, race
or language. They are not permitted to have the aim of destroying national unity
by creating minorities by means of the protection, development or dissemination
of languages or cultures other than the Turkish language and culture, and they are
not permitted to develop any activity whatsoever of this sort." Up until this ruling
at least forty-eight of the party's officials had been murdered by death squads.70
This ruling effectively put paid to the promises of a move to genuine democ-
racy and a recognition of Kurdish rights by the True Path Party (TPP) and the
Social Democratic Party (SDP), following Tansu Ciller's election as prime minis-
ter on 13 June 1993. The Coalition Protocol of June 24 1993 undertook to abolish
the state of emergency, eliminate the village guard system and remove "the legal
and other obstacles that hinder the free expression of our people's ethnic cultural
and language rights."
However, the Democracy Party (DP), which had been formed to replace
HEP, became subject to the same form of attacks. On 4 September 1993, Mehmet
Sincar MP and Metin Ozdemir, chairman of Batman DEP, were shot dead in
Batman. Six days later the house of Sincar's father was also bombed, injuring six
others.71 On December 1993, Ankara state security prosecutor Nusret Demiral in-
stituted proceedings to ban the Democracy Party.
In that hearing Demiral submitted that Yas,ar Kaya, chair of the DEP, had
by implication incited a struggle for "an independent and unified Kurdish state"
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by demanding a "political solution . . . in which Kurdish identity is recognized"
and by stating that the Kurdish question should be resolved according to the
CSCE process and the Paris Charter. According to Demiral, the principles of self-
determination in the Helsinki Final Act and minority rights contained in the Paris
Charter contravened the territorial integrity of the Turkish republic; because the
provisions related to peoples under colonial domination, it could not apply to the
republic by virtue of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923.
The submission reflected Turkish authorities' recognition of the need to
provide a legal basis to the prosecution in order to give legitimacy to the proceed-
ings. However, the nature of that submission betrayed the cavalier approach of the
authorities toward international legal obligations. On the one hand, it prayed in
aid of the specific application of the Final Act, and, on the other hand, it totally
rejected the welter of other international obligations concerning the right to free-
dom of expression and to a fair trial.72
The disingenuous nature of the proceedings were confirmed by the events
of the next few months. On 10 January 1994 six people were arrested at the DEP
offices in Lice when it was shelled by the army, together with thirty-six other
houses.73 On 20 January 1994 DEP offices in Ankara and Mamak were also
bombed. Ten days later the Derik office in Mardin province was hit. On 6 Feb-
ruary, Murat Bozlak, the general secretary, was wounded by gunmen.74 And on
18 February the main offices in Ankara were bombed, injuring sixteen people.
As a result of these events, the DEP finally withdrew from the local elections on
25 February 1994.75 This enabled the Islamic Refah Party to capture a number of
mayoralties including that of the regional capital, Diyarbakir.
Then, in March 1994 the Turkish Grand National Assembly removed the
immunity of Kurdish MPs, which led to the arrest of six DEP MPs: Hatip Dicle,
Leyla Zana, Orhan Dogan, Sim Sakik, Ahmet Turk and Mahmut Alinak. Two
further MPs, Sedat Yurtdas. and Selim Sadak, were arrested under Article 125 on
1 July 1994, following the Constitutional Court's decision to dissolve the DEP on
16 June 1994, when it upheld the submissions made by Mr. Demiral. On 8 De-
cember 1994, five of the DEP MPs were found guilty under Article 168, para-
graph 2, of the penal code, for membership of the PKK, and each were sentenced
to fifteen years imprisonment.
Another MP, Sedat Yurtdas,, was found guilty under Article 169 for aiding
and abetting the PKK and given seven years and six months imprisonment.
Mahmut Alinak and Sim Sakik were found guilty under Article 8 of the Anti-
Terror Law and given three years and six months but released on bail pending
appeal. The Supreme Court has recently confirmed the fifteen-year sentences.
Unlike other cases before it, the prosecution and eventual conviction of the
DEP MPs was given widespread coverage in the international press. As a re-
sult, Western public opinion began to focus once more on Turkey's human rights
record. On 12 April 1994 the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly called
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for the immediate release of the DEP MPs, stating that, in its view, the MPs had
not gone beyond the rights of free expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the
European Convention. It went on to declare that the lifting of immunity and sub-
sequent prosecutions were "a possible threat to the very existence of parliamentary
democracy."
This view was subsequently adopted by the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly
in its Vienna Declaration of 8 July 1994 and confirmed by the findings of the
delegation of the Committee on the Human Rights of Parliamentarians of the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), which reported on its visit to Turkey on 3 April
1995. Concern over Turkey's human rights record also found expression in the
meetings of the EC-Turkey Association during December 1994 and March 1995,
when the president of the European Union "informed Turkey that its record
on democracy, human rights and the rule of law fell far short of the situation
in Member States, and that Turkey should respect international standards, par-
ticularly given its obligations as a member of the Council of Europe and the
OSCE."76 These findings echoed the earlier public statement issued by the Euro-
pean Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) on 15 December 1992, following its visits to
Turkey in September 1990, October 1991 and December 1992. The CPT went
public as a result of the "continuing failure of the Turkish authorities to improve
the situation in the light of its recommendations concerning [i] the strengthening
of legal safeguards against torture and other forms of ill-treatment in police es-
tablishments and [ii] the activities of the Anti-Terror Departments of the Ankara
and Diyarbakir Police."77 The conditions in Turkey were further confirmed by the
report of the United Nations Committee against Torture (CAT) on 9 November
1993, •when it concluded that there was systematic, habitual and widespread tor-
ture in Turkey.78
The increasing concern expressed by European institutions over Turkey's
human rights record was met with alarm by officials in Ankara, who were en-
deavoring to seek support for Turkey's entry into the European Customs Union
(ECU). As a result, the authorities' policy toward dissent shifted in focus once
more. Particular attention was now paid to the Turkish Human Rights Associa-
tion and associated lawyers who had been involved in the drafting of individual
petitions to the European Commission of Human Rights.
The Turkish Human Rights Association (IHD) was founded on 17 July
1986. Its headquarters are in Ankara and it has a total of fifty-four branches
spread over the width and breadth of Turkey. It has a membership of over fifteen
thousand members, who elect nine hundred delegates, who in turn elect members
of the head office. The IHD is a member of the International Human Rights
Federation, whose head office is in Paris. The aims of the IHD are laid down in
Article 2 of its constitution: "The single and clear aim of the Human Rights As-
sociation is to perform activities in the matter of Human Rights and Freedoms."
190 / THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
The scope of its activities are detailed in Article 3 and include research into
human rights practices, publication of its findings, advice on citizens rights, and
enforcement of such rights.
Throughout its existence, the IHD has been subjected to constant persecu-
tion by the Turkish authorities. Individual members and human rights activists
have been subjected to threats, arrests, detention and ill treatment.79 The 1990s
saw members of various management committees murdered, including Verdat
Aydin, chairman of the Diyarbakir IHD in 1991; SiddikTan, member of the Di-
yarbakir IHD Management Committee in 1992; Kemal Kihc, member of the
Urfa IHD Management Committee in 1993; and Mertin Can, chairman of the
Elazig IHD, also in February 1993.
As a result, most of the IHD branches in the Emergency Region have
closed down from such harassment. In Istanbul the authorities have sought to
close the IHD through legal measures for "separatist" offenses.80 Diyarbakir IHD
is now the only functioning branch operating in the southeast region and is the
only organization actively involved in the protection and advancement of civil and
political rights of ordinary citizens on a pro bono basis.
In doing so, the Diyarbakir IHD developed numerous contacts with Euro-
pean Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs),81 who sent missions and trial
observations to the region throughout 1991-95. As the intensification of the
Kurdish conflict continued into the 1990s, many Kurdish intellectuals found them-
selves exiled to Europe. Further contacts were established, which promoted a
greater level of understanding of the system of redress provided for by the Coun-
cil of Europe.
This led to the submission of over two hundred petitions to the European
Commission during the latter part of 1994 and 1995. Much of this work has been
undertaken by the Kurdistan Human Rights Project acting in tandem with the
Turkish Human Rights Association and other defense lawyers within Turkey. The
KHRP was founded in London in December 1992.82 It is an independent, non-
political charity committed to the protection of human rights of all persons within
Kurdistan, irrespective of race, religion, sex, political persuasion or other belief or
opinion.
To date over forty of its petitions have been declared admissible by the Eu-
ropean Commission. These petitions detailed all sorts of alleged human rights
abuses, including murder, extrajudicial killings, rape, torture, bombing, unlaw-
ful detention, and denial of the right to freedom of expression, association and
movement.83 They essentially corroborate the various findings of NGOs, such as
Amnesty International, over the last five years.84
The increasing use of the Convention mechanism by the IHD is a direct
result of the collapse of regular civil administration and the imposition of a state
of emergency. The militarization of political and judicial structures within the
region resulted in the loss of any practical redress for victims of human rights
abuses in the domestic courts. The failure of the Ciller administration to respond
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to the PKK cease-fire of 1993 and establish a dialogue with those elements within
the Kurdish intelligentsia still willing to promote a peace settlement through non-
violent means, helped accentuate this development.
The subsequent repression of the Kurdish lawyers and members of parlia-
ment in 1994 also reduced the scope of political compromise and had the effect of
moving the war of attrition into Europe. It was in response to these developments
that the authorities shifted their focus toward the activities of the IHD and its
filing of petitions. It is perhaps unsurprising then, that, in February 1995, seven
members of the IHD Management Committee in Diyarbakir found themselves
subject to prosecution.85
They were all charged with being members of an armed gang (PKK) and of
making separatist propaganda under Articles 168(2), 31, 33 and 40 of the Turkish
penal code and Articles 5, 8(1) and (2) of the Anti-Terror Law. The IHD Di-
yarbakir branch faces closure by virtue of Article 7(1) and 7(4) of the Anti-Terror
Law. The prosecution is seeking sentences of up to fifteen years imprisonment. All
seven lawyers face mandatory disbarment if they receive prison sentences of one
year or more.
The basis of the charge relates to the IHD publication of its 1992 report,
which the prosecution alleged was separatist in nature due to its documentation of
extrajudicial killings by contraguerrillas controlled by the security forces. It is al-
leged that the publication of this report was part of a wider strategy to mobilize
public opinion against the Turkish state and in favor of the PKK. On 13 Febru-
ary 1995, two of the three prosecution witnesses were called to give evidence about
the defendants' involvement in this alleged conspiracy. Both witnesses retracted
their statements, alleging that they had been obtained under torture. The case
continues.86
What is interesting about the case is that the authorities waited some three
years before launching this prosecution. The effect of this prosecution was to shut
down the IHD offices and interrupt the filing and updating of petitions. At the
same time as this prosecution, the authorities commenced proceedings against the
Peoples' Democracy Party (HADEP), Diyarbakir branch.&7 Eleven defendants
were arrested on 27 February 1995, including two lawyers, Firat Anli and Sinan
Tannkulu, who were are also members of the Diyarbakir IHD. They were taken
for interrogation to the Diyarbakir Gendarmerie HQ,. where they were held in-
communicado for ten days and allegedly tortured.88 They too were subsequently
charged under Article 168(2) of the Turkish Penal Code and article 5 of the Anti-
Terror Law.
One of the express particulars of the indictment includes the act of send-
ing unwarranted and unfounded applications to the European Commission on
Human Rights. This clearly represents a radical attack on the authority and opera-
tion of the Convention itself. It challenges the very jurisdiction and power of this
internationally binding agreement. Article 25 of the European Convention states
that "the Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary General of
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the Council of Europe from any person . . . claiming to be the victim of a violation
by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Conven-
tion, provided that the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has
been lodged has declared that it recognizes the competence of the Commission
to receive such petitions. Those of the High Contracting Parties who have made
such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this
right.
Although the above provision is not a substantive right under the Conven-
tion, the Commission has previously held it to be illegitimate to discipline de-
tainees who have entered into correspondence with either the Commission or the
Court in respect of a complaint of violation of the Convention.89
These prosecutions highlight just how far the Turkish authorities are pre-
pared to go to deny its Turkish-Kurdish citizens any effective representation in the
domestic or international courts. This aspect has not gone unnoticed. One im-
portant finding of the European Commission is that Turkey has not established,
as a matter of fact, that applicants have at their disposal adequate remedies under
the state of emergency to deal effectively with their complaints. In the case of
Hiiseyin Akduvar and others v. Turkey, Application No. 21893/93, Decision on Ad-
missibility, on 19 October 1994, which concerned the destruction of a villager's
home, the Commission ruled as follows:
It is a well-known fact that there has been significant destruction of villages
in South-East Turkey with many people displaced as a result. . . . The Gov-
ernment has outlined a general scheme of remedies that would normally be
available for complaints against the security forces. However, it is note-
worthy that, although the destruction of houses and property has been a
frequent occurrence in South-East Turkey, the numerous decisions by the
administrative courts referred to by the Government all concern compensa-
tion for damage in different circumstances. The Government has not pro-
vided a single example of compensation being awarded to villagers for
damage like that allegedly suffered by the present applicants.
Nor have significant examples been given of successful prosecutions
against members of the security forces for the destruction of villages and the
expulsion of villagers. In this connection it would seem unlikely that such
prosecutions could follow from acts committed pursuant to the orders of
Regional Governor under the state of emergency to effect the permanent or
temporary evacuation of villages, to impose residence prohibitions or to en-
force the transfer of people to other areas.
Thus, the Commission effectively rejected the submission that judicial review was
possible under Article 125 of the constitution or Article 1 of the Law on the State
of Emergency90 or that the Turkish penal code, which makes torture or ill treat-
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ment a criminal offence and lays down a procedure for the filing of complaints to
the Public Prosecutor that the police are duty bound to investigate, has provided
practical redress.91 For example, of 109 cases submitted by the KHRP, only 68 ap-
plicants sought a remedy. Of those, thirty-eight investigations were opened with
only ten concluded, with a decision not to prosecute in six cases. Five of those
cases involved deaths in police custody. In four other cases legal proceedings were
initiated but no convictions were reached.92
The cases before the European Commission are of immense significance, as
they provide victims with a measure of redress, document the systematic nature of
human rights abuses suffered over the last five years and call the Turkish govern-
ment to account for its actions. Taken together, the cases provide a graphic illus-
tration of the ways the Turkish government has consistently sought to silence all
domestic criticism concerning its handling of the Kurdish issue.
The cases also confirm how the battle over Kurdish representation has
moved from the press to the Parliament to the courts and now to Europe. A vir-
tual silencing of the free press in Turkey on the Kurdish issue occurred during
1993. A virtual elimination of Kurdish representation within Parliament and the
courts occurred in 1994. Now, 1995-96 is witnessing the destruction of the right
of individual petition to the European Commission of Human Rights for Turk-
ish Kurds.
T H E IMPLICATIONS OF THE POLICIES OF ETHNIC-NATIONALISM
FOR THE RULE OF LAW IN TURKEY
The effect of these policies on the rule of law within Turkey has been profound.
In order to pursue these policies of repression, Ankara has undermined the whole
republican basis of the constitution and the Turkish adherence to Western modes
of government and law. Individual rights concerning freedom of expression,
movement and association have been eroded by the introduction of a whole series
of security measures, including the infamous Anti-Terror provisions. Traditional
judicial structures have been undermined by the introduction of state security tri-
bunals, whose jurisdiction and procedures have fundamentally compromised basic
legal norms concerning fair trials. International obligations have been flagrantly
breached. The separation of powers between the executive, judiciary and military
has all but disintegrated, leading to the virtual destruction of civil society in the
southeast region of Turkey. It can only be a matter of time before the collapse of
law and order threatens the entire country, as the circle of violence and repression
engulfs the European centers in western Turkey.
Turkey today is plagued by a nationalist ideology that is no longer relevant
or capable of implementation. Its continued adherence to the Atatiirk creed has
stifled proper political debate and dialogue. For seventy years Turkish institutions
have been straight]acketed by the principles of nationalism espoused by Atatiirk.
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The present constitution ensures that no state institution or citizen can legiti-
mately question the nature or scope of these principles. They have become fixed
and immutable tablets of stone that cannot be examined or refined.
This situation has led to a static political culture. The inability to question
or refine Mustafa Kemal's political legacy has meant that no new thinking can be
applied to age-old problems. Thus, while Turkish society changes rapidly with the
onset of industrialization and urbanization, politics remain in a time warp. This
ideology is now at odds with the social transformation that has already occurred
in Turkey. It is increasingly unable to deal with the diverse and complex nature of
the society it purports to characterize. Its continued existence requires the sup-
pression of pluralism. It is a fight that it cannot hope to win.
The disenfranchisement of one-fourth of the population93 has created an
endemic source of instability within the political system, which leads to cultural
and ethnic polarization in which minority groups hold no stake in the system and
have every incentive to turn to less legitimate means of self-expression. Turkey
must either redefine its idea of citizenship to encompass all sections of society or
be prepared to eliminate those sections in the name of ideological clarity. It must
either decide to change its ideology or reality. If Turkish policy-makers were to
disconnect Atatiirk's ethnic notions of the citizenship from the republican nature
of the state, some real progress could be made. After all, what is wrong with a
multicultural Turkish state?
The historical reasons that gave rise to the policies of oppression no longer
exist. Turkey is an essential member of NATO and the Council of Europe. It
enjoys vast trading links with Europe. It is seen as a bulwark against Islamic fun-
damentalism in an otherwise violent and unstable Middle East. The West can and
will guarantee its territorial integrity.
The West should recognize that continued support for ethnic-nationalism
will bring neither stability nor prosperity to the region. The Kurdish conflict con-
tinues unabated with no military solution in sight. The secular and republican
nature of the state is on the brink of collapse. Islamic fundamentalism is on the
increase as the disenfranchised turn to more extreme alternatives. In the general
election held on 24 December 1995, the Islamic Refah Party recieved 21.6 percent
of the share of the vote and became the leading political party of Turkey. Surely
it is time for the West to recognize the link between stable government, social jus-
tice and strategic interests.
What is lacking, then, is the political will to confront and reform the out-
dated ideological basis of the state. Turkey's unconditional entry into the Customs
Union on 14 December 1995, will not, by itself, create this political will. If any-
thing, it will simple allay the fears of the political elite and allow them to delay
fundamental reform.
The European Union can help engender this political will. It should resist
simply calling for improvements in Turkey's human rights record. Instead, it
should reiterate its geopolitical commitment to Turkey while insisting upon noth-
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ing less than the adoption of the basic norms of liberal democracy and a return to
the rule of law. It should call for the slow dismantling of security provisions and
demilitarization of political and judicial institutions. These demands should be
coupled with a commitment to use its good offices to promote a just and peaceful
reconciliation between all of Turkey's constituent parts. This can only be achieved
if those that represent legitimate minority interests in the media, Parliament and
the courts are allowed to express themselves freely and enter into meaningful dia-
logue with the authorities concerning legal and political reform. Only then will a
measure of stability return to Turkey. In the words of Mustafa Kemal, "Changing
the rules of life in accordance with the times is an absolute necessity. . . . Nations
cannot maintain their existence by age-old mentalities.... Superstitions and non-
sense have to be thrown out of our heads."94
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